755.00/52
Report by the Naval Attaché in Belgium (Gade)20
At the meeting of the Belgian Cabinet, on October 14th, the King made a speech on national defence and foreign policy. At the close of the meeting the Prime Minister requested the unusual procedure of publishing it. (Mr. Van Zeeland felt this would greatly facilitate the passing in the Chamber of the Army bill in question, involving in particular, changes in the system of national defence and the extension of the period of military service). By approving the publication of the King’s speech, the Government adopted as its own, the policy advocated by the King. The portions of the King’s speech which deal with foreign affairs recommend an “exclusively and integrally Belgian policy” in order to keep Belgium out of its neighbors’ conflicts, and He further emphasized the great value Belgium had derived from her pre-war neutral status. This was in line with the Foreign Minister’s speech, of some three months ago, the Prime Minister’s speech of two months ago and the desire which has for some time been evident, namely for Belgium to limit her international obligations.
[Page 367]The King used as an introduction the statement that Belgium’s foreign policy necessarily determined Belgium’s military policy. He continued:
“The re-occupation of the Rhineland, in violating the Locarno agreements, both in the letter and in spirit, has almost placed us in the same international position as before the war.”
Possibly the most important point of the King’s speech followed shortly afterwards when He said:
“Our geographical situation compels us to maintain a military machine big enough to dissuade anyone of our neighbors from using our territory to attack another State. By fulfilling this mission Belgium contributes eminently to the peace of Europe, and creates for herself ipso facto, a right to the respect and, if need be, the assistance of all States which are interested in that peace.
On this basis I believe Belgian opinion is unanimous. But our commitments should not go further.”
The King went further and pointing out how valuable Belgium’s pre-war neutrality had been, stated:
“Our moral situation would have been incomparably weak abroad and the world would not have shown us the same sympathy, if the invader had been able to argue that there was an alliance on our side with one of the adversaries.”
The King’s procedure was very unusual. It is exceptional for Him to intervene in political affairs, and even more so for Him to address His ministers on so controversial a subject as military service is, between the different political parties. Equally out of the ordinary was the fact that the King went out of His way to advise His Ministers, on Foreign Affairs, when the whole question of international commitments and negotiating of new agreements to replace the Locarno pacts was in the balance.
The King’s speech undoubtedly marks a definite development in Belgian foreign policy and reflects the desire of a large section of public opinion for a policy of neutrality in fact, if not the guaranteed neutrality of the pre-war period, and for a Belgian foreign policy free from any sort of alliance or obligation extending beyond Belgium’s own frontiers.
The King was prompted to make His speech by the change which has slowly but inevitably taken place in the Western European situation. The occupation of the Rhineland and the importance of the Locarno signatories in the matter, France’s accord with Russia, the weakness of the League of Nations (as exhibited in the Abyssinian war) and the Russo-German tension have all greatly changed the situation. Belgium’s political evolution has had to follow pace. Belgium feels that by remaining immune, not neutral, and by having no [Page 368] alliances but becoming militarily strong, she can not only best safeguard her own inviolability but contribute to the greatest extent to the peace of Western Europe.
Despite all that was at first concluded by the French and English press the speech implied no repudiation whatsoever of any existing Belgian obligations as existing under the Covenant of the League, the Franco-Belgian Military Agreement and the London agreements of March in connection with the Locarno pacts, nor any attempt to abandon the principle of collective security, nor any scheme of pacts whereby peace could be secured. The speech is an important indication that Belgium does not wish to undertake as a guarantor any new international commitments, but wishes to follow an independent policy “a realistic policy of independence” (such as Holland) and if possible avoid becoming involved in the conflicts of her neighbors.
The speech was neither anti-French, nor anti-German, merely advocated an independent Belgian policy, one that becomes impossible unless Belgium has an adequate system of defence and a strong army so that her neighbors would not be tempted to use Belgium territory as a base of operation in their conflicts.
An independent policy is necessary if the support of the entire country is to be gained for the national defense policy. Belgium recognizes that its geographic situation is an extremely dangerous one and an alliance with any of its neighbors is a temptation and an excuse for the use of Belgian territory as a base of military operations, for any nation having a quarrel with Belgium’s ally would naturally use Belgian territory in the attack on the ally. She does not wish to be dragged into adventures in which she has no interest. As the League of Nations offers no real protection therefore Belgium must look to its own defence.
In conclusion, what Belgium wishes is complete independence and freedom of decision coupled with an armed force, sufficient to make anyone well consider the losses as well as the gains if entering Belgian territory in order to attack France or England or Germany. Belgium has no thought of shirking her international obligations.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- Copy transmitted to the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, November 24.↩