740.00/62
The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Wright) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 29.]
Sir:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Upon my return to this country, I find—as I have previously reported—government officials deeply concerned but not openly perturbed concerning the slow but steady accretion of Germany’s power. It will be observed that President Beneš in his incessant trips to the border districts is apparently making every effort to placate the Sudetendeutsch elements and districts, and it has been especially interesting for me to observe that the question of the administration by this government of such districts was referred to in several of his speeches very shortly after the conversation which I had with him upon that subject as reported in my despatch No. 511 of July 25, 1936.
A close friend of the President who, in fact, has for many years been one of his principal lawyers, observed to me only a few days ago that there was actually less and less enthusiasm in Czechoslovakia regarding the pact with the Soviets. Upon my pursuing this matter to a degree rendered possible by the friendship which I enjoy with him he finally said that, in the last analysis, he believed his government had been forced into this pact in the absence of anything better—for considerations of security transcended all others in his mind, and he is frankly fearful of Germany’s growing power.
I feel confident that, after having read this running comment upon opinions and tendencies in other countries, you will find not without interest the following remarks made to me today by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He has always been good enough to discuss matters with me with an almost complete absence of reserve.
Dr. Krofta said that one of the primary considerations was the necessity of a strong England—not that Great Britain would necessarily fight if Czechoslovakia were invaded but because of the great moral force which England always exerted in European affairs. He seemed to be under no illusion that Great Britain would resort to arms for the protection of this country, and it is fair to assume that Great Britain’s attitude with regard to any onslaught upon Austria and especially the lamentable “sanctions program” as regards Abyssinia, are the reasons underlying his opinion.
With regard to France, he immediately observed that the reason for any disturbances that might occur in that country and for the perturbed state of mind in France, of which everyone is aware, is the [Page 340] civil war and the almost inevitable defeat of the “popular front” in Spain, and the inescapable repercussions upon the “Front Populaire” in France. He added that there was no doubt but that France would resort to arms in the defense of Czechoslovakia, should necessity arise; in fact they were bound to do so. In this connection, opinion has not been lacking in other quarters that France might find it impossible or impolitic to do so but, as is natural, this government bases its entire policy upon the assured support of France.
As Mr. Benton94 has reported in my absence, Dr. Krofta considers that the recent agreement between Germany and Austria is at best superficial, and that it means that Austria is more than ever in the hands of Germany. The repeated references to the Germanic characteristics which they enjoy in common is, in his opinion, an indication to that end and, if the actual “Anschluss” should not take place, Austria will inevitably become a “colony” of Germany. He unreservedly expresses his concern as to the effect that this evolution will have upon this country, which is meanwhile perfecting its army and its defenses in every way possible—the army maneuvers which have just been concluded being a tangible example.
With regard to Hungary, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Gömbös95 is really an ill man. In reply to my inquiry as to whether Count Bethlen might reappear as Prime Minister, the Minister observed that such was quite probable and that Bethlen is “more dangerous” than Gömbös because he is more adroit and has had infinitely longer experience.
I inquired whether the non-inclusion of Mr. Titulescu in the new Rumanian Cabinet was of immediate import to Czechoslovakia. He replied that his elimination was of course unfortunate for this country because—as President Beneš has so often remarked to me—Titulescu has always been an ardent supporter of the Little Entente and has been one of its most valuable (and voluble) spokesmen at Geneva. The Minister added that his absence will in no way change Rumanian policy which remains faithful to the precepts of its adherence to the Little Entente and to France—adding that Titulescu was by no means politically dead.
Turning to Yugoslavia, he stated that the flirtation of that country with Germany was not to be taken too seriously—its main reason having been a demonstration against Italy. He has no fear of any weakening of the Little Entente as a result thereof.
The Minister said that it was indisputable that Italy is not as strong as she once was—as could be directly inferred from the fact that the [Page 341] Italian Minister in Prague had said to him that even if the actual “Anschluss” or control of Austria by Germany should eventuate, Italy could do nothing. “What a contrast,” observed the Minister, “to the mobilization of troops upon the Italo-Austrian frontier a short time ago!” Dr. Krofta added that everyone knew that Italy’s financial bill was enormous, that her inevitable expenses in Abyssinia were a constant drain upon her treasury, and that she had been bled nearly white already.
Reserving his comments concerning Germany until later, the Minister observed that there was no reason to dissemble the fact that Czechoslovakia frankly fears her and he is convinced that many stages of a well thought out game remain to be played by that country. By an interesting coincidence, the Rumanian Minister in Prague called Dr. Krofta by telephone at that moment and informed him that he had recent information from a most reliable source to the effect that Germany was about to offer Czechoslovakia a treaty of “non-aggression” or of “friendship.” Dr. Krofta, with a smile at me, remarked over the telephone that treaties of this nature are far from identical—adding that his Government had no knowledge of such a proposal and that the German Minister in Prague had only yesterday denied any knowledge thereof. The Rumanian Minister replied that he had great confidence in the source of his information, to which the Minister for Foreign Affairs responded that the matter would be dealt with when the offer was received. Dr. Krofta then said to me that if such an offer were made (and I deduced that he had in mind that the first mention thereof would be made at the “Parteitag” at Nurnberg which begins on the 9th instant), it would be accompanied by many conditions, some of which would be absolutely inacceptable to this country; i. e., that Czechoslovakia denounce its pact with the Soviet and also enter into discussion with Germany regarding the question of minorities. Dr. Krofta did not pursue further the subject of the Soviet pact, although I improved the opportunity afforded by this frank conversation to seek an expression of his opinion by telling him that everyone in other parts of Europe had the Soviet pacts with France and Czechoslovakia very much in mind and were far from enthusiastic about them. Dr. Krofta did say, however, that although a special Convention between Czechoslovakia and Poland permitted discussion of such a minority question as that of Teschen, for example, no such treaty existed between Czechoslovakia and Germany; therefore any discussion of the German minority in Czechoslovakia was absolutely not permissible. He repeated what he and Dr. Beneš have so often said to me before: Czechoslovakia has always sought and will continue to seek an agreement with Germany which, provided it be consistent [Page 342] with the independence and the dignity of this country, will afford her the protection which she desires and which is so essential to the peace of Europe.
I then referred to the position of Poland and her present policy. The Minister unhesitatingly expressed the opinion that the visit of Colonel Rydz-Smigly to Paris was of considerable significance—in view of the fact that one of the purposes of General Gamelin’s96 recent visit to Warsaw was to inquire whether Poland had any agreement with Germany concerning an attack on Czechoslovakia or any territorial exchange of certain districts should the “readjustment” of the Danzig situation become imperative (the old rumor regarding Germany’s assistance to Poland in obtaining Teschen). General Gamelin was assured that nothing of the sort existed and this assurance is to be put in writing by Poland—with the additional statement that Poland will not proceed against Czechoslovakia, even if Germany should for any reason attack this country.
I am not at present prepared to draw these conclusions to any one head, for the field covered by the despatch is too diffuse. I trust, however, that—read in conjunction with the reports on the various subjects that may have come from other Missions—you may find it not entirely devoid of interest.
Respectfully yours,