770.00/453
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)
The Rumanian Minister called to see me this morning after several months absence from his post and had many interesting observations to make regarding the present political situation in Europe.
[Page 369]Of particular interest was Mr. Davila’s reference to the discussions which took place at the last meeting of the Little Entente Council at Bratislava. It appears that a vigorous, but unsuccessful, effort was made at that time by the Czechoslovaks to convert the Little Entente into an alliance for mutual defense against attack from whatsoever quarters. The Little Entente was, as is well known, set up for the primary purpose of blocking the Hungarians in any attempt they might make to regain territories lost to their neighbors as a result of the World War and, secondarily, to nullify any attempt to restore the Hapsburg dynasty. The Czechs are of course at the present time greatly alarmed over developments in Germany and wish to obligate the Yugoslavs and the Rumanians to come to their assistance in case of a German attack. The Bratislava meeting of the Little Entente Council resulted in the complete failure of the Czechs to obtain their end. The Minister stated that the Rumanians are neither willing to undertake any commitments to fight against Germany in case of an attack on Czechoslovakia nor against Italy in case Yugoslavia is attacked.
The Bratislava meeting, furthermore, emphasized the difference of viewpoint between the Czechs on the one part and the Rumanians and Yugoslavs on the other part respecting a Hapsburg restoration. While the Czechs are for obvious reasons inalterably opposed to the Anschluss and would much prefer the Hapsburg restoration if no other alternative is afforded, both the Rumanians and the Yugoslavs have become reconciled to the idea of Anschluss but are still bitterly opposed to the idea of a Hapsburg restoration.
Further dissension arose among the Little Entente members during the Bratislava meeting with respect to their Russian policy. The Czechs, being now in alliance with Soviet Russia, were bent upon drawing the Yugoslavs and Rumanians into a similar relation. The Yugoslavs have from the beginning been inalterably opposed to any sort of understanding with Russia, and the Rumanians, since the fall of Titulescu, have practically dropped the idea of a Russian alliance along the lines of the Franco-Soviet and Czecho-Soviet alliances.
In this connection the Minister stated that the extreme Nationalist groups in his country appeared to be rapidly gaining the overhand and that any idea of an agreement with Soviet Russia entailing military cooperation was anathema to them. The Minister mentioned in passing a recent press report from Bucharest to the effect that these Rightist groups in Rumania had recently threatened the life of the King if he involved the country in any commitments to Soviet Russia. The Minister said he now felt certain the reports were true since all endeavors on his part to obtain a denial from his Government had been unsuccessful.
[Page 370]I asked the Minister at this point whether the Soviet-Rumanian understanding which Mr. Titulescu was sponsoring prior to his fall envisaged the passage of Soviet troops across Rumanian territory, and somewhat to my surprise he replied that such was of course the case. He added that he had remonstrated on this subject with Titulescu and had asked him how he would expect to get Russian troops out of Rumania in the eventuality that they were used in a successful war against Nazi Germany. Mr. Titulescu was somewhat vague in his ideas on this point, but persisted in his conviction that there was no other way out for Rumania.
Mr. Davila further revealed to me that if Titulescu’s plans for a Soviet-Rumanian alliance had gone through Rumania would have obtained in compensation an explicit recognition of her sovereignty over Bessarabia. He added, however, that Mr. Titulescu had been experiencing great difficulties in his negotiations with the Russians, who pointed out to him their misgivings over the Rumanian trend to extreme Nationalism and the likelihood that any Soviet-Rumanian understanding would be repudiated by the mass of the Rumanian people even if it could be successfully negotiated. The Minister observed somewhat ruefully that in view of recent developments the Russians at that time appeared to be better informed on conditions in Rumania than Mr. Titulescu himself.
With regard to Franco-Rumanian relations the Minister said he believed his Government should cling to the French as long as it was humanly possible in the hope that the French would eventually come to realize that they either had to meet the German menace with military force in case Germany attacks Czechoslovakia or else France herself would in the long run fall a victim to over-whelming German power. The Minister said he held this view despite the fact that one hears on all sides in France in speaking to the average Frenchman that they will be willing to go to war for one purpose and one purpose only, namely, to defend the actual frontiers of France.