793.94/2585
The Japanese Embassy to the Department of State57
The Japanese Government welcome the views of the American Government so thoughtfully expressed in the memorandum of the American Embassy of November 5 on the subject of the Manchurian incident.58
In that memorandum, the attention of the Japanese Government is invited to the fact that “a situation has been created in Manchuria which gives Japan substantial control of Southern Manchuria and has temporarily, at least, destroyed the administrative integrity of China in that region.”
It is evident that shortly after the military action taken by the Japanese railway guards along the South Manchuria Railway to defend themselves as well as to protect the railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against attacks of the Chinese armed forces, the Chinese authorities in the affected districts have practically ceased to function. In consequence, the Japanese military authorities were obliged to undertake for some time the duty of maintaining peace and order in such districts.
Recently, however, local committees for the preservation of peace have been set up in various places by resident Chinese, and have organized a police force for that purpose. In the city of Mukden, for instance, the Chinese committee has under its direction and control 4,000 police officers and men. Those local bodies for the maintenance of public order serve to lighten the police functions of the Japanese troops, and are, as such, favorably received by the Japanese Government. Should they prove themselves effective to assure a reasonable degree of security in the respective districts, and to afford adequate protection to foreign residents, the Japanese troops will be ready at any time to withdraw to the Railway Zone.
The state of things now prevailing in Manchuria is certainly abnormal. But it is only temporary. Similar conditions occurred in Tsinan in 1928–9, when the Japanese forces were in occupation of that district, in order to protect Japanese residents against ravages of the Chinese troops. In no case have such military measures been inspired [Page 40] by any thought of bringing about any territorial or administrative dismemberment of China. It will be recalled that soon after the close of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–5, a policy looking to the eventual “partition of China” appeared to be gaining ground in some quarters of the world. In the denunciation of such a policy, the United States, Japan and Great Britain were in complete accord, and their determination to respect the territorial and administrative integrity of China was affirmed in many of the diplomatic instruments signed by those Powers. The Japanese Government remain unchanged in their stand against the partition of China.
In the memorandum of the American Embassy under review, it is pointed out that there are two distinct points to be considered: first, the peaceful solution of the present situation, and, second, a solution through negotiation of the various matters at issue between Japan and China, arising from misunderstanding as to the respective treaty rights of the two nations. The memorandum then proceeds to conclude that a settlement of the various broader issues of the second point can not appropriately be reached until the first has been disposed of.
The Japanese Government feel that their position is virtually in harmony with that conclusion of the American Government. They have no intention of insisting on the final adjustment of the whole series of their controversies with China, as a condition precedent to the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the Railway Zone. Their efforts for the present are primarily directed towards the peaceful solution of the present situation. It is not, however, possible to hope, as things stand at this moment, that the recall of the Japanese troops now operating outside the Railway Zone would solve the existing situation. With the replacement of the Japanese troops by the Chinese, violent hostile agitation against Japan under the auspices, overt or covert, of the Chinese authorities would be set to work in Manchuria as in other parts of China. Japanese and Koreans carrying on peaceful pursuits in that region would once more be subjected to persecution and outrage as they have been for several years. All the treaty rights of Japan would be challenged and ignored, and the security of Japanese subjects would at once be menaced.
Such dangers would inevitably be involved in any premature withdrawal of the Japanese troops. In order to provide against those dangers, the Japanese Government have been brought to the conclusion that candid recognition, by an arrangement between Japan and China, of certain fundamental principles, the substance of which has already been communicated to the American Government, is of supreme importance. The principles which they have thus formulated are no more than those that are generally observed in practice in dealings of organized peoples with one another. In seeking agreement on terms [Page 41] of such a nature, Japan can not justly be accused of any intention of exerting military pressure on China. The Japanese Government trust that an arrangement between Japan and China on those fundamental principles, affording as it will a measure of security for the lives and property of Japanese subjects, will pave the way for an early withdrawal of the troops to the Railway Zone.
They believe that the arrangement now indicated can not be regarded as solution of the various matters of the second point mentioned in the memorandum of the American Embassy, but that it is simply a process for the settlement of the first point. The whole Manchurian incident is an outcome of manifold and complicated events with historical background extending over more than thirty years. The Japanese Government hope that it will be appreciated that time and patience are needed for an adjustment of the problem.