Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, General, British Commonwealth, Volume I

762.65/258: Telegram

The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State

Berlin, November 14, 1936—noon.
[Received November 14—9:55 a.m.]

332. Despite the intense diplomatic activity through discussions among the several Chancelleries of Central Europe, Germany and Italy both in combination and individually it is difficult to know at this stage what if anything definite may ultimately result. Especially confusing is the Italo-German “axis” which while undoubtedly meaning close Italo-German cooperation in certain situations does not prevent a fundamental mutual distrust if not indeed an active rivalry in jockeying for position among the Danubian and Balkan states. For the time being these rivalries are cloaked by the present Italo-German rapprochement Indeed the necessities of the times may even result in a real cooperation of such delicate matters as Central European questions. But it is impossible to judge how far Italy’s conversations and negotiations with Austria and Hungary meet with actual German approval. They may be an effort rather on Italy’s part to create an obstacle to overweening German ambitions in the Danubian and Balkan areas. With all the magnetic attraction in Central Europe of such a powerful country as Germany and the pull of the complementary German trade opportunities and trade propaganda as regards the Danubian and Balkan states, there must always be coincidentally an apprehension in these countries of Germany’s gaining too great an ascendancy in that region for their eventual political safety. It would be only natural therefore if Italy were exploiting this to preserve her own position in Central Europe as regards Germany’s constantly increasing influence there.

In all these circumstances we believe it is coming to be considered rather generally here among well-informed observers both German and foreign that one result of this somewhat uneasy cooperation between Italy and Germany is the growing isolation of Czechoslovakia. This has become especially noticeable since Titulescu’s removal²¹ and the closer rapprochement between Italy and Germany of the last few months. It is not possible at this stage to analyze this clearly. It may be for the purpose of breaking up the Little Entente in general and so bringing pressure on Czechoslovakia to come to terms with Germany and the Danubian states (we were told that an offer was made to her by Germany some 6 months ago). It may be preliminary preparation for an eventual partition of Czechoslovakia in which Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Austria would participate directly and Yugoslavia and Rumania indirectly through a benefit to them of the abandonment of Hungarian revisionist claims regarding these countries in return for satisfaction from Czechoslovakian territory.

Then the Polish-German situation with regard to Danzig is puzzling. Once the Poles acquiesced in the defeat of the League of Nations’ supervision we felt the situation would rather rapidly deteriorate and that it was only a question of time when Danzig would be entirely under German control if not administration. There is undoubtedly a readjustment in the offing there but in what form and whether calculated to disturb German-Polish relations it is impossible to state at this time. It is difficult to believe that either Germany or Poland want to quarrel about Danzig now. The explanation of the present press embroglio may lie in the use of Danzig persons by Germany and Poland each for its own ends as part of a maneuver in other fields such as Central Europe or participation of Poland in a new Locarno or for Polish internal politics which seem somewhat unsettled.

Hitler is spending most of his time at Berchtesgaden. Frequently this is portentous in the case of this restless personality whose record has been pretty consistent in moving from one fait accompli to another of increasing magnitude and adventure. Public and even diplomatic opinion has usually been taken by surprise in these situations because they are viewing with a normal mind the probable policy of an eccentric and instinctively clever and audacious lawmaker. Nevertheless prophesy is unwise in view of the lack of information caused by the increasing secretiveness of the Foreign Office and other government organs and associates. We do feel however that some move of an important character again may be under consideration here. Czechoslovakia may be the object of this for the reasons mentioned above. Then this is one situation in Central Europe where Italy and Germany could happily combine in a positive policy. Furthermore Czechoslovakia bears an important relationship to the Franco-Soviet pact particularly since France has been blanketed by the military reoccupation of the Rhineland. And finally through Czechoslovakia Germany and Italy could score in a most practical fashion against Soviet Russia.

Schmidt, the Austrian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, is scheduled to come here November 18 presumably to inform the German authorities of the Vienna conversations.²² Possibly we may have more light on the situation after this visit.

Cipher text mailed to London, Paris, Rome, Moscow, Praha, Vienna.

Dodd

21. Nicholas Titulescu, former Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had been excluded from the Rumanian Cabinet formed on August 30, 1936.
22. On November 11–12, between the Austrian, Italian, and Hungarian Foreign Ministers; for text of communiqué issued November 12, see Documents on International Affairs, 1936, p. 309.