Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1933, The Far East, Volume III

893.00/12623: Telegram

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

Peiping, January 5, 1934—1 p.m.
[Received January 6—6 p.m.²⁰]

11. The following supplements my estimate of the situation in China contained in the Legation’s telegram 137, [February 13,] 1933.

The outstanding events of the year in China were:

1. The capture of Shanhaikwan by the Japanese (January);

2. Hostilities between China and Japan which resulted in, (a) the loss to China of Jehol Province (March), (b) the departure from China of General Chang Hsueh-liang (April) and (c), the establishment of a demilitarized zone south of the Great Wall (May);

3. The return of Wang Ching-wei to the Presidency of the Executive Yuan (April);

4. The establishment of a $50,000,000 credit by Finance Minister Soong for the purchase of cotton and wheat in the United States (May);

5. Initiation of negotiations between Japanese military and Chinese officials at Peiping appointed by the Nanking Government with regard to Sino-Manchukuo problems;

6. Resignation of Finance Minister Soong (October);

7. Suspension of the above-mentioned negotiations (November) and;

8. Establishment of a rebel government in Fukien Province (November);

9. Departure from Europe for China of General Chang Hsueh-liang.

At no time in my experience have I felt the domestic political situation to be so discouraging. I cannot view this situation as other than one more phase of the revolt which began in 1911 and which is continuing and may be expected to continue for many years before political stability is attained.

I. The Government

(a) The Kuomintang.

The Kuomintang, which was at one time the most potent political force in China becomes increasingly impotent. Its leadership is divided and has deteriorated. … The dissension among its leaders in the presence of danger from abroad has caused the Kuomintang to lose what little prestige it still had outside of Canton. The party remains for many merely a rice bowl that is badly cracked because of diminishing support from overseas Chinese due to business depression, fall in exchange value of foreign currency, and dwindling confidence in the party leaders.

(b) General Chiang Kai-shek.

The declining power of the Central Government has been transferred to General Chiang Kai-shek. … However, he actually controls only the Yangtze Provinces and his authority is threatened by problems of varying importance, namely, (1) the communist forces south of the Yangtze which apparently cannot be defeated decisively; (2) the Fukien rebels who have made common cause with the Communists; (3) the doubtful attitude of the Southern Provinces and of the Northeastern troops in North China; (4) the danger of further separation of Chinese territory by Japanese action; and (5) increasing financial difficulties. There seems to be little if any hope that Chiang can unify China.

(c) The Provinces.

Except in the Yangtze Provinces military leaders have bitter animosity toward Chiang’s [Chiang, and?] eleven provinces of the South, West and Northwest are practically independent of Nanking. The situation in the five provinces of North China is similar although at present there is nominal supervision by appointees of Chiang at Peiping. Between Nanking and the South large areas are occupied by Reds. Outer Mongolia is completely severed from China; Tibet is practically so; and Nanking’s hold over the Mongols of Inner Mongolia is doubtful.

Most of these provinces are controlled by militarists who give nominal allegiance to the Central Government but who treat it with the utmost cynicism. They regard their troops as their own concern and contribute little if any revenue to the National treasury. (Their troops which must be diminished if China is to attain stability have not decreased during the year.)

(d) The People.

The great mass of the people are not interested in the matter of government. The revolution which began 22 years ago has scarcely touched them except where communism (so-called) has undertaken settlement of tenant and farmer difficulties. Those who may have had interest have suffered disillusionment, and hope for no real good from present leaders.

(e) Hopeful Developments.

Only a few recent developments might be regarded as hopeful: (1st) the Central Government appears now to realize the importance of economic and agrarian developments for political stability but has done nothing significant; (2d) I was impressed in my recent trip through China by the amazing construction work in port cities but until these cities feel a mutual need for unity the political situation will remain unaltered; (3d) there has occurred most substantial progress in such phases of social welfare as education, local sanitation, and public health; (4th) there is a wider realization among the people of need of reform but it is defeated by disillusionment; (5th) during December delegates from Nanking visited the South but there is small hope that something approximating an understanding can be achieved.

II. Foreign Relations

(a) Japan

The hope that Japanese aggression in the Northeast would create in China a national feeling is unrealized and China today is less capable of resisting further spoliation by Japan (the danger of which is still acute) than it was 2 years ago. During recent months in North China officials have become surprisingly friendly toward the Japanese; the people appear to regard further Japanese encroachment with at least apathy and the boycott of Japanese goods is practically nonexistent. Leaders in favor of conciliating Japanese however hesitate to resume negotiations, partly from fear of popular feeling and partly because the Chinese are convinced that war between Japan and Russia this spring is inevitable. Chinese leadership is procrastinating while preoccupied with speculations as to the winner in a war where China is bound to lose. These speculations have been given direction by America’s recognition of Russia, most Chinese being convinced it was essentially an initial move to stop Japan.

(b) Western Nations.

Effective Chinese cooperation with the League of Nations and the United States for the economic restoration of China can scarcely be anticipated because of (1) danger of Japanese action to render such cooperation ineffective, (2) the weakened position of those Chinese favoring cooperation as a result of Soong’s resignation and (3) the doubtful benefits to China of the $50,000,000 American credit, the possible advantages of which have already been in part frustrated by Japan.

There are indications that the pendulum in China is again swinging toward anti-Westernism: (1) hatred of Japan is being dissipated, the Chinese memory of wrongs suffered being proverbially short; (2) the Chinese have been disappointed by the failure of Western nations to assist them against Japanese aggression; (3) with continuing disintegration of China factions may be expected to adopt an antiforeign policy in order to gain popular support of which there are indications already in the Fukien revolt.

Johnson

20. Telegram in two sections.