740.00/60
Memorandum by the Minister in Austria (Messersmith)97
Germany.
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As respects foreign policy, comparison between 1914 and today is difficult, for the territorial and other objectives of the present National Socialist Government know no bounds. If in 1914 and before, Germany nourished Pan-German objectives and envisaged economic and political domination of Southeastern Europe, her territorial aspirations were still small as compared with those of the leaders of National Socialism today. It is the aim of the National Socialist Government in Germany to make Germany the strongest country of Europe and the strongest country in the world. National Socialist foreign policy in its many ramifications grows out of this. Germany must be made as self-sustaining as is possible and made independent so far as possible of all overseas supplies. To [Page 343] this end the annexation of a good part of the present Russian Ukraine is a primary objective of policy. Danzig and Memel must be incorporated into the Reich, and the Corridor eliminated. The Silesian frontier with Poland must be corrected so as to bring back the territory there which Poland got under the treaty and the consequent plebiscite. Austria is to be incorporated as a whole into the Reich. The Czechoslovak state is considered as a hybrid and impossible product, and a partition of Czechoslovakia is a definite objective. German economic and political penetration and domination are to be pressed in all of the states of Southeastern Europe to the Dardanelles so that this vast hinterland which Germany considers as peculiarly and solely her own, shall be to all intents and purposes a part of the Reich, although the form of sovereignty of most of these states shall be permitted to remain. In the West the reconquest of Alsace and Lorraine is an objective which is to be attained as the program in the East has been carried through. Eupen and Malmedy are to be recovered from Belgium and a separatist movement in Belgium stimulated with the eventual intent of bringing the Flemish provinces with the port of Antwerp into the Reich. Denmark, because of its strategic nature, is to be absorbed into the Reich. The colonial desires of Germany are being rapidly brought to the fore and with growing military power and domination, the Party conviction is that Germany will rapidly have more than her proper share of colonies in Africa and elsewhere.
The Party program was well elaborated and carefully planned for both internal and external action. The internal measures were carried through during the first three years of the control of the Party and culminated in the military reoccupation of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. With that action Germany had thrown off all of the shackles of the Treaty of Versailles, and further action had to be taken beyond the frontiers. The program internally was carried through with a definiteness and with a thoroughness which must arouse certain admiration, but it gives a specious impression of the power of Germany both to the people within Germany and in Europe.
Since March 7, 1936, whatever steps Germany may take must be taken beyond her frontiers and the momentum of the German program has definitely slowed down since that date. When Greiser lost his temper at Geneva over Danzig98 he made a slowing up of the German program in Danzig necessary in order not to provoke England, France, and Poland. The difficult relations with Rome over Austria and the impossibility of Berlin to answer the British memorandum made the Austro-German accord of July 11, 1936, a necessity [Page 344] and committed Germany publicly to the recognition of Austrian sovereignty and non-immixtion in Austrian internal affairs. The plans for the setting up of an autonomous state in Czechoslovakia leading to the disintegration and partitioning of that state had to be given up for the time being for fear of provoking a conflict for which Germany realized she was not ready.
Although German economic expansion in Southeastern Europe is proceeding rapidly in most of the countries in that area, it has not been followed by the degree of political predominance which was anticipated. While Germany has been able to prevent the conclusion of a Danubian Pact, was able to sabotage partly the Austro-Czechoslovak trade treaty early this year, and has succeeded in preventing any measure of economic cooperation in Southeastern Europe from making headway, the Little Entente still remains and is somewhat stronger than it was a few months ago. The German program on the whole in Southeastern Europe has been disappointing to Berlin. In practically every direction therefore German policy since March 7, 1936, has had a setback and as was to be foreseen, the external program cannot make the progress which was made in the internal program as the problem is an entirely different one. Europe was content to permit Germany to take action within her frontiers which she is not yet prepared to permit her to take beyond her frontiers or at least Germany does not yet feel herself strong enough to take action beyond her frontiers which might provoke defensive or aggressive action when she feels that the balance of power would yet be too strongly against her.
As the very essence of National Socialism is such that it must maintain its position within the country by constant stimulation of the population, the Party cannot remain static.
Internally the Party program against the Churches had already raised considerable silent opposition to the Government and it was recognized that externally the treatment of the Churches and of the Jews and other social measures had made progress towards gaining sympathy in England for Germany difficult. As the Party had to undertake some action, and action on the external program was for the time bound to be difficult and slow, the decision was reached to intensify the so-called struggle against communism which would also serve the purpose of weakening Russia, and indirectly France and England. The attack on communism therefore was launched some weeks before the troubles in Spain started. The communist support in Spain of the Madrid Government and the atrocities committed against the Church and its priests and nuns were immediately utilized by the Party to intensify the anti-communist movement it had set [Page 345] in motion. Evidences now point to an agreement having been reached between the Vatican and Berlin on the basis of which the Vatican will support an anti-communist movement throughout the world and in return Germany will sign a new Concordat which the Church hopes will improve the position of the Catholics in Germany. Through the united action of Berlin and the Vatican this anti-communist movement is likely to assume wide proportions and may have far-reaching political consequences in a disturbed Europe as the movement is aimed in reality not so much against communism as having for its objective the isolation of Russia and the weakening of France and England.
German policy within the next months will be directed towards improving the atmosphere for German success in the approaching conversations which are to lead to a new agreement in Western Europe. Emphasis will be laid on the need for German markets if the rearmament program is to be modified in Germany, and while the European powers are prepared to recognize that such markets are necessary, they are not yet prepared to open their markets to Germany when the distinct danger remains that the only result would be the strengthening of the German position without any change in objectives. Germany needs time, markets, and credits and a generally more favorable attitude towards her in order to be able to carry through her external program, but there is no indication that there is any change in German objectives or that the National Socialist Party can change any major aspect of its policy or its objectives.
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