740.0011 Pacific War/547
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I called on him again today and we discussed at length the situation which had [Page 533] come about as a result of the establishment by Japan of bases in southern Indochina and the reported action of the American Government in freezing Japanese assets in the United States,67 concerning which I have up to the present received no official confirmation from Washington. In view of our complete divergence of opinion upon the subject under discussion, there could be no meeting of minds between the Minister and myself, and since our conversation consisted largely of a reiteration of the views brought out in my conversation with him last night68 I shall not in this report outline our conversation in detail. Mention may, however, be made of the following points which arose in our discussion.
The Department’s telegram No. 423, July 24, 7 p.m.69 reporting the Acting Secretary’s conversation with the Japanese Ambassador70 having been decoded immediately prior to this interview, I conveyed the substance thereof to Admiral Toyoda so that he might know exactly what the Acting Secretary had said to Admiral Nomura. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was particularly anxious to ascertain the exact words of the Secretary’s statement to the effect that he was unable to see that there was now any basis for continuing the Washington conversations. The Minister requested my interpretation of the Secretary’s statement. I told him in reply that we could do no more than accept the statement at its face value. The Minister gave obvious indications of being profoundly concerned at the rupture of the Washington conversations, and as I have ground for believing that immediately prior to our interview he had been received by the Emperor I regard it as likely that he was reflecting the concern of the Emperor.
Admiral Toyoda told me that he particularly regretted the Acting Secretary’s remark to the Japanese Ambassador regarding German pressure on the French Government and told me that the Japanese negotiations with the French Government in regard to Indochina had been carried on without any pressure from any outside source.
Admiral Toyoda, as he had done with the British Ambassador, endeavored to draw a comparison between Japanese action with respect to Indochina and the measures undertaken by England in Syria, in reply to which I emphasized the complete dissimilarity of the two cases.
Admiral Toyoda continually reiterated the view that the present deplorable situation between the United States and Japan was due solely to a misunderstanding on the part of the United States of Japan’s real purposes, to which I replied that this entirely unfounded [Page 534] allegation had been exploited ad nauseam for many years both by Japanese officials and in the Japanese press, and I recapitulated to him a number of bitter lessons which we had learned from experience as a result of the assurances and promises of previous Japanese governments in regard to the true aims of Japan. I made it clear to him why finally it had become impossible for the Government and the people of the United States to give credence to Japanese pledges and explanations of Japan’s “true intentions”.
The Minister inquired with every indication of concern whether the United States Government intended to adopt further retaliatory measures in addition to the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States, to which I replied that I had received no information in the premises.
Admiral Toyoda told me that he had hardly slept at all during recent nights and he appeared greatly discouraged at the turn of events and especially distressed that the present situation should have arisen at the very time of his assumption of the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs. I reviewed in detail my endeavors over many years, with particular reference to my efforts with the Yonai Cabinet,71 to place Japanese-American relations on a sound and enduring basis and referred in this connection to Admiral Nomura’s work in that direction in Washington recently.
In conclusion, after stating that I was reluctant to end our talk in an atmosphere of defeatism, I emphatically urged him to use his best efforts with the view to preventing the further deterioration of relations between the United States and Japan, which would inevitably attend any future aggressive moves on the part of Japan in the Pacific area.