793.94/6550
The Counselor of Legation in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 29, 1934.]
Sir: Whether Japan’s attitude and policies toward China are determined by any one authority in that country or whether, on the other hand, they are the expression of factional views, it is probably impossible for a foreigner to determine. Nevertheless, the impression I have gained from numerous conversations with Chinese official and private persons in Nanking during the last two or three years is that Chinese are unanimous in believing that Japan’s policy in China is one of aggression and that Japan consistently endeavors to retard the political stabilization of China.
As an example in point, I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of remarks18 made by Dr. H. H. Kung, Minister of Finance, during a conversation with me on December 27. The idea underlying Dr. Kung’s observations was that the Japanese military authorities were originally alarmed by the professed anti-Japanese policies of the rebel movement in Fukien Province, but having received from the leaders in that movement assurances that these announced policies were designed merely to enlist popular support in China and that the real attitude of the rebel faction is one of willingness to cooperate with Japan, the Japanese military authorities are now friendly disposed to the said rebel faction.
During the same conversation Dr. Kung informed me that the Japanese Government had forbidden the Japanese cotton mills in China to purchase from the Chinese Government any cotton bought in the United States under the credit granted to the Chinese Government by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the reason for this action being the unwillingness of the Japanese Government that [Page 489] the Chinese Government should realize any profit from this transaction.
Even those Chinese who advocate nonresistance to Japan do not, in my experience, differ from the general belief that Japan is continuously and actively seeking to weaken China, with a view to the strengthening of Japan’s power in this country, but defend non-resistance on the ground that China cannot grow in internal strength if it is engaged in constant struggles with Japan, and must postpone resistance to Japan until there is likelihood of success.
On the morning of December 28 I had a conversation with Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister of Justice and until August, last, concurrently Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Dr. Lo gave a clear exposition of the reasons for believing that Japan has for some years consistently endeavored to keep alive factional dissensions in China.
Dr. Lo recalled the “Tsinan Incident” in the spring and summer of 1928,19 at which time he was Minister for Foreign Affairs in Peking, during the last days of the leadership in the North of Marshal Chang Tso-lin. The situation then was that a strong Japanese garrison was astride the Tientsin-Pukow Railway at Tsinan, the capital of Shantung. The Nationalist troops were advancing from the South and Chang Tso-lin, with his formidable army, was prepared to resist their advance. The Japanese Government had issued a general warning that no military activities on the part of either the Nationalist forces or the Northern forces would be permitted at Tsinan and this served as an effective blocking of the northern advance of the Nationalist troops along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway.
Chang Tso-lin was inclined to regard the presence of the Japanese force at Tsinan as being greatly in his favor, since it constituted an additional obstruction to his enemies, the Nationalist forces. In this situation he called Dr. Lo Wen-kan in for consultation.
Dr. Lo said that he told Chang Tso-lin that he must not confuse a foreign problem with a problem which was essentially a domestic one. He pointed out that if the Japanese were opposing the northward advance of the Nationalist army it was not because they wished Chang Tso-lin’s faction to acquire supremacy and the Nationalists to be eliminated, but merely because they wished to keep both factions alive, with a view to perpetuating civil warfare. He also pointed out that the only way in which China could become strong enough to bring about the withdrawal of the Japanese force from Tsinan was for both Chinese factions to unite, and he advised Chang Tso-lin to inform the Nationalist forces that no further resistance would be offered to them.
Dr. Lo recalled that his advice to Marshal Chang was followed. [Page 490] Fighting ceased and, very shortly, Chang Tso-lin announced that he and his forces were returning to Manchuria. The refusal of Chang Tso-lin to continue the internecine fight angered the Japanese, and Marshal Chang Tso-lin was murdered by them before he actually reached his capital in Manchuria.
Dr. Lo commented in sardonic vein on the fatuousness of his fellow nationals which blinds them to the necessity of sinking their internal differences in order to unite against Japanese encroachments. At the same time he admitted that the predicament of these factions, and of the National Government itself, is now a difficult one.
Dr. Lo insisted that the situation in Fukien has all the elements to create a second “Tsinan Incident”. If the 19th Route Army, which is promoting the insurrectionary movement in Fukien, fails to curry favor with the Japanese military authorities in Formosa and to assure them that the 19th Route Army is actually prepared to cooperate with Japan, the rebel faction will not only find itself constantly hampered and harassed by its powerful neighbor, separated from Fukien by only a narrow strait, but may even see Japanese troops landed in Fukien on some pretext or other, it being commonly believed that Japanese military leaders are impatiently waiting for some excuse to dominate China’s coast in that vicinity.
Dr. Lo pointed out that Japan, faced with the imminent danger of a conflict with the Soviet Union, has additional reason at this time to fear growing strength and unity in China. On this account, Japan is constantly and successfully seeking to neutralize this danger by instigating internal dissensions, a feat which Japan easily accomplishes by its skillful combination of inducements and threats applied to this or that faction.
In view of the general conviction that Japan is constantly intriguing in China, it is not surprising that Chinese in general attach significance to the removal of Mr. Hidaka, the present Japanese Secretary of Legation and Consul General in Nanking, and to his replacement by Mr. Suma, now Secretary of Legation residing in Shanghai, who is commonly considered the arch schemer and manipulator among Japanese diplomats. The impression among Chinese seems to be that the Japanese Government regards Mr. Hidaka as too much of a conventional diplomat and too considerate of Chinese susceptibilities to make full use of his strategic post in the national capital. It is undeniable that Mr. Hidaka has a most attractive personality and is universally liked, even by Chinese. He came to Nanking from a service of several years in the Paris Embassy.
Very respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. ii, pp. 137–178, passim.↩