861.00/5084: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State
[Received August 21, 1:32 a.m.]
On Admiral Kolchak’s return from his second visit to the army he sent for me and I was with him the greater part of the afternoon. He believes that the failure of the Bolshevik to continue their advance beyond the Tobol River significant and indicates some weakness. The remnant of his army is resting between the Tobol and Ishim Rivers but is still disorganized and disinclined to fight. He attributed the present collapse to a mistaken estimate of the Bolshevik strength: his Government had made its plans on the assumption, which events proved to be false, that the Bolshevik Government would not survive an aggressive military campaign this spring; he had therefore concentrated his attention on the military situation to the exclusion of pressing financial and economic problems. He still believed Bolshevism was rapidly losing ground in European Russia, but he admitted that in view of the social and economic [Page 416] conditions in Siberia his Government could not be continued unless it received from the Allies and particularly from the United States assistance, character discussed in our conferences.
I asked him what he thought would happen in Siberia if he failed. He replied that in his judgment the struggle against Bolshevism would become localized; that a number of military leaders mostly but not entirely Cossack Atamans would operate independently in different parts of Siberia; that Semionoff would lead because of the support and assistance he would at once receive from Japan, whose interests he pointed out would be better served by a divided rather than a united Siberia.
I was glad to learn from him that he had decided to call a conference of the head men of the peasant communities in Siberia. I have long wished that such an arrangement would be tried for I have believed such a conference would release forces of primary value in the reconstruction of Russia. I agreed with him however that he could not act in the matter until he was in a position to state definitely whether any Allied assistance could be expected.
He then pressed earnestly for my personal opinion as to whether our Government would consider favorably the comprehensive plan agreed on by the Allied representatives; I told him that I was not in a position to express an opinion; I had been absent from the United States for two years, was out of touch with public opinion there, and had no advices indicating whether the conclusions which we had reached would be deemed either wise or practicable.
This answer indicates the position which I have taken since my arrival. The local newspapers have been both [omission] and bitter in commenting on my unconcerned neutrality. Perhaps I have been too reserved but I have feared lest by some word or action I might hold out hopes which would be disappointed.
Changes all for the good have been made in the ministry: Michailoff, the Minister of Finance, has resigned and De Hoyer, for some years manager of the Russo-Asiatic Bank in Peking, has been named in his stead; Telberg has been relieved of his position as Secretary of the Council but remains as Minister of Justice. Sukine resigned in the face of attacks by a small reactionary group who are in favor of a German-Japanese alliance and have received encouragement from Colonel Fukuda, permanent head of Japanese Military Mission. Kolchak has declined to accept the resignation and Sukine’s [status?] is dependent on the success of his negotiations for Allied assistance. He is accused by the reactionaries of being pro-American, which in their view is the most serious charge that can be preferred.
I am still awaiting further suggestions or instructions from the Department. General Graves has returned from Ishim where all [Page 417] that he was able see confirms previous reports of military disorganization; for details I refer to his report to the War Department.