761.94/485
The Ambassador in Japan (Forbes) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 26.]
Sir: I have the honor to submit a few comments supplementing my despatch on the subject of Soviet-Japanese relations as affected by the disturbances in Manchuria (Despatch No. 410 of December 5, 193183). The tension which I remarked in that despatch is still apparent, although the situation which causes it has changed to some extent. I may say in beginning that definite information on this subject is difficult to obtain, and because of the constant rumors and stories, an accurate picture of the situation is hard to draw.
As I reported in my previous despatch, there has been considerable uneasiness among Soviet leaders on account of Japanese military activities in Manchuria near the Soviet border. Added to this is a feeling of apprehension caused by Japanese assistance in the formation of the new Manchurian state with the consequent extension of “imperialistic” influence presumably antipathetic to the Soviets. Some tension might be expected in any nation at the near borders of which military activities were being carried out. In the present case there are further causes: Japanese troops have occupied Chinese territory within a few hours by rail from Vladivostok in a region that has long been considered [Page 555] a Soviet “sphere of influence”; Japan has demanded and used the Chinese Eastern Railway for transportation of troops despite treaty provisions which would seem to prevent; Japanese have been suspected of supporting White intrigues against Soviet Russia; Japanese troops have been reported as massing on the Korean-Soviet border contrary to the provisions of Article II of the Portsmouth Treaty (I shall discuss these points later). Moreover, the Japanese plan of extension of the Changchun-Kirin railway to the Korean coast constitutes a direct threat to the commerce of the port of Vladivostok, and promises competition to the Chinese Eastern Railway.
There is plenty of evidence of this apprehension on the part of the Soviets. Reports of utterances of Soviet leaders in Russia, which I shall touch on below, indicate the state of mind in that country. On the other hand, there has been in Japan very little comment, official or otherwise, on the relations between the two countries. There have been, it is true, newspaper reports of massing of Soviet troops in the Maritime Provinces and near Manchuli, but comparatively little notice seems to be paid to these reports. The Japanese Army has long considered Soviet Russia as a potential enemy and apparently regards that country with a mixture of apprehension and disdain. The reported strength of the Soviet Army has long been held up before the Japanese public by the Army to justify its own expenditures. Japan has never forgotten, as I am often reminded by Japanese friends, the action of Russia in 1898 in seizing Kwantung Peninsula after Japan had been forced to relinquish her war-won claims there in 1896 [1895].
With the attitude of the two countries in mind, I shall endeavor to comment on recent happenings. The chief fear on the part of Soviet Russia seems to be that the Eastern provinces will be wrested from the Union. More concretely, the fear seems to be that White Russians, supported by Japan, will attempt to duplicate in the Eastern Provinces of the Union what has recently been done in Manchuria.
On January 30, Mr. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, is reported to have stated in an address: “The Russian White guards in Manchuria …84 are openly building plans to break the Far East away from the U. S. S. R. and create with foreign aid a buffer state …84 We are completely occupied in peaceful construction and are doing everything possible to prevent new imperialistic attacks on the Socialistic Republic”. Mr. Litvinov at Geneva is quoted as stating in a speech on February 11: “Present events in the Far East which have evoked universal alarm, cannot but cause special anxiety to the Soviet Union, owing to its geographical nearness to the theatre of these events, where huge armies are operating and where anti-Soviet [Page 556] Russian émigrés are mobilizing their forces”. A manifesto signed by Defence Commissar Voroshilov and issued on the 14th anniversary of the organization of the Red Army, stated: “In the East and West they are laying plans for intervention, preparing public opinion and organizing bands of Russian White guardists for an attack against the Soviet. The White guards, with the support of certain groups of Imperialists, are openly planning to seize the territory of the U.S.S.R. in the Far East”. A United Press despatch from Moscow, dated February 25, states: “The official Tass agency is understood to profess complete confidence in the accuracy of the report (of the formation of a White Russian army in Mukden province under Japanese direction for the purpose of attacking the Maritime Provinces of the Soviet Union) …85 Both Soviet and Japanese representatives here (Moscow) have recently indicated to the United Press representative that the Russian émigrés constitute the chief menace of war in Manchuria between the Soviet Union and Japan”. The same news agency reports (March 4) a leading article in Izvestia which quotes from documents supposed to have been written by Japanese of authority urging an early attack upon Soviet Russia. The article declares that the Soviet Government regards the danger as serious, and cites other developments to justify military vigilance, especially the “symptomatic significance of the fact that Japan two months ago did not consider it necessary to reply to a proposal for a pact of non-aggression with the Soviets”. Also mentioned are the intrigues of the White Russian émigrés in Manchuria which are stated to be on the increase since Japanese occupation has extended.
