861.00/4920: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State
[Received July 28, 7:56 a.m.]
Yesterday afternoon I was in conference with Sukine, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. He reviewed with apparent frankness the history of the Kolchak movement and the difficulties with which it is struggling; and admitted the extreme seriousness of the present military situation, which he hoped would improve but which he realized might change the whole outlook. He referred to the “persistent scare” of Japan and to the efforts of Japanese officials to discredit American activities. He expressed his personal conviction that the future of Russia must be worked out in harmony with the progressive forces represented today by Great Britain and the United [Page 397] States. But he added there was bitter resentment among all classes of Russians against the American policy of neutrality toward the civil war in Siberia, and that this resentment made it inexpedient if not impossible for him to give any public emphasis to his purely private convictions. He believed however that he had succeeded in persuading Admiral Kolchak, with whom his relations, he said, were of the closest personal character, not to allow his mind or actions to be influenced by anti-American feeling. In the course of the conversation, he touched briefly on the question of Semenoff and frankly acknowledged that Semenoff was under Japanese control; that Kolchak had only nominal authority over him; that at that moment Japanese representatives were urging Semenoff’s promotion to a full generalship and that this “request” would be granted immediately. In conclusion he referred to the difficulty created by the determination of the Czechs to withdraw from Siberia.
In reply I explained in the words of the President the action of the Supreme Council at Paris, which left open the question of formal recognition and the nature of the assistance to be rendered to Russia. I told him that I had no authority to commit our Government to any course of action but suggested full and free discussions of the problems and needs of the present Government, with a view to determining what help the United States might give in association with the Allied Governments. I suggested that such discussions should include plans for the continued Allied operation and guarding of the railways, and the problem of the Czechs; for the establishment of a better order of things in eastern Siberia and the Baikal region; and for the strengthening and broadening of the Admiral’s Government so as to make a stronger and wider appeal for popular support; and for furnishing the Siberian Army and people with necessary supplies. When asked how he thought we might best proceed to the formulation of such a comprehensive plan, he begged for time to confer with Admiral Kolchak. My only reference to his criticism of Japan was a statement that we must of course recognize Japan’s deep interest in Siberia and endeavor to work in full cooperation with her representatives.
My plan is to proceed on the assumption that the Government will survive the present crisis and to begin these discussions at once with the various Government officials, and at the same time to confer regularly with Sir Charles Eliot and Count Martel, in the hope that we can agree upon definite recommendations to be submitted to our Governments. For the present I will also confer with General Takayanagi, chief of the Japanese military mission, with whom I have very cordial relations and who is the only helpful Japanese representative here.
[Page 398]This discussion of plans will give something constructive to work on, will prevent our becoming involved in the gossip and intrigue so prevalent here and will afford me an immediate opportunity to test the spirit and purpose of those around the Admiral. I would greatly appreciate the criticism of this procedure. To be continued.