Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

46. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, April 29, 1959, 8 p.m.

2232. For Acting Secretary, Assistant Secretary Robertson, and Secretary of Defense. CINCPAC exclusive for POLAD and Adm. Felt. COMUS Japan exclusive for Gen. Burns and Capt. Harrison (CINCPAC Rep). I had two long private meetings with Fujiyama and Yamada yesterday afternoon and evening, during which latter gave me complete Japanese “package” on revision of Security Treaty and Administrative Agreement. Fujiyama went over with me Japanese proposals carefully which I will report in detail together with my specific comments in separate telegrams. In handing me package, Fujiyama again (Embtel 2201)¹ stressed it should be held in strictest secrecy.

Re treaty, Japanese have withdrawn all “tentative” suggestions which Fujiyama mentioned to me (Embtel 2005)² and have in fact agreed to every point of substance in US position including treaty area limited to Japan and excluding Ryukyus and Bonins. (However, have maneuvered this so it is Japanese who propose exclusion of these islands, which should help Gen. Booth in Okinawa.) Japanese have proposed certain modifications of our language to meet specific points which I will explain in my comments.³ While Japanese proposals will require careful study, they seem not only satisfactory but fully in keeping with my discussions with Senators Fulbright, Mansfield, Wiley, and Hickenlooper,⁴ and also fully consistent with our other security treaty engagements in Pacific.

Japanese have also proposed formula for consultation virtually same as in Embtel 1115, Nov 28,⁵ and have accepted in toto (as indicated in Embtel 2076⁶ and subsequently confirmed to me again) four points in US position set forth in Deptel 824, Dec 7 [6].⁷ Japanese formula, together with their acceptance of our four-point understanding, would seem to give us everything we insisted on with respect to this matter. Furthermore, they have dropped insistence that formula be protocol to treaty and have agreed to our position that it be contained in exchange of notes which they will present to Diet.

Re Admin Agreement, both Kishi and Fujiyama have been under very heavy pressure, not only from Conservative Party, but from certain Cabinet Ministries such as Finance, MITI, Justice, and Labor, to press US for massive substantive modifications of existing Admin Agreement. Fujiyama showed me memorandum half as thick as telephone book containing suggestions from party and other ministries for changes or modifications. He said impulse for these proposals in many instances arose from demagoguery of certain LDP members or narrow-mindedness on part of certain bureaucrats in other ministries. However, others were prompted by three important reasons which he and Kishi felt deserved consideration: (a) to remove phrases which appeared to carry over occupation concept into present era; (b) to conform Admin Agreement with UN SOF Agreement previously ratified by Diet; and most importantly (c) to eliminate or minimize appearance of inequalities between arrangements US has concluded with certain of its NATO and other Allies and those made with Japan.

Fujiyama said he and Kishi opposed massive substantive modifications because they believed, after careful study, that they are not necessary, and also because I had pointed out repeatedly that any such proposals on part of GOJ would consume many months or perhaps years of detailed negotiations.

Fujiyama said it had been major political problem for him and Kishi to reconcile requirement of substantial party unity with need to limit proposals for changes in Admin Agreement to those they believed would cause US no major difficulties. They met problem in these ways: (a) they have proposed considerable number of changes, many of form only, to improve appearance of Admin Agreement when it goes to Diet; (b) in certain cases they have proposed no changes in present language of Admin Agreement but have suggested agreed interpretive understandings couched in general terms; (c) in several cases where they have serious problems they have put problems to us with request for our view on how they should be dealt with to meet their difficulties rather than proposing new language for Admin Agreement which might get frozen on Japanese side and limit their ability to work out problems to our satisfaction. Among proposed changes, they have insisted on dropping Article XXV (2b) on yen support costs, as we reported to you they would do. To summarize, Japanese proposals on Admin Agreement are in three categories: (a) proposed modifications; (b) changes of form or otherwise to improve appearance but not of such basic substance as to give us trouble; (c) problems on which they will ask our views re solutions.

They have also accepted: (1) exchange of letters, with non-substantive changes, on continued validity of decisions of joint committee, etc. (Deptel 1029);⁸ (2) exchange of notes carrying over as guidance for new joint committee the existing official minutes of Feb 26, 1952,⁹ re Admin Agreement (Embtel 2201); and (3) inclusion of new interpretive understandings in exchange of notes. At my suggestion they have actually written into new Admin Agreement (instead of in separate exchange of notes as we proposed) a new paragraph agreeing that we continue to have use of all facilities and areas we are using when new agreement comes into effect. I proposed this with new language because in discussion with Fujiyama it became clear that to Japanese State–Defense language (Deptel 1029) in proposed exchange of notes on continued use of facilities and areas as ambiguous re our continued use of facilities under Rusk–Okazaki exchange of notes of Feb 28, 1952.¹⁰

Comment: I thought you would like to have my appreciation of this entire picture which is as follows:

1. Over all, both Kishi and Fujiyama have behaved very correctly throughout negotiations, although I have had to go over and over again with them our new draft treaty, full implications of language of which they did not at first understand. They now understand it thoroughly and with modifications they have proposed, they like it and are prepared to support it to hilt. From their discussions with party leadership, even anti-mainstream, they believe treaty will be well received by LDP, Japanese press, and people.