These quotations are sufficient to indicate the Soviet feeling toward Japan at present. How much this attitude is justifiable by fact is extremely difficult to ascertain. Soviet leaders seem frequently to be conjuring up bogies of imperialistic intrigues and intervention, and it would probably be a mistake to take their utterances too seriously. There seems, however, to be some evidence that the Japanese military have taken steps to organize White Russian troops, for use either by the new Manchurian government, or in guarding railway lines, but in the absence of definite information I hesitate to do more than make mention of this report. If the Japanese military had any intention of making an attack on the Soviet Far East, they would undoubtedly find useful a nucleus of organized White troops around which the many Russians of white sympathy could rally.
In connection with this report, Mr. Karakhan, on February 24, demanded of the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow an explanation of certain developments in Manchuria, according to the United Press. [Page 557] One question, of four proposed, was in regard to the increased activities of émigré Russians in Manchuria against the Soviets, “under the protection and direct support of the Japanese”. The reply of the Foreign Office, transmitted through Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Ambassador, a few days later, stated that there was no truth in the report of assistance by the Japanese Army to the White Russians, and that the Japanese Army was doing all it could to curtail their activities and was ready to suppress any political steps they might take. (I shall refer later to the remaining three questions proposed by Mr. Karakhan).
A second source of anxiety to Soviet leaders is the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops and the significance of the organization of the new Manchurian state. The formation of the new state in Manchuria has an element of threat to the Soviets. In case the White Russians in Manchuria participate in the formation of the new government and form a part of it, the new state may be expected to have an anti-Soviet bias.
In Mr. Karakhan’s questioning, above referred to, a demand was made for “information about the newly established government in Manchuria and its nature”. The reply of the Japanese Government, made a few days later, is highly diverting. It was stated that “the Japanese Government has no connection with it (the Manchurian state) and knows little about it. However, when full details of the new constitution and the organization of the government are learned they will be transmitted”. This bit of apparently diplomatic casuistry has not called forth any further requests for information from the Soviets.
As I reported in my previous despatch, above referred to, the Soviet government has been forebearing—remarkably so—in regard to Japanese military activities in regions of great strategic interest to Russia. Japanese troops have penetrated as far north as Tsitsihar, Harbin and Imienpo, with scarcely more reaction from the Soviets than the issuing of a warning to abstain from injuring Soviet interests and property. More recently the Soviet government granted permission for the transportation of Japanese troops from Changchun to Harbin, and from Harbin to Imienpo over the Chinese Eastern Railway, although technically a refusal might have been made under provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty. On the 14th anniversary of the Red Army the Pravda stated, according to the United Press: [“]The actual war between China and Japan and Japanese capture of the chief centers in Manchuria, would have been quite a sufficient ground for Tzarist Russia to interfere in the war. The Soviet government, on the contrary, proposed to Japan to conclude a pact of non-aggression. No provocation will divert Soviet Russia from her firm and invariable policy of [Page 558] peace”. I believe, as I pointed out in my previous despatch, that the Japanese Government has been pleasurably surprised by this absence of opposition on the part of Russia to Japanese activities. Such opposition would certainly have rendered the problem of the subjugation of northern Manchuria infinitely more complicated.
Nevertheless, the Soviets have not viewed with favor the Japanese conquest. In the first place they foresee the loss of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In an interview with a United Press correspondent at Harbin, Mr. Rudy, Soviet General Manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, stated that Japan’s domination of Manchuria suggests that in coming years the Japanese will tolerate no strong foreign economic influence there, such as that which the Chinese Eastern Railway affords the Soviets. Moreover, in his opinion the competition of the Kirin-Seishin Railway, certain to be accomplished shortly under Japanese rule, will deprive the port of Vladivostok of much trade and is destined to make the Chinese Eastern Railway an unprofitable enterprise. He stated that although the Japanese military had been careful to avoid damaging Chinese Eastern Railway property, leading some observers to believe that Japan intends to let Soviet railway interests alone, he understood from certain sources that the Japanese would soon attempt to install in the Chinese Eastern Railway board of directors a group of Chinese officials who are subservient to Japan’s wishes. If this is true, he stated, it would mean the extension of Japanese influence to the single remaining railway in Manchuria over which they have now no control.
I may at this point mention the remaining two questions raised by Mr. Karakhan, both of which affect the Chinese Eastern Railway. On or about February 24, the Japanese Military, acting apparently without instruction from Tokyo, requested permission of the Soviet director of the Chinese Eastern Railway to transport Japanese troops over the eastern line to points where Japanese interests were reported threatened by Chinese soldiers. At the same time the Army seems to have asked for reduced fares on the railway for Japanese soldiers. Permission to transport troops from Changchun to Harbin had previously, in January, been granted. As the later request for permission involved sending troops as far as Pogranichnaya, near the Soviet border, it seemed to raise a problem beyond the competence of the Soviet officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the matter was referred to Moscow. Mr. Karakhan then called upon the Japanese Ambassador for an explanation for these requests, pointing out that under Article VII of the Portsmouth Treaty “Japan and Russia engaged to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively [Page 559] for commercial and industrial purposes and in no wise for strategic purposes”.
