Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/136
General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
[Received September 30.]
The usual state of uncertainty as to Roumanian intentions is still with us. However, since their bluff was called on the immediate departure threat they have been more reticent on that subject.
On the 25th of August the Roumanians were asked to immediately evacuate Western Hungary and they replied that they would take the matter up at once. On the 19th of September when General Mardarescu and M. Diamandi appeared before the Mission they were reminded of their promise and General Mardarescu made the ridiculous statement that he could not remove his troops from the west bank of the Danube until he was positive that the Hungarians were not going to attack him. I asked him if he could as a soldier state that he actually feared any such action on the part of the Hungarians. I also asked him if he did not know that, if the Hungarians contemplated [Page 687] an attack his present disposition of forces on the west side of the River was dangerous in the extreme as they were dispersed in small detachments which could be quickly and easily cut off, whereas on the other hand if behind the bridgehead of Budapest, and behind the Danube as an insuperable obstacle, they would be safe from any attack.
Prior to the arrival of the Roumanians at the session of the Mission on the 19th, the French and Italian members had each prepared a memorandum of decidedly searching and pertinent questions which they desired to propound to our visitors. As rehearsed to the accompaniment of flashing eyes, resounding diction and much table thumping, these memoranda sounded like a China Sea typhoon compared to their gentle and zephyr-like delivery when the Roumanians arrived.
In the presence of the Roumanians I insisted that they be called upon to immediately evacuate Transdanubia and in this I was ably seconded by General Gorton. The French and Italian members, however, gave it as their opinion that General Mardarescu should have time to examine into the imaginary danger of Hungarian attack, so the Army Organization Committee, consisting of a French officer and a Roumanian officer with the former as chairman, was directed to investigate and report without delay.
After the Roumanians left I told our two colleagues that I thought we might just as well shut up shop and spend our time in joy-riding as to fritter it away in any more such sessions; that I knew and they knew that all the Roumanians wanted was time to do more looting, and that I proposed to be on record as absolutely opposed to any such ridiculous procrastination. They admitted then that they thought I was right, but that it would be better to put our demands in letter form. They then drafted and sent a letter which will have about as much effect on the Roumanians as a bed-bug bite on a crocodile. It has since been learned that the Roumanians had located an immense deposit of wool in West Hungary which they wished to remove.
At our meeting on the 22nd of September the cat came out of the bag with a loud yowl. I again brought up the subject of the Roumanian delay in evacuating Transdanubia and told my Latin colleagues that I considered that their yielding to the Roumanian’s asinine demand that evacuation be deferred until it was shown that there was no danger from a Hungarian attack, made this Mission responsible for a continuation of the present rotten conditions in West Hungary with all of its attendant consequences; adding that there would be considerable delay before the committee sent to investigate could report and asking when the committee would have its report ready. This forced the issue and the French representative admitted that the committee had not yet started and would not start until the 23rd of September. As the start could easily have been made early [Page 688] in the afternoon of the 19th, this caused a delay of nearly five days.
As reports have been received of engagements between Hungarian and Roumanian patrols, General Gorton mentioned that he had an officer who could be spared, and suggested that this officer be sent to remain with the Hungarian Army to avoid as much as possible any of these minor engagements and to immediately investigate them and fix the responsibility whenever they occurred. The French member bitterly opposed this and was carrying on the discussion indefinitely when I suggested that the Committee on Army Organization, of which a French Lieutenant Colonel is chairman, have charge of this investigation also. This he consented to, and then I proposed that the British officer before mentioned, be placed as an additional member on this Army Committee and stated that I would furnish an American officer also, and that really the Committee should assume more of an Interallied aspect. He was obliged to swallow this proposition, and eventually the Italian representative stated that he would send an officer also.
. . . . . . .
The handling of the Hungarian situation, boiled down, means that nothing can be accomplished until the Roumanians are in some way or other expelled from the country. Their entire conduct is marked by a combination of viciousness and child-like irresponsibility.
Some of the delicate scientific instruments which they have seized were removed from their places in such a manner that they could never again be utilized even had they been immediately restored after having been taken from their fixtures. When they arrive in Roumania they can never be more than so much junk.
A complaint has just been received from the Coal Mines of the Salgotarjan Company, Ltd., that they are practically put out of the production business on account of the Roumanians disarming their gendarmerie; the reason for the necessity of gendarmerie being that there are so many Bolshevists in the neighborhood who endeavor to influence the miners, that they cannot operate the mines without police protection.
It has been noted that many papers state that the Roumanians when they entered Hungary were received with loud acclaim by the population. On the 8th of August when they entered the city of Godollo the first thing they did was to go to the city treasury and appropriate 2,390,000 crowns. From another town in the vicinity they took 375,000 crowns. In general they interfere with governmental and municipal functions beyond anything ever contemplated by the rules and customs of war.
