740.0011 Pacific War/502
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
As a result of the delay which is at present being encountered in the delivery of telegrams, the Department’s no. 428, July 25, 9 p.m.,72 was received only on the morning of July 27. As it would appear that the element of time is of first importance and the Foreign Minister was received by the Emperor last evening, it would have been of great advantage to me to have had the account of the President’s proposal to Admiral Nomura prior to my interview with the [Page 535] Foreign Minister yesterday. Nevertheless, with a view to neglecting nothing which might bring about an acceptance of the President’s proposal, I at once requested an appointment with the Foreign Minister and called on him at 11.30 this morning.
I told Admiral Toyoda that I was not calling on him under instructions from my Government but to have a private “off-the-record” conversation on my own initiative in connection with a subject of such prime importance that I felt that the circumstances warranted my requesting an immediate appointment. I then conveyed orally to Admiral Toyoda the gist of the President’s proposal to the Japanese Ambassador as outlined in the Department’s telegram so that there could be no possibility of any misunderstanding of the President’s remarks due to faulty or inadequate reporting by the Japanese Ambassador to his Government. I left no written statement with the Minister.
Admiral Toyoda to my amazement told me that he had received no report from the Japanese Ambassador concerning the President’s suggestion and having left the room for the obvious purpose of verifying this statement with the Foreign Office he returned to confirm that no report on this subject had been received from the Japanese Embassy at Washington. As I read to him in paraphrase the various points of the President’s proposal, the Minister examined them with close attention. He then stated that he was afraid that the President’s suggestion had come too late and that in any event, until Japanese public opinion which had been greatly exercised against the United States as a result of the action of the United States Government in freezing Japanese assets had had an opportunity to cool, nothing could be accomplished along the lines of the President’s proposal. He, however, agreed that before an answer could be given to the President’s proposal it would have to be carefully examined and discussed with other high officials of the Japanese Government.
I was careful to point out to the Minister that I myself did not expect an answer and that the reply of the Japanese Government would of course be conveyed through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington following the receipt of the latter’s report of his conversation with the President. I took occasion at this point in the conversation to make it abundantly clear to the Minister that the purpose of my call on him was not to communicate to him the proposal of the President, which I assumed he had already received, nor to request an answer but merely to urge upon him, on my personal initiative, certain considerations in regard to this proposal which appeared to me to be of the greatest importance. I pointed out to the Minister that this proposal clearly and directly met the [Page 536] Japanese contention that the occupation of bases in Indo-China was caused by the necessity of protecting and of forestalling an alleged encirclement of Indo-China by third countries and that, therefore, if the President’s proposal could be accepted and put into effect it would adequately solve the problem from the point of view of Japan. The Minister gave careful study to the President’s reference to full and free access to food supplies and raw materials and inquired whether this reference was also applicable to the Dutch East Indies, to which I replied that for the moment the question at issue was exclusively that of Indo-China but that as the Minister was fully aware the conversations recently held in Washington had dealt with the question of equal opportunity and free movement of trade throughout the entire area of the Pacific. I then told the Minister that although I had no authority whatsoever to touch on this question and was therefore merely voicing certain personal observations, the acceptance of the President’s proposal in regard to Indo-China might conceivably lead to the establishment of a new basis for the continuance and successful conclusion of these conversations.
At this point the Minister again reverted to the resentment which was felt in Japan at the freezing of Japanese assets. I told him that I had little knowledge of the intention of my Government in regard to the administration of the Executive Order freezing Japanese assets but that I believed, again speaking unofficially and personally, that there might be considerable flexibility in the administration of the Order. I reminded the Minister in this connection of the very liberal treatment which had been granted to Japanese interests after the expiration of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and told him that I personally believed that if the Japanese Government would shape its actions and policy in accordance with those principles which the American Government desired to see in effect in the Pacific area, there would be no reluctance on the part of my Government to facilitate any Japanese efforts to that end.
I then urged the Minister with all the strength and earnestness at my command to take advantage of the President’s statesmanlike and far-seeing suggestion for obviating further and serious deterioration of Japanese-American relations and indeed of the whole Far Eastern situation. I told him that I fully recognized that the element of “face-saving” must of necessity enter into the question, but that the Minister was now presented with an opportunity to rise above such considerations and to act in conformity with the highest statesmanship and to take a decision which would not only permit him to be relieved of the truly appalling situation with which he was confronted at the very beginning of his office, but which might well result in his; being regarded by history as one of the greatest statesmen of Japan. The [Page 537] Minister, I believe, was deeply impressed by my words and it is possible that this appeal may affect his presentation of the President’s suggestion to the Emperor and to the Prime Minister.
I am fully aware that in seeking this interview with the Foreign Minister, and in making this approach to him, I have been acting without any authority from my Government but I was led to undertake this approach on my own initiative and responsibility after careful consideration of the following three factors:
- 1.
- The vital importance of making sure that the Japanese Foreign Minister should receive an accurate and complete report of the President’s proposal;
- 2.
- The time element, which is of equal importance, prevented my seeking prior authority; and
- 3.
- The certainty of my belief that having made his farseeing and statesmanlike proposal to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, the President would desire that nothing should be neglected to ensure that the far-reaching importance of this proposal should be fully understood by the Japanese Government and should be given the most careful and serious consideration. The acceptance or rejection of the President’s proposal may well determine the future peace in the Pacific.