In his reply, the Japanese Ambassador disclaimed intention of sending troops further than Imienpo, or possibly Hailin, and stated that no question of the use of the Chinese Eastern Railway for strategic purposes would arise as the Japanese action was purely for “self defence”. Furthermore, he disclaimed any knowledge of the request of the military authorities for reduced fares for Japanese troops. This statement seems to have satisfied Mr. Karakhan, for on February 28 the permission was granted.
On this occasion Mr. Karakhan took the opportunity to call attention to the reported concentration of Japanese troops on the Korean side of the Soviet border, which would be in violation of Article II of the Portsmouth Treaty. This charge was refuted, according to the press on March 9, by the Japanese Ambassador who stated that no additional Japanese troops were being massed on the border. Incidentally, he is reported to have remarked that the Japanese had no intention of engaging the Russian forces, to which Mr. Karakhan replied that Japan’s intentions were subject to various interpretations. Apparently diplomatic conversations at Moscow are carried on with a minimum of finesse.
The local press reports that on March 3rd, the Foreign Office stated that it knew nothing about the alleged troop concentration on the Korean border. Lacking any reliable source of information I have been unable to learn whether there is any truth in the Soviet allegation. The Japanese are said to be building extensive port improvements at Seishin and are very likely adding to the fortifications of the town. Possibly engineering contingents have been despatched recently to that region in connection with the plan for the extension of the railway to Kirin, but this is purely conjectural.
I have, thus far, dealt largely with the Soviet viewpoint in Russo-Japanese relations. There remains to be mentioned Japanese apprehensions of Soviet activities, which have been aroused recently by reports of warlike activities in Soviet territory. The press reported on March 1st that the Foreign Office had received a report from the Japanese Consul General in Vladivostok that he had been reliably informed that 100,000 troops had been concentrated in the Maritime Provinces. The report stated that Vladivostok was being heavily fortified and that munitions and supplies were being collected. One member of my staff who inquired at the Foreign Office was informed that new troops had undoubtedly been moved into the Maritime Provinces, but that the number was not excessive and that the Foreign Office attached no particular significance to the movement. The official [Page 560] of the Foreign Office stated that the total number of Soviet troops east of Lake Baikal last autumn was estimated to be 60,000, but had now been increased to approximately 70,000. Another member of my staff was informed at the War Ministry that at least 100,000 troops had been concentrated in the Maritime Provinces alone. This figure contrasts with the 30,000 troops Japan now maintains in Manchuria.
I do not think that the Japanese are very much perturbed by these rumors of warlike preparations. They have seen demonstrated unmistakably the conciliatory attitude of the Soviets and are not inclined to consider as a threat what seems to be a mere strengthening of the Soviet frontier garrisons to provide against a possible emergency.
I am at a loss to explain the absence of editorial comment on Soviet-Japanese relations in recent weeks, in view of the usual readiness of the Japanese press to play up any alleged threat from the north. Perhaps, as I suggested in my previous despatch on this subject, the Japanese Government has impressed on the local newspapers the importance of avoiding antagonizing the Soviets during the present crisis in China.
In any event the relations between the two countries at present are somewhat tense but not actively unfriendly. This tenseness is not particularly notable, because it is somewhat chronic. I may repeat my conclusion made in my last despatch: “I have reason to believe that both sides are sincere in wishing to avoid complications, and will not willingly be led into an embroilment which would prejudice the success of their own undertakings and interests”. The Japanese would have much to lose by picking a quarrel with Russia at the present juncture when their resources and energies are being expended in the embroglio in China. On the other hand, the Soviets have taken every precaution against being involved in the conflict among their neighbors, have avoided taking steps to oppose or check Japan’s military actions in North Manchuria, and have maintained, in the face of some provocation, a strictly neutral attitude.
In concluding, I should mention that so far as I am aware no further action has been taken by the Japanese Government in regard to the non-aggression pact proposed by the Soviet Government. The Soviet Ambassador has called at the Foreign Office several times recently in this connection, but I learn that he has been informed that the matter is still receiving the “careful consideration of the Japanese Government”. I do not believe that the Japanese Government has any immediate intention of concluding such a treaty. The Japanese seem to feel that they would not be justified in entering into any new commitments until conditions in the Far East are on a more settled basis.
Respectfully yours,