The situation is bad now, but as cold weather sets in it will be aggravated by the lack of fuel and the Roumanians seem to be unable or [Page 689] unwilling to see the trouble that is coming, or to admit that they can be in any way responsible for the consequences. It is not unlikely that the Roumanians are hanging on so as to leave the Hungarians in such a demoralized condition that they cannot for years to come make a dangerous recovery, and also they may be waiting for cold weather so as to be sure of a safe retreat. General Mardarescu has stated that when the Roumanians retire he will have a strong artillery rearguard and if he is molested he will shell and destroy Budapest and then reoccupy the city. It would be very easy for him, with his wonderful imagination and lack of military sense, to carry out such a program.
The telegram drafted at the Mission’s session on the 20th, which was included in my telegram number eighty,48 and which was sent to the Supreme Council on the 21st [20th] as the Mission’s number M2, is as clear a statement of the situation as I am capable of making. For convenience and reference it is repeated and was as follows:
[Here follows the text of telegram No. 1722 (M2), September 20, from the Interallied Military Mission to the Supreme Council, printed on page 684.]
It is understood that Sir George Clerk will be here on Tuesday and it is hoped that he will bring news of some change of plan on the part of the Roumanians. As matters stand it looks as though a small third rate power had put over a tremendous bluff on the four great powers of the world. I have endeavored to find some economic pressure which could be brought to bear upon Roumania but have been unable to locate any. If she were declared to have forfeited her rights as an Ally and could be blockaded and held in a state of non-intercourse with the rest of the world until restitution were made, it would restore some of the lost prestige of the four great powers. As Roumania has violated most of the agreements of the Allies she might also be informed that Transylvania, the Banat and Dobrudja will be taken away from her, all or in part, unless certain conditions are immediately complied with. The Roumanians are very much afraid of the Serbs, and they are not hankering for any brush with the Bulgarians in Dobrudja. They have, however, apparently got themselves so stirred up over the proposition that many minor wrongs have been exaggerated in their minds and they feel that they have received rotten treatment. I refer to the question of having had no monitors given them while several were given to Serbia; of having had no member on the board that investigated looted property in Bulgaria, while Serbia, Greece, Italy, France and other powers were represented; of having the “Minorities” clause thrust into the treaty, and many other things. It must be borne in mind also that for centuries these [Page 690] people, like the Filipinos, were under a foreign oppressor, and were obliged to deal so continually in false-hoods that they have become confirmed liars, and frequently cannot tell the truth when it would be in their interest to do so. If there were such a thing as an order of “Ananias and the Forty Thieves”—I could recommend many Roumanian candidates for decoration.
With reference to the resolution of the Supreme Council which was repeated in your telegram number forty seven, September 20th, it is regretted that this does not help or alter the situation. The Hungarian authorities have known all along that the speedy constitution of a Gendarmerie Force capable of maintaining order after the withdrawal of the Roumanian Army, was desired. The Roumanian authorities were informed six weeks ago of the Supreme Council’s wishes and intentions in this respect and they were invited and requested repeatedly to afford every facility within their means for the formation and armament of such gendarmerie. It is only of late by giving this matter considerable of my personal time and attention and by having Colonel Yates placed in charge of a committee for the organization of the Gendarmerie that we have been able to make any progress whatever. The Hungarians are powerless to do anything without the assistance of the Roumanians and the assistance of the latter has been obstructive rather than constructive.
Now that the Roumanians have ransacked practically all of the public buildings and large establishments in Budapest they have begun to turn their attention to the Royal Palace where the Mission has its offices. On the 17th when I was entering the court-yard, accompanied by Colonel Loree, I found a whole Company of Roumanians, armed with rifles and bayonets, blocking the carriage entrance. Colonel Loree and I expelled them at the point of our riding crops, and I afterwards located the officer in charge and made him apologize for such an intrusion.
I had heard that the Roumanians were lately seizing property and then making the owners ransom it back again, and on the 23rd instant I got a specific case where General Serbescu, the Roumanian Officer in charge of requisitions, had seized furs from a wholesale fur establishment and then allowed the firm to redeem their property on the payment of 1,100,000 crowns. General Serbescu advised them to come up to the Military Mission and have a protest made against the seizure as that would then cover him in the restitution. I shall locate a few more concrete cases of this kind and keep them on file. Of course, the question naturally arises as to how much of the ransom goes into the Roumanian treasury and how much into the private funds of the officers concerned, but in any event it shows one reason why the Roumanians are not anxious to leave the country.
