861.01/116: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State
[Received August 17, 10:35 a.m.]
Because in my observations upon the Kolchak government I may seem to have emphasized strongly its weakness and mistakes and failed to express fully my appreciation of the difficulties it has [Page 415] faced, I would again emphasize strongly my conviction that after its instructive experiences of the last two months it is the best, perhaps the only available agency, through which we can give our promised aid to Russia.
I even wish that our Government were immediately in a position to announce definite action when the issue is still in doubt, and so give to Admiral Kolchak the strength he so sorely needs.
Perhaps I am too close to see the Russian situation clearly in its true proportions, but I am sure that whatever the outcome of this crisis may be the Kolchak government cannot continue without the open support of our Government. To come to its aid in the hour of discouragement and defeat is, I admit, to take a great risk; but it is also to take advantage of a great opportunity. If the Kolchak government should collapse we could not be worse off than if we stood and waited for the event. On the other hand, if by our timely and active service Kolchak should survive, we should be in a preeminent position to assist and even to lead in the reconstruction of Russia, to maintain the “open door” now in imminent peril of being closed, and to preserve the integrity of Siberia.
With the withdrawal of the French and British, and of the Czech Army, … endeavor to bring about establishment of peace in Russia will be put off indefinitely.