793.94/3135: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Forbes) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 9—12:25 p.m.]
256. Department’s 259, December 8, 11 a.m. I called first on the French Ambassador who saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs last night having a long session with him and giving him the text of Briand’s message. I also saw the British Ambassador who had conferred with the French Ambassador and was sending his Counsellor to see Nagai.76a They both agreed I had better see Shidehara immediately.
This evening I had a long talk with the Minister for Foreign Affairs who said he was doing his level best to bring about the settlement of the whole situation by peaceful means and without further use of force. He went into all the details at great length illustrating his points on the map. He said that Wellington Koo’s original proposition was to the effect that the Chinese troops should be withdrawn to Shanhaikwan.76b He said that the region between that and Chinchow is bounded by mountains on one side and would be easily protected against bandits. He feels the Chinese police can handle it adequately. In any case the Japanese could withdraw their subjects and would be prepared to do so in that region if the situation required it.
East of the river which runs close by Chinchow he said the bandits are active and wholly beyond the power of the Chinese police to handle. The Japanese would be compelled to be ready to issue forth from the railway zone on protective and punitive expeditions, not occupying territory but retiring as they have done and are doing now after order had been restored. He repeated what he had said previously: That the number of these bandits and their equipment proves conclusively that they are being supplied and sent out to harass the Japanese and that he is convinced they are supported by the Young Marshal Chang. Moreover, the Chinese have not withdrawn their troops even to Chinchow but are occupying Kowpangtse and Tahushan; and, to make matters worse, Koo is now withdrawing his proposition and denying it was definite. The feeling in the Japanese Army and among many civilians is that the Chinese have duped the Japanese Government into a withdrawal, have not done their part, and he, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, is being very fiercely criticised and receiving quantities of telegrams daily very bitterly assailing him for permitting his Government to be deceived and for trusting the Chinese offer.
He spoke of the episode of the Associated Press article and said it was ended and closed but that the attacks, particularly those engineered [Page 58] by the Seiyukai, were continuing and were very bitter, and they had even threatened to bring him into court for revealing military secrets.77 He had prepared a memorandum of what he said to me in the interview78 and I have indorsed it as follows: “This statement is in substantial accord with my recollection of the interview in question.” I have told him that we wanted to support and assist him in every way in his efforts to bring about a peaceable solution of the problem.
In regard to Tsitsihar he said the policy had not been changed. The evacuation was only delayed due to the menacing position of General Ma with whom negotiations were in process and which he hoped would result in making possible an early withdrawal.
It seems probable that unless the Chinese adhere to Wellington Koo’s proposition and withdraw their armies to the line he suggested, it is only a question of time before the Japanese will feel compelled to drive the Chinese armies back. Shidehara did not describe this as asking them to evacuate their own territory except insofar as to make good their own proposition.
- Matsuzo Nagai, Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1930–33.↩
- See telegram No. 262, Dec, 11, 1931, to the Ambassador in Japan, p. 62.↩
- See telegram No. 239, Nov. 28, 1931, from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 51; telegrams Nos. 247, 248, Nov. 28, 1931, to the Ambassador in Japan, pp. 53, 54.↩
- See telegram No. 234, Nov. 24, 1931, from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 50.↩