852.00/3130: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

210. An American correspondent, who has succeeded in gaining to an extent the confidence of the Soviet Government, told me last night that Litvinov spent most of an hour and a half interview granted him for background purposes in denouncing Blum and the Blum Government. According to this correspondent, Litvinov told him the following:

1.
Blum has shown cowardice in facing the Spanish situation.99 If at the beginning of the uprising he had boldly treated the Spanish [Page 346] Government as a friendly Government entitled to receive assistance in the form of military equipment the rebellion would have been put down in a short time. When Italy gave 10 aeroplanes Blum should have countered by giving 30. Instead he had played into the hands of the Fascists by declaring an embargo upon the shipment of arms to Spain at a time when the Government was more sorely in need of equipment than the rebels and by maneuvering other governments sympathetic to the cause of Spanish Popular Front into such a position that they were practically compelled to do likewise. As a result the rebels are gaining an upper hand. The Fascistization of Spain would give an impetus and perhaps even an eventual victory to the Fascist movement in France.
2.
Blum has demagogically endeavored to make the French public believe that he is succeeding where his predecessors have failed in leading Poland back into the French orbit. In reality he has been making overtures and concessions to Poland despite the fact that the Polish position vis-à-vis Germany and Eastern Europe has undergone no change and will not change so long as Beck continues to be Minister for Foreign Affairs.
3.
Blum has shown too great a disposition to mollify Germany rather than to demonstrate to the German Government that he will firmly defend French interests. As a result the small countries of Central Europe, such as Czechoslovakia and Rumania, are beginning to fear that they cannot depend upon the firm backing of France in case a really critical situation should result from their continued resistance to German influence.
4.
Blum is also failing to support with sufficient firmness the Soviet endeavor to render the League of Nations a more effective instrument for collective security.
5.
Blum has shown himself to have not the fighting qualities of a Socialist but the compromising and defeatist character of a Menshevik. Even a Laval would be preferable to Blum as the head of the French Government at the present time.

A responsible Soviet official told me two days ago that Blum has lost the confidence of the French workers and that his Government was doomed.

The above lends support to the feeling prevalent among German observers in Moscow that the Kremlin is dissatisfied with its United Front experiment, at least in so far as France is concerned and that the Communist International section of Franco is under orders to seize the most favorable moment to assist in bringing about the downfall of the Blum Government. It is believed that the Kremlin is particularly anxious that a more strongly nationalistic French Government represent France at the next meeting of the Locarno powers. Soviet officials do not hesitate to say in private conversations that what France needs at the present time is a leader like Herriot.

Copies sent by mail to Paris and Berlin.

Henderson