793.94/5953
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The Japanese Ambassador called by appointment to complete the conversation that we were having last Thursday. But in opening he said he wanted to tell me that as a personal matter he thought the tone of my last note to the League of last Saturday concerning the action of the Assembly was temperate and conciliatory.37 He said he appreciated that I had been trying not to pour oil upon the fire and he thought my attitude would be appreciated by his people, although he had not yet had time to hear of their reaction to my note.
We then passed on to a general talk for which he had come and, taking my cue from what he had said, I reminded him that I had never been unfriendly to Japan; that I had publicly stated, before these events in Manchuria, that I regarded the welfare of Japan and her position and influence in the Far East as important to the welfare of the United States, and that I had frequently, before these events had taken place, called her a stabilizing influence in that part of the world. The Ambassador said he remembered the expressions I had used on the occasion of the Emperor’s birthday which were very gratifying. I then went on to remind him that when the Manchurian outbreak occurred in September, 1931, I had not attributed it to the Government of Japan or to the statesmen whom I used to know, Shidehara and Wakasuki, or to the people of Japan, but to the efforts of a small group of persons of militaristic ambitions and desires. The Ambassador said he knew this very well. I reminded him further that in what action I had thereafter taken in opposing Japanese actions in Manchuria I was not actuated by hostility to the Japanese Government or people but by a desire to preserve and maintain certain peace treaties which I regarded as vital and important not only to the world at large but also to Japan. I told him that I had made several speeches in which I had explained my views as to the importance of those treaties. I said I believed the Great War had demonstrated that we had developed both in [Page 117] Japan and in this country and in many parts of Europe and the rest of the world a complex industrial civilization which could not withstand modern war, and I explained to him in detail what I meant. I pointed out that we were developing into great congested populations of people who were not self-supporting but were dependent upon trade and commerce for their supplies and food; that I believed the Great War had shown that unless future wars could be checked and minimized this civilization would be destroyed. The Ambassador expressed his assent. I pointed out that these peace treaties, including the League of Nations Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty, were earnest attempts by the people of the world to carry out this view and to protect our civilization against its destruction by war, and that they were, each of them, an attempt to stabilize the world after the war and to protect the welfare of each nation. He said he recognized this. I told him that this had been the mainspring of my action.
The Ambassador said he recognized all of this and on his part, although he had been disappointed many times when he had given me assurances which were afterwards not carried out in Manchuria, he still wanted to say that he believed in his people and that sooner or later the moderate elements would not disappoint us. I told him I joined in his hope that this would be so. I then said that in regarding the situation it seemed to me that the whole of Manchuria itself was not as important to Japan as the confidence and good-will which were being jeopardized by these campaigns. He indicated that he thought this was so. The Ambassador said he was going to devote himself to a cultivation of friendly cultural relations between the two countries, abandoning talk about Manchuria. He expressed himself warmly in the hope that we shall be able to continue our personal relations even after I go out of office. I reciprocated these hopes and told him that I looked forward to the time when the campaign against Chinchow would no longer prevent me from coming to his Embassy, referring to an incident of last winter. The Ambassador laughed and said he hoped so too.
- See telegram No. 78, Feb. 25, 1933, to the Minister in Switzerland, supra.↩