[Page 691]All of my colleagues are located in very pretentious buildings. The Frenchman occupies the palace of the Countess Ladislaw Szeehenyi, who was formerly Miss Gladys Vanderbilt, and is surrounded by much pomp and circumstance. The Italian occupies an even more palatial building and is equally ostentatious. The British are able to combine by having both Admiral Troubridge and General Gorton here, and they are located in a fine building, but display a little less swank than the others. I am quartered in part of the home of Count von Edelsheim, which although not as pretentious either internally or externally as the dwellings or my colleagues, is nevertheless eminently suitable. We have all been giving rather big dinners and I think I can state without boasting that our dinners have been a shade better than those of any of the others. Each other Mission has large numbers of soldiers and sailors constantly about and also a large number of officers. I now have twelve men, but they make up in quality what they lack in quantity and although we Americans are few in number I don’t think there is an inclination on the part of anybody to think for a moment that America is playing second fiddle.
If the Roumanians leave we shall have much reconstruction work to do and the more officers I could have within reason, the more I could do. On the other hand, I realize, of course, that the Commission does not expect me to do the impossible and I shall always endeavor to do the best I can with the means at my disposal.
September 24th, 1919.
Yesterday afternoon I was called upon by Count Somssich, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who without any preamble asked me when I thought the Roumanians were going to leave. I told him I could make no more of a guess on that subject now than I could have made six weeks ago, and asked him why. He said—“That is also the way it looks to me and I can see no alternative but to make terms with the Roumanians. They are rapidly destroying our country and if we want to save anything from the wreck we must accede to their terms without further delay.” I told him that I considered any such arrangement ridiculous because the Roumanians would force fulfillment of terms by the Hungarians, and would probably not comply at all with their part of the contract. He said he realized this, and proposed to fight fire with fire; in other words he would dicker with them and fill his part of the agreement only to such an extent as suited him. I told him I considered this decidedly reprehensible, and that I was positive that in the long run Hungary would win out by staying by the Entente. He said—“That may be so, but at present the Entente either cannot or will not help us. We have waited [Page 692] patiently for nearly two months and the outlook becomes more gloomy every day.”
I asked him what arrangements he had made for discussing the matter with the Roumanians. He replied that he expected to discuss the matter tomorrow (Wednesday) with M. Ardeli, the same sub-rosa gentleman who delivered the ultimata to the Archduke. He added that he would make no definite terms but would discuss the matter; if possible, get Ardeli to write out his conditions and then let me know. He asked me to mention the matter to General Gorton, the British representative, but to say nothing whatever to either the French or the Italian members.
I then asked if he had ever been approached at all by the French and he said—no, but that he knew that the French were willing to let the Roumanians do whatever they saw fit because they did not wish to offend the Roumanians and lose their trade.
I then asked him if he had ever been approached by the Italians and he said—yes, that General Mombelli at their first meeting had suggested that Hungary make terms with the Roumanians.
The substance of the foregoing was then placed in code and telegraphed to the American Commission.49
At the meeting this date a letter was received from General Mardarescu, stating that he had found it necessary, instead of delivering at Monor the fire-arms destined for the police, to designate as the depot, Czegled, a place twice as far away; that this depot was not yet ready, would take some days to prepare; and furthermore that the arms he proposed to turn over to us were in Roumania and it would be necessary to ship them back. He then added that he could consent to no arms being delivered to the police at all until he had received an accurate report of the number of arms and amount of equipment in the hands of the Hungarians; that arms were to be given the Hungarians by the Roumanians assisted by the Entente; that only such arms as were absolutely necessary would be delivered to the police, and that the remainder would be returned to the Roumanians.
I then called the attention of my colleagues to the fact that on the 19th, when I had been fighting for the evacuation of Transdanubia, Minister Diamandi, with his greasy smile, had made the argument that he thought we were unreasonable and trying to do too much at one sitting; that we had already in one day acquired ten thousand rifles and forty machine guns for the police and why try to do too much, all of which had had its effect upon Generals Graziani and Mombelli. I said that they could now see just exactly [Page 693] where we had been led to by the wily Roumanian and that we were like a lot of pack-mules following a bell mare.
General Mombelli, the president, asked me what I suggested and I insisted that a letter be written to General Mardarescu, stating that on the 19th instant we had invited his attention to the urgent necessity of immediately organizing and equipping the police; that he had agreed to furnish us ten thousand rifles and forty machine guns by the 23rd; that these arms were to be delivered by the Mission assisted by the Roumanians to the Hungarians; that he had broken his promise, and that we could not interpret his action other than as an intention not to afford any assistance whatever; that we should hold him responsible for any disturbances or troubles that might result from a lack of arms and equipment on the part of the police; and that we would advise the Supreme Council of his action.
General Graziani suggested that if we write that much, we add that the Roumanians could now show their desire to actually assist by turning over to us two or three thousand rifles. I stated emphatically that I would not put myself or my country in the position of bickering with the Roumanians for two or three thousand rifles when they might again make us ridiculous by refusing even this request, and I told him it was a beautiful and edifying sight to behold the representatives of France, Italy, Great Britain and the United States on bended knee, craving paltry favors from a third-rate power like Roumania and added that I would not agree to any such arrangement.
The letter was finally drafted and sent in substance as above indicated by me.