711.94/2178
Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State
The Japanese Ambassador came in to see me this afternoon at his request. The Ambassador first of all said that he would greatly appreciate it if I would tell him what the policy of this Government was, with regard to the freezing order, in connection with Japanese vessels in American territorial waters. He said that this question was giving his Government great uneasiness and, in view of his sincere desire to avoid any further difficulties between the two countries and to do what he could to contribute to an easing of the present situation, he would appreciate any information I could give him.
I replied to the Ambassador that for the time being and under present conditions (and I repeated these phrases twice), the Treasury Department would grant prompt clearance to any Japanese vessels in American ports which desired to clear. The Ambassador seemed greatly relieved at this reply and then asked what the attitude would be with regard to the purchase by these vessels of food supplies which they needed for their crews and of fuel supplies which they required in order to make it possible for them to return to their own ports. I told the Ambassador that all of these transactions would, of course, [Page 538] require specific licenses from the Treasury Department itself, but that for the time being and under present conditions licenses would be granted for these transactions so as to make it possible for these ships to clear from American ports when they so desired. The Ambassador expressed great satisfaction at the replies I had made to him.73
The Ambassador then expressed his hope that by the exercise of the powers of statesmanship, both in Japan and in the United States, the present difficult situation would be passed without further deterioration in the relations of our two countries. I reminded the Ambassador of the extraordinary patience which the United States had demonstrated in its relations with Japan during recent years and particularly during the past six months. I said that time and again the Ambassador must have been struck with that fact throughout the course of his talks with Secretary Hull. I said that if any additional confirmation had been required that confirmation had been afforded in the exceedingly important proposal which the President had made to the Ambassador on July 24. I stated that in view of the Ambassador’s statements, I felt it due him to say in an extremely frank way that I had been greatly surprised by receiving a report this morning from Ambassador Grew relating his conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda yesterday, July 27,74 in which Ambassador Grew informed me that the President’s proposal had not yet, at that time, reached Admiral Toyoda.
Admiral Nomura did not look particularly surprised. He said, however, that he had immediately telegraphed a brief summary of the President’s proposal; that he had then gone to New York and that yesterday, the evening of July 27, he had telegraphed a very full and detailed account of the President’s proposal to his Foreign Minister.
The Ambassador then went on to say that he felt that what should now be the objective, in view of the divergence of national policy between Japan and the United States, was some compromise solution which would prove acceptable to both sides. I said that I regretted that I must differ from the Ambassador. I said that our policy, as the Ambassador was well aware, was a policy of the maintenance of peace, of a renunciation of force and conquest in the dealings between each other of the nations of the Pacific area and of equal commercial and economic opportunity for all of these nations on nondiscriminatory and equal terms. I said that as the Secretary of State and as the President had repeatedly made clear to the Ambassador, there was no desire on the part of this Government to prevent Japan from receiving the assurances of an economic and commercial character which she desired, provided the policy which we had laid down was [Page 539] pursued by all of the nations involved. Furthermore, I said, the President’s proposal provided a complete ratification of what Secretary Hull had so often said to the Ambassador, namely, that none of the other powers mentioned—Great Britain, the Netherlands, the United States, the British Dominions, and, we were sure, China—could conceivably be regarded as having any aggressive designs upon Japan and that I believed Secretary Hull had even gone so far as to say that were Japan to be confronted by any real menace from Indochina, the United States fleet would be sent in order to make it evident that this Government was opposed to the operation of any such menace against Japan.
In view of all of these facts and of the policy which we had not only preached but practiced, I did not see that there was the slightest ground for any compromise solution of the kind the Ambassador had in mind. I said it seemed to me we had come to the point where Japan had now undertaken a policy completely different from that which had been under discussion with this Government; the Ambassador now requested that Japan continue her policy and we modify our policy. The compromise the Ambassador suggested amounted merely to an abandonment by this Government of the principles and policies for which we stood, which Japan had been discussing with us, and which we believed alone could afford Japan the economic safety and the national security she alleges she is seeking.
Upon leaving the Ambassador asked whether the President would be able to receive Colonel Iwakuro before the latter left on July 31. I told the Ambassador that since the Ambassador himself made the request, I would submit it to the President, but that I felt sure the Ambassador realized the great number of demands which were now being made upon the President’s time. The Ambassador was very emphatic in saying that he by no means wished to intrude upon the President’s time.