2. Similarly, they have bought basic substance of our proposal for consultation formula and do not anticipate any difficulty in gaining its full acceptance in Japan.

3. Admin Agreement has been issue which has caused them greatest difficulty. As reported, I have continuously pressed both Kishi and Fujiyama to avoid substantive changes in Admin Agreement. Kishi and Fujiyama have understood our view and have steadfastly held line against demagogic conservative politicos who wished to tamper massively with Admin Agreement as well as against some of interested Cabinet Ministries. They believe changes which they have proposed to us, which they understand still leave US substantially more privileges in Japan than in some NATO countries, are minimum for getting acceptance of new Admin Agreement. At same time they believe changes they have proposed are sufficient to obtain LDP and Diet approval.

4. Greatest compulsion on Kishi, Fujiyama, and Fukuda (LDP SecGen who is playing ball well with us), to resist those who wish greatly to change substance of Admin Agreement is their desire to see agreement on treaty and new Admin Agreement reached before upper house elections first week in June. Therefore it would seem to be in our own basic interest to proceed with examination of Japanese proposals on basis of great urgency with view to replying to their proposals by May 10. I realize this will require maximum and extraordinary efforts on part of State–Defense because each Japanese change must be carefully examined. But if we cannot reach agreement on these matters before upper house elections in June, ability of Kishi, Fujiyama, and Fukuda to hold line and to limit changes in Admin Agreement to minimum will be substantially reduced and there will not be same reason for resisting pressures to open up many other substantive aspects. Should this occur, we could have a Philippine-type situation develop with Admin Agreement becoming an aggravated domestic political issue readily susceptible to manipulation by unscrupulous and publicity-seeking politicians.

5. On timing, Fujiyama said Kishi hoped we could reach basic agreement on over-all package sufficiently before Diet Upper House elections June 2nd to enable Japanese to give out, in agreement with us, basic outline of what is included in new treaty. They feel this will have very beneficial effect on June 2 elections. They recognize treaty texts and documents cannot be tidied up for signature before elections, and therefore Kishi proposes to send Fujiyama to US to sign treaty, Admin Agreement, and related documents in Washington about June 20. Kishi feels it is of utmost importance that treaty be signed before he departs on his European and South American trip early in July. Japanese timing would involve submission of treaty, Admin Agreement, and appropriate related documents to Diet in special session in autumn with view to obtaining Diet approval by end of year. If this schedule were carried out, Kishi understands we would ask Senate to act on treaty after it convenes in January 1960. I have made absolutely clear to Kishi and Fujiyama that we will not ask Senate to take final action on new treaty until Japanese Diet has approved both treaty and Admin Agreement.

6. In view of above I urge that State–Defense working group be set up at once to go over Japanese package. I discussed with Adm Felt at Baguio need for urgent consideration of Japanese package once we had received it. He has kindly sent member of his staff to work with Embassy and COMUS Japan in examining Japanese proposals. I and my staff will of course work closely and intimately with COMUS and CINCPAC reps as we examine in detail Japanese proposals re new Admin Agreement. Results of our studies which both State and Defense will wish to have will be transmitted as soon as completed, but I urge that Washington also start examination of Japanese package immediately.

7. I cannot of course guarantee that Kono or some of LDP anti-mainstream factions may not eventually try to use treaty or Admin Agreement to pull rug from under Kishi’s feet. Neither Kishi nor Fujiyama believes they will do so once treaty and Admin Agreement signed, and particularly in view of party action approving principles governing negotiations. I think we should take their judgment on this, for there would seem to be every advantage for us in assisting Kishi in every way possible to settle on basis of US proposals as modified by him and Fujiyama since we will certainly not get any better, if as good, proposal later from Kishi or any future govt.

If we can reach final agreement on basis of our proposals as modified by Japanese, I think we will be out of woods on this very difficult problem and that it will be accepted by Japanese public and Diet and will have effect of placing our security relationships with Japan, which are so vital to our own over-all security interests in the Pacific, on much more durable long-term basis.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/4–3059. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to CINCPAC and COMUS/Japan.
1. Telegram 2201, April 24, reported on the discussion that MacArthur had in a publicly announced meeting on April 23 with Fujiyama. During the meeting Fujiyama said that the Government of Japan would be ready to present the whole package soon. MacArthur then emphasized the importance of strict secrecy regarding the Japanese package, particularly the existence of an earlier U.S. draft. (Ibid., 611.94/4–2459)
2. Dated April 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/4–359) See Supplement. Also pertinent are telegrams 2012 and 2088 from Tokyo, April 3 and 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/4–359 and 611.94/4–1159) See Supplement for both.
3. See Document 48.
4. Senators J.W. Fulbright of Arkansas, Bourne B. Hickenlooper of Iowa, Mike Mansfield of Montana, and Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin were members of the Foreign Relations Committee.
5. Document 35.
6. Dated April 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/4–959)
7. Document 38.
8. See footnote 8, Document 43.
9. Transmitted in telegram 1776 from Tokyo, February 25, 1952; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, Part 2, pp. 1192–1194.
10. For text, see 3 UST (pt. 3) 3413.