Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

48. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, April 29, 1959, 6 p.m.

2236. CINCPAC exclusive for POLAD and Adm Felt. COMUS/J exclusive for Gen Bums and Capt Harrison (CINCPAC Rep). Secnog 3. Following are my comments on Japanese proposals for new security treaty:

Verbatim text.

1. Preamble:

Comment:

a. The title word “Preamble” has been dropped. This is consistent with pattern of our other treaties in Pacific area.

b. In second full paragraph, Japanese have moved word “economic” to link it with “stability” and have eliminated words “in the Pacific area”. Japanese do not wish to give appearance that their economic objectives in Southeast Asia, including their important economic relations with such neutral countries as Burma and Indonesia, are in any way related to a military security treaty, as they fear it might lead to charges that they are reviving greater Asia co-prosperity sphere of prewar Japanese militarists. They are prepared however (see para d below) to stress in other ways their interest in security of entire Far East.

c. Japanese have inserted one-line fifth paragraph, “desiring that the security of Japan be ensured.” For comment see paragraph 5 (a) below.

d. New sixth para gives us what we had sought as per Deptel 1028, para 2.¹ It provides stronger basis for US use of facilities and areas in connection with maintenance of peace and security outside of treaty area [and] as formulated should be quite acceptable to Japanese opinion. (Same thought is also very clearly expressed in new Japanese proposed language in Article VI.)

2. Article I.

Comment: Additional para about strengthening UN designed to make treaty more acceptable to Japanese public opinion. Both sentiment and language appear to be unexceptionable and would seem to raise no problems.

3. Article II.

Comment: Japanese have eliminated phrase “including economic cooperation with other friendly and like-minded countries in the Pacific area” for same general reason as stated in comments in para 1(b) re Preamble and also because phrase “like-minded” might be construed by some as meaning Japan would give reference [Article] II economic cooperation to countries also having military security pact with US such as SEATO countries, GRC, etc. Deleted phrase is not of course essential and was proposed by us on assumption it would please Japanese.

4. Article III.

Comment: Japanese proposal involves four modifications of our proposal:

a. Introductory phrase “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty” has been eliminated. Since objectives of treaty as set forth in Preamble, as amended, envisage maintenance of peace and security in area larger than the treaty area, GOJ feels it must avoid charge that Article III would obligate Japan to build up capacity to resist armed attack also outside of treaty area, which would clearly be considered unconstitutional. This would not seem to raise any major problem since as Japanese know, some of our former security treaties such as that with ROK do not have phrase “in order more effectively to achieve objectives of this treaty.”

b. “Individual capacity and in cooperation with each other” has been substituted for “separately and jointly”. Fujiyama explained that Japanese legal experts believed “jointly” in this context would imply integrated effort and thus impairment of Japanese sovereignty, and also that Japan might be obligated to contribute to development of its capacity to resist attack outside of treaty area. Fujiyama therefore suggested we drop phrase “separately and jointly”. To meet problem, I suggested ad referendum “individually and in cooperation with each other”. This phrase in conjunction with phrase “continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, etc.” would seem fully to preserve intent of our original language which is based on Vandenberg resolution concept.

c. Elimination of words “individual and collective capacity” and substitution of “capacities”. Japanese cannot accept word “collective” because in Japanese it connotes a multilateral meaning which would raise major difficulties and would be interpreted as first step of Japan into SEATO. We note that words “individual and collective capacity” are also not contained in our mutual defense treaty with ROK.

d. Elimination of final clause on subversive activities. Japanese believe reference to counter-subversive activities will create major parliamentary difficulties. They point out Socialists last fall tried to connect new treaty with Japanese police revision bill (Embtel 1058)² and that Leftists, Neutralists, and leftist-oriented Japanese press would use counter-subversion phrase to stir up troubles. Also, Japanese fear clause would be interpreted as retention substance of so-called “civil war” clause in Article I of present treaty. They prefer handle problem as in 5a below. This clause is not essential, and Japanese are aware language on subversive activities is not contained in Mutual Defense Treaty with ROK or Philippines. Above four modifications seem to us quite acceptable.

