740.00/59
The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 12.]
Sir: I have had the honor previously to indicate our opinion of the principal reason for the uncertainty of European foreign policies. We have felt this to be due essentially to the fact that Germany has suddenly resumed, or is by way of resuming, her normal position of importance in Europe with the logical consequence that the artificial situation in Europe, created by the Treaty of Versailles, has collapsed, and all and sundry European states have been forced to reconsider their alliances, associations, and therewith their foreign policies. This same condition continues today. Consequently there is the same [Page 336] somewhat frenzied stress and strain, of weighing advantages and disadvantages, etc., among the various states looking eventually towards the establishment of definite divisions or groups in Europe. Parenthetically, it is to be regretted that the League of Nations, designed as much as anything else to prevent the formation of such divisions or groups, has really made the contrary inevitable, since under French leadership the League itself became partisan and only emphasized the duration of the dictated Peace of Versailles and divided Europe into opposed camps. Germany’s refusal in March 1935 longer to endure this situation shattered the delicately poised artificiality and thereby, as we have indicated above, all of Europe was thrown into a ferment and a scramble for adjustment.
This turmoil of foreign policies, coincident with and possibly dominated by the sociological aspects and influences of the present era, has as we have observed, created a confusion preventing any concrete estimate of present-day European foreign policies or of what may finally eventuate. Nevertheless, it is perhaps desirable occasionally to take stock of conditions in Europe with special reference to Germany, and analyze briefly, and as correctly as may be, the momentary outlook on the Continent.
Thinking back to last autumn when European and world idealism appeared possible of realization by British efforts to vitalize the League, we find that Germany has made enormous strides in power and position since the collapse of these efforts and the impotence of the League which followed. Germany’s rapid regaining of her position in Europe is perhaps as much a matter of feeling as of fact. But certain milestones can be noted. After the League’s collapse and more especially England’s suddenly weak position, Germany felt capable of throwing off the last of the Versailles military servitudes and marched into the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland. Both from the point of view of prestige and practically as an impediment if not a prevention of any attempt France might make in the future to bring military aid to her eastern allies, this step, materially unopposed by France, tremendously enhanced Germany’s position in Europe. Then the fracas in and over Danzig during the summer, while probably a mistake with regard to German-Polish relations, showed Europe again the powerlessness of the League and of France and England to curb Germany’s outbursts. The German-Austrian agreement coming shortly afterward was a further success for Hitler, if you take the view that, temporarily at least, this meant Italy’s renunciation of a rivalry with Germany for Danubian and Central European hegemony.
At the time of the German-Austrian agreement it was rather widely felt, and we believed correctly, that, while German-Italian “parallelism” or coincidental relations were strengthened, the old weak [Page 337] spots of mutual distrust still existed. Too much was not to be augured from this relationship, and therefore it was considered that the creation of a definite Central European block, consisting of Germany, Italy, Austria, Hungary, and possibly Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, was not immediately on the cards.
Heretofore the Bolshevik menace in Europe has been typified by the subterranean activities of the Third International rather than by Russian nationalistic militarism. Latterly, however, which may perhaps date from the recent increase in Soviet armed forces and the success of the Soviet hopes if not activities in Spain, there seems to have been a significant and aggressive change in Russian sponsorship of World Revolution. We incline to feel that this may have reached a point where the prospects for this revolution, as far as Europe is concerned, with France the next victim through Spain, simultaneously with the achievement of a certain accomplishment in the enormous armament in Russia, has persuaded Stalin and his advisers of the desirability of coming out into the open and aggressively combining Russian militant imperialism with Russian communism.
Through the Franco-Soviet alliance, through the apprehensions felt in many quarters in Europe over Germany’s renaissance, and through Russia’s adroit diplomatic maneuvers the Soviets have been able to pose as the saviour to those states in Europe most fearful of the rebirth of a powerful Germany. By cleverly proceeding with the activities of the Comintern, Soviet Russia has been able to carry forward simultaneously her dual design of communism and imperialism. She can face either way or advance on both fronts at the same time, dependent upon the particular country concerned or the particular circumstance involved. With her military power now realized to a high degree, with the terrible conditions in Spain and the promising field of France for civil disturbance, the Soviets seem now to be adopting a more decisive attitude and thereby becoming a further major disturbing factor in Europe.
Curiously enough, the German situation would seem strikingly similar. Apprehensive as they are of communist dangers, which we believe is the case with the leaders in Germany, there is no doubt that her imperial designs, to use that broad term for a multitude of aims and ambitions, have never been lost to view. Just as imperialism and communism have been combined in Russia, partly through accident and partly through design, so it seems that Germany is in a position to face two ways and to create the impression of being the defender of Europe against Bolshevism, which she may well become, while pursuing a path calculated to promote her imperialistic ideas.
This generalization brings us back to the question of German-Italian relations and the formation of a Central-European group. [Page 338] We said above that at the time of the German-Austrian agreement in July the prospects of the creation of such group in the immediate future seemed rather unlikely. Now, however, we have the feeling that the contrary is perhaps true. German suspicions of Italy, her fundamental distrust and her lack of respect continue. Italy’s apprehensions of Germany’s power and designs and a certain lack of sympathy have not changed. But since July the Bolshevik menace has brought these two countries closer together.
Both the Italian Embassy here and the German Foreign Office have indicated quite clearly to us that they can not contemplate the establishment of a communist Spain, i. e., a communist state in western Europe. For Italy this means the Mediterranean. As a result of the Dardanelles agreement,92 which incidentally Italy has not yet ratified, the eastern end of the Mediterranean is more open to the Russian fleet. With a communist Spain largely influenced by the Soviets, their power would also perhaps be a vital factor in the western Mediterranean. This jeopardizes Italy’s plans for a mare nostrum and her general Mediterranean development. For Germany a communist Spain would mean a tremendous influence inclining toward radical control in France which in turn must affect Belgium and even, to a certain extent, Switzerland. Communism established in western Europe is clearly something that Germany cannot safely tolerate, especially when the Russian-manned Czechoslovak flying fields and Poland’s everlasting uncertainty are considered. All these things must be having a definite effect on German-Italian relations and in turn on the question of the formation of a so-called anti-Soviet bloc in Central Europe. If it is true, as many believe, that Italy has definitely limited her imperial aspirations, for the time being at least, to the Mediterranean and is willing to see the other Fascist imperialism, Germany, control Central Europe, there would be no reason why these two Powers, under the pressure of the Soviet menace, now sociological as well as political, should not join to press for unity in Central and Southeastern Europe and the creation of a solid defensive position in the middle of the Continent.
Such a report as this must of necessity be indefinite in character. It is rather an effort to raise certain ideas and indicate certain lines of thought than to pursue them to their logical conclusion. The picture changes too rapidly in Europe, and the uncertainty of foreign policies, which we have commented upon at the beginning of this despatch, are unfortunately too great to handle questions of this nature otherwise.
Respectfully yours,
- The Montreux Convention, signed July 20, 1936; for correspondence, see vol. iii, pp. 503 ff.↩