Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume II

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

Memorandum by Messrs. Hoover, Davis, and Cotton²⁸

undated

Analysis and Comparison of the Plans of President Wilson and the Plans of the Allied Representatives

The memoranda of the 12th of December, being a report to the Prime Ministers of England, France and Italy, is, of course, not intended as a reply to the President’s proposal and is merely a recommendation to these members of the Supreme War Council for consideration at some future meeting. The recommendations contained therein differ from the President’s proposal in very essential matters.

The President’s plan contemplates a single-headed administration of relief and a confinement of scope of relief to the immediate problem during armistice so that human life may be saved and anarchy prevented without other objective, the cooperative relations of the United States to the Allies being preserved in the manner heretofore followed in such relations.

The Allied plan contemplates the widest control of the world’s food and its use in political and economic objectives.

(I) In more detail, the President’s proposal embraced the following essential principles:

(a) The sole object of relief should be humanity. It should have no political objective or other aim than the maintenance of life and order.

(b) It contemplates the feeding of neutral, liberated, and enemy territories as a special undertaking, to be administered as a relief measure and only for the period of the armistice.

(c) The political issues involved therein to be subject to the Supreme War Council.

(d) The independent control by the United States of its surplus food under the direction of the United States Food Administrator working in cooperation with the existing technical organizations.

(e) The absolute necessity of single-headed administration stated as a fundamental requisite for efficiency, emphatically necessary in this emergency situation.

(f) The principle that all enemy shipping should be used during the armistice for relief of the liberated and enemy peoples, either directly or through substitution, without commitment as to ultimate disposal.

(g) The requisite and logical financial provisions to be determined by the joint Treasuries.

II. The Allied proposals amount to:

(a) A complete world control of food by an inter-allied body, not limited to the armistice, and which involves a much broader control than has ever yet been granted to any inter-allied body. In any single matter, action would be possible only by unanimity of agreement or alternatively by total abandonment of inter-allied action.

(b) Through control of “source”, quantity and distribution to all European countries there would in effect be a total control of the world’s markets, including the U. S.

(c) The natural executive or administrative relations are minimised. Instead of confining the functions of the proposed Council or Board to the maintenance of associated co-operation and to the determination of broad legislative policies for the guidance of the United States Administrative official, it is proposed that this legislative board assume most important executive functions.

(d) The principle that enemy tonnage is to be used for relief purposes is not accepted.

(e) No definite proposal is made for finance, and the impression is conveyed that objection will be found to the cash payment by enemy for food. In fact, in various discussions, Allied representatives have called attention to the fact that payment in cash or in exchange would result in depletion of German assets as against indemnities.

(f) The plan outlined would subordinate and jeopardise prevention of starvation until complete agreement of all four governments on every point—political, financial, transportation, and source of supply, instead of mere agreement on general policy as proposed by the President.

III. We are in entire agreement with the Allies in the assumption that it is necessary to preserve a unity of action against the enemy. This does not, however, apply in the same degree to liberated territories and to neutrals. In the discussion, we have at all times conceded this principle and have gone so far as to suggest that not only should the general associated action and policy be determined by the Supreme War Council or some body to be set up for the determination of such questions, but also that inter-allied commissions should be established in enemy territory in order to preserve even the appearance of complete unity of action. Our view has been that if a small Council or Board were set up for the sole purpose of determining the policy of relief to enemy territory and its conduct to liberated and neutral countries (with its functions limited to determination in advance of general policy) it would answer every legitimate criticism in this regard. The notion that such a council should dominate practically all supplies and distribution in the world is to our mind wholly unnecessary, as the Allied programs are already determined and under execution, and the relief body would deal entirely with the surplus not required by the Allies. There is, therefore, no conflict of interest which would subject the Allies to competition, and no real ground for criticism of the proposal of a separate body to deal solely with relief. Moreover, the emergency would mostly be over before such a grand world control could function. Furthermore, it is doubtful if the American people would consent to such a domination of her markets and trade by a body not responsible to their own government. Nor is it probable that the necessary voluntary support could be obtained in the procuring of supplies.

IV. There can be no question that there are situations in Europe requiring attention within days, perhaps within hours, and to obtain, with the political currents now flowing, inter-Allied agreement, in the sense expressed in this memorandum, on complex problems of organization, etc., with the rapidity necessary to prevent starvation and anarchy, will be entirely hopeless.

V. This document is a memorandum of recommendation, and apparently cannot be acted upon until a meeting of the Supreme War Council, not now in session. In the meantime, there are certain situations, particularly in Vienna, German-Austria, Serbia, and other localities, where immediate action is required or starvation and a total abyss of anarchy will supervene. Our thought is, therefore, that rather than to attempt an immediate solution of these points of entire difference in fundamental principle, the President should propose that the American Government will take action independently to remedy these critical situations by furnishing such supplies as may be available and suggest to the Allies that they cooperate and take similar action. This will give ample time for consideration and development of common view.

28. This statement as to the authorship of the memorandum is based upon a notation accompanying another copy of the memorandum filed under Paris Peace Conf. 862.5018/7.