793.94/3133a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Forbes)
259. 1. It is reported from Paris by Dawes that instructions to make representations against any measures which would tend to aggravate further the situation in regard to Chinchow are being sent by members of the League Council to their respective diplomatic representatives in Tokyo.
The text of Briand’s communication to Shidehara through Yoshizawa was given to Dawes by Briand. The following is the text of the communication:75
“My colleagues and I are in any case convinced that the Japanese Government will respect fully the resolutions of September 30th [Page 55] particularly so as to prevent say [any?], aggravation of the situation. It would be deplorable if, at a moment when an agreement is well in sight which we believe will be acceptable to both parties, the situation should be embittered and even endangered by fresh outbursts of fighting. In this connection I would draw Your Excellency’s attention to the proposal set out in my letter of November 29th76 and Your Excellency’s reply thereto in which it is stated that if a danger of contact between the Chinese and Japanese troops arose, the Japanese Government would be disposed to examine attentively the suggestions made to avoid such a contact.”
It is my desire that at once you communicate with the British and French Ambassadors, and, if you find your colleagues are making representations of this nature, that you cooperate with them and talk along the same lines with Shidehara.
2. The following is for your guidance and information: Yesterday the Japanese Ambassador came to see me and told me that the Chinese after having promised to evacuate the neutral zone were making difficulties by refusing and that Baron Shidehara’s position was made very difficult because of this. It was intimated by the Ambassador that to prevent the Japanese Army from advancing again would be very difficult. Thereupon, I talked very seriously to him, and said that if the Japanese forces after having been recalled should now advance on Chinchow, the matter would be made ten-fold more clear to the American public that the advance was with the intention of destroying the last fragment of Chinese authority in Manchuria and not for the purpose of protecting Japanese nationals. It would be extremely difficult, I pointed out to him, to ask China to withdraw her own army from her own territory, which evidently was what he wanted us to do. Also, I pointed out the complete absence of reports of any attacks in Chinchow on Japanese citizens, and said that under these circumstances a very painful situation would be created in American public opinion if the Japanese Army moved again on Chinchow. What we would do in such a contingency I said was even now being asked by the press. In detail I reviewed the long sequence of advances by the Japanese Army and pointed out how in each case the Japanese Foreign Office had made representations as to their purpose which had proved to be unfounded. I said a final advance would be conclusive for public opinion in the United States that the entire movement since September 18 has been for the purpose of attacking Marshal Chang’s Chinese army wherever it could be found and not for protection of Japanese life and property. Further, I said, under such circumstances it would be difficult to contend that the provisions of the [Page 56] Kellogg-Briand Pact had not been broken and very difficult to persuade any one that it did not amount to a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty as to the guarantee of the territorial and administrative integrity of China.
The reply of the Ambassador was that he had no intention of implying that General Hon jo would advance immediately. Then I said that what I desired to hear was that Japan had accepted the resolution pending before the Council and that the Council had passed it. The importance of that resolution in its effect on our public opinion was emphasized by me, also the importance of an impartial investigation in Manchuria and of a cessation of hostilities. He thought we would hear good news on that in a very few days he said. My reply was that it might better be a matter of a very few hours and that it would be far easier to reconcile Chinese public opinion to self-control if the resolution were passed than it would be without the resolution.
The political difficulties surrounding Baron Shidehara were again referred to by the Ambassador. I told him that Baron Shidehara’s difficulties, in my opinion, were nothing like as severe as the difficulties which the Chinese Government was having in explaining why from their own territory they should be asked to withdraw their military forces when these troops were merely where they had a right to be and were not engaged in attacking anybody.
Summing up, I requested the Ambassador to urge most seriously upon Baron Shidehara the serious effect on the opinion of the American public which any new advance by the Japanese Army would have, and the serious thought which was already being given to that problem by us. With this in view, I stressed also the particular importance that surrounded an immediate passage of the proposed resolution and a prompt and successful solution of the action pending before the Council of the League of Nations.
3. Debuchi presumably will have reported what I said to him.
It is my wish that by seeing Shidehara, you signalize the solidarity of view with regard to the question of Chinchow between the American Government and the other Governments, and secondly that on my behalf you emphasize the points which, as outlined above, I emphasized to Debuchi yesterday.