Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume I

793.94/2498: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Forbes) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, November 6, 1931—3 p.m.
[Received November 6—8:35 a.m.]

209. My 206, November 5, 4 p.m.⁵⁶ In the presentation of the memorandum to Baron Shidehara I had a long and friendly interview in which the problems were very frankly discussed and the Japanese position fairly clearly set forth. He requested me to reply that the memorandum would receive the most earnest consideration from himself and his Government. He outlined the Japanese position which was:

That before the withdrawal of troops they wanted an agreement between the Chinese and Japanese, binding on both, affirming the following five general principles:

1. No aggression on the part of either country against the other.

2. Obligating each country to respect the integrity of the territory of the other.

3. Agreement on the part of the Chinese Government to prevent the enforcement of boycott by violence, and freedom on the part of Japanese and Chinese citizens to carry on their trade wherever they pleased and without intimidation. (He recognized the right of individuals to conduct a boycott by discontinuing purchases or trade relations when and where they pleased.)

4. Protection of lives and property of Japanese and Koreans resident in China. In this connection he said immediate or early withdrawal of troops until these points were agreed upon would result in general disorder and acts of violence against the Japanese and Koreans in Manchuria who would, he feared, be practically driven out.

5. Recognition and reaffirmation of treaty rights.

He expressly excluded from these problems to be settled before withdrawal any of the details and points, numbering several hundred, resulting from injuries, destruction of property, acts of violence or violations or evasions of treaty obligations.

I pointed out to him the emphasis laid by my Government upon the importance of not having these agreements reached under military pressure and that while the troops were in occupation military movements and engagements were of more or less daily occurrence, they could not deny that military pressure was being exerted. He was however firm in the position that if the fundamental principles were agreed upon withdrawal would promptly follow.

It is the opinion of Mr. Neville, our Military and Naval Attachés, and some close observers that there is grave danger of the militant element obtaining control of the Government and ousting the moderate element, and that there is much public excitement and opposition to the conciliatory policies of Baron Shidehara.

Forbes

56. Not printed; it reported that the memorandum set forth in Department’s telegram No. 217, Nov. 3, 1931, had been delivered to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs at 3 p.m., November 5, 1931.