Woodrow Wilson Papers
The Chairman of the United States Shipping Board ( Hurley ) to President Wilson
My Dear Mr. President: I went into the various conferences with Mr. Hoover and the British, French and Italian representatives with reference to the shipping phases of the program for emergency control and distribution of food, but I found that it was not necessary to disclose my own anxiety for a postponement until your arrival. The British themselves felt that the plan proposed would create the impression among the peoples to be relieved that the Allies were holding aloof from relief work; that the American Food Administrator alone was feeding the liberated peoples and the enemy countries. Lord Beading argued that while Hoover should be at the head of the organization, the work should be carried on in the name of all the associated governments. Minister Clementel, of France, felt that the whole question should be held in abeyance until your arrival. Both the British and the French will submit their proposed modifications in writing.
In line with my cablegram to you,29 I have been convinced that no great harm will come from this relatively slight delay. Hoover has informed me that there is already in existence an agreement under which the neutrals are being supplied with food. There are some urgent services to be performed, but in working out the plan for general relief I felt that it would be a tactical error for any concessions to be made to the British and French except by you personally. In shipping as well as in food I have believed that [Page 662] concessions can and probably should be made, but that if these concessions were made before your arrival the larger solutions you have in mind would be more difficult.
In all the conferences I have had on this side, I have been impressed with the fact that it is not the League of Nations, nor an International Court, nor even the Freedom of the Seas that is feared by Lloyd-George, Clemenceau, Orlando or their associates. What they are thinking about, as you are probably already aware, is the increased power of our shipping, commerce and finance. In every conversation the commercial question has come to the front. France fears that she will not be able to get the raw materials she needs at the same price as other nations; Great Britain fears that we will have a bigger merchant marine than she will be able to build, and that our government will operate it, regardless of cost, so that we can capture the best markets in the world.
Sir Joseph Maclay, Shipping Comptroller of Great Britain; Lord Reading, and their chief shipping expert, Mr. Salter, all have told me with considerable feeling that they are planning to turn their ships back to private operation at the earliest possible date. They indicated, in feeling me out, that they presumed we would do the same thing. I gave them no reassurances whatever. I felt that it might be well for them to entertain their fears until you find it advantageous to state your position.
In the same manner, Clementel, Minister of Commerce and Transportation of France, formally proposed to me that we provide France with 800,000 tons of shipping in the next three years. Fearing that Great Britain and the United States will dominate the shipping of the world, the French are frantically anxious to have a merchant marine of 6,000,000 tons by the end of 1921. They had 2,000,000 tons before the war. They want to treble their pre-war tonnage. They point out that Great Britain has charged them exorbitant freight rates. They have placed an order for 500,000 tons of ships with England. It would be to our advantage to build them 800,000 tons, but they would regard it as a distinct concession. I have indicated to them my doubt about the feasibility of the project. My reason for this was that I felt that this, as well as all other concessions, should be reserved for you to make yourself.
The French want to be sure they will obtain their raw materials at the same price other nations receive theirs. They feel that domination of shipping by the United States and Great Britain means domination of freight rates and, consequently, control of raw materials. The Italians are already trying to protect themselves by passing bills to [Page 663] establish government monopolies over various commodities. Both the British and the French are talking of nationalizing their oil, and other commodities, in order to make their markets as exclusive as possible.
Somewhere, in your larger plans, it may be possible for you to deal with these tendencies in such a way as to provide the reassurance of fair-play. Equalization of conditions on the seas, commercially, may be possible. Certainly I am convinced that it will be helpful if you can get what is in the back of the minds of the men who express any fear of the League of Nations. None of the European nations want another war. They are aware that if another conflict should come more thrones, and more governments would crash to the ground. They know, moreover, that their peoples will rally to the support of any proposal that you make, with a view to preventing future wars.
If there is any way in which the general principles you have in mind could be applied immediately to the relief problem in Europe, it would go a long way towards getting the League of Nations into practical operation and would shorten the period of abstract discussion. To a certain extent the various councils of the associated governments have illustrated the practicability of a League of Nations, but these councils have been exclusive. It may be possible to make some adaptation or extension of the idea immediately. If this could be done, it would be at once reported to the world that the League of Nations is already under way. It would be possible then to build around the nucleus thus provided.
Our shipbuilding capacity, which had not been exhausted by any means when the war ended, makes it possible for us to build ships for any nation in the world, and I think that you will find it advantageous, in your conferences, to recall that our present law prevents foreigners from placing orders with our yards without the government’s consent.
I am convinced that the principles you have applied to American business are adaptable to the international situation. The European nations are really suffering from an attack of “nerves.” They have had a bad night, and the morning finds them depressed and worried. The British Navy was built largely to protect its merchant marine. The British are fearful that under a League of Nations the United States, with its present wealth and commercial power, may get the jump on the markets of the world.
If it can be made clear to them that the essence of the League of Nations is international fair-play, that membership in the League is dependent upon square-dealing, and that a nation becoming a member [Page 664] of it would not be able to put into effect retroactive and confiscatory legislation against foreign interests, as Mexico did to England’s disadvantage and our own, I am convinced that whatever opposition there may be will be swept aside.
I realize that your plans may contemplate only the discussion of the larger principles, but I am convinced that whatever commercial concessions or assurances are to be made should come directly from you, with a clear understanding that they do come from you, so that your larger task may be made easier. If either I or any of your lieutenants should make these concessions, the British and French and Italians would be quick to think that it is easier to deal with us than to deal with you. Your own influence, which has been the greatest asset of the whole world in this war of humanity, should not be frittered away by segregated groups.
At the first convenient opportunity I would like to present the shipping phases of the matter to you in greater detail. At any moment now I can arrange for sufficient tonnage for the return of our army, but Pershing tells me the effort to retain our troops here is very strong. Personally, I feel that we should get the larger portion of the troops back as soon as possible.
Faithfully yours,