5. Article IV.

Comment:

a. Japanese have two reasons for proposed insertion of words “the security of Japan or” into our draft. First, they feel that since Article XXIV is to be dropped from Admin Agreement (as approved in para 1(c) of Deptel 1029),³ treaty should contain some language calling specifically for consultation in event of threat to security of Japan. Secondly, Fujiyama has had trouble with small number Diet members who are concerned over dropping of “civil war” clause in Article I of present security treaty. For reasons stated in para 4 (b) and (d) above, GOJ feels that any direct reference to joint action in case of internal disturbances would be politically undesirable. However, the words “security of Japan” proposed for insertion in Article V would in GOJ view give additional reassurances to such Diet members that treaty does not preclude consultations also on internal threats directed from without. Fujiyama also believes this will have some useful impact on Communist powers in deterring them, should they ever be so tempted, from organizing an insurrection in Japan which would be directed and supported by them from without.

b. The phrase “at the request of either party” has been substituted for our original phrase “in the opinion of either of them”. This change, which involves no difference in substance and is one purely of form, is due to GOJ concern lest Socialists charge that Japan would be required to consult about internal security of Japan at a time when in its own opinion there might be no need for such consultation. Substitution of “at the request of either party” meets this difficulty, and consultation can still be held at any time either party considers it necessary or desirable for any reason.

c. Substitution of words “international peace and security in the Far East is threatened” stems from Japanese acceptance of our proposal to include in Preamble and Article VI an affirmation of common concern in peace and security of Far East and to that extent signifies increased Japanese interest in peace and security outside treaty area. This would seem to raise no basic problem, because obviously if either Japan or US felt peace or security in Far East threatened, there should be consultation. This same concept appears, of course, in other of our treaty engagements.

6. Article V

Comment:

a. New language defining treaty area is substantially same as that proposed in Deptel 1028.

b. Insertion of “in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter” serves to call attention to compatibility of new treaty with UN Charter.

Both above changes appear non-substantive.

7. Article VI.

Comment:

a. Japanese draft first para would seem constitute improvement as against our draft because it makes clearer Japanese interest in maintenance of international peace and security in Far East, and thus provides stronger basis for use of US facilities and areas in Japan for purposes other than defense of Japan.

Reference to land, air and naval forces makes more specific what had been implied in our draft.

b. Second draft para would seem quite acceptable and takes account of fact that use of facilities is governed not only by new agreement on status of forces and use of facilities and areas with subordinate agreements thereto but also by consultation formula.

8. Article VII.

Comment: No change from US proposal.

9. Article VIII.

Comment: This new article is important to GOJ for domestic political reasons as it emphasizes that treaty does not impose obligations on either party conflicting with its constitutional provisions. From our viewpoint this would seem to create no problem.

10. Article IX (VIII in US draft).

Comment: Japanese have substituted “on the date on which” for “when”, to make language of article more precise. This seems fully acceptable. Japanese initially proposed that “Japan” should precede “the United States of America” in treaty. We opposed this and then proposed ad referendum that in English language version “the United States of America” come first and in Japanese language version “Japan” come first throughout treaty. Japanese have agreed to this.

11. Article X (IX in US draft).

Comment: Additional phrase is simply to be more precise regarding present security treaty and raises no problem.

Article XI (X in US draft).

Comment:

a. Japanese have substituted for our word “indefinitely” the phrase “until in the opinion of the Govts of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such UN arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.”

This language was developed from language Secy Dulles wrote into Article IV of present treaty. Its effect for purpose of this article is basically same as “indefinitely” and it is much more acceptable to Japanese opinion than word “indefinitely” as it carries hope that eventually the UN will be developed and strengthened to point where it will be able to ensure peace and security.

b. Original last sentence of this article as proposed by US was subject to ambiguity as to whether minimum term of treaty would be ten years or eleven years. Accordingly we proposed new language for second sentence of this article which makes clearer that minimum duration of treaty is eleven years (Embtel 2005).⁴ From our point of view this language would seem to be preferable.

13. New concluding sentence of treaty indicates that both American and Japanese versions are equally authentic. Japanese envisage signature of treaty in Washington with exchange of ratification instruments in Tokyo.

14. Overall Conclusions: Draft with modifications proposed by GOJ appears fully consistent with basic objectives of our draft and also with our other Pacific security treaties. It is also consistent in every respect with discussions I had with Senators Fulbright, Mansfield, Wiley, and Hickenlooper last September and with further discussion I had with Senator Fulbright in November, as Dept may wish to mention to them. I strongly recommend we accept modifications which Japanese have proposed to our draft since Japanese have in fact accepted all points of substance we proposed except for original treaty area which was constitutionally and politically impossible for them to accept but where they have accepted our second choice on treaty area.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/4-2959. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC, COMUS/Japan.
1. Document 43.
2. Telegram 1058 from Tokyo, November 17, 1958, reported that Tokyo papers carried an AP release from Washington stating that experts considered the police bill, security treaty, and constitution revision to be “somewhat related.” Moreover, the AP story continued, the United States would welcome revision of the Japanese constitution. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.00/11–1758)
3. See footnote 8, Document 43.
4. Dated April 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/4–359) See Supplement.