45. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State0
1867. CINCPAC for POLAD and Admiral Felt; COMUS/Japan for General Burns. Following our discussion of Bristol Bay salmon1 yesterday, Fujiyama said he wanted to report on latest developments in connection with security treaty negotiations.
Fujiyama said following our last conversation (Embtel 1806)2 he and other Govt leaders had been giving further serious consideration to question of how to handle Administrative Agreement and they had now come to agree with position I had indicated, that new Mutual Security Treaty and new Administrative Agreement should be one package and that any changes made in latter agreement must be with view to making it durable and not having it all opened up again for renegotiation. Japan and US would of course as in past have right under Article XXVIII to request changes in Administrative Agreement, but object of present exercise should be to have a new Administrative Agreement which would not need to be opened up after it and treaty are ratified. To this end, GOJ must be able to show that Administrative Agreement involves significant improvements in line with new relationship of equality between our two countries.
I told Fujiyama I had been rather disturbed by irresponsible press stories that seem to be grab-bags of all possible features of Administrative Agreement that might come in for revision. I said if such overall revision were proposed it would involve very prolonged negotiations, [Page 126] with prospect that socialists, press and other elements hostile to Govt would seize on every disagreement, in which case I saw no prospect for early conclusion of new Mutual Security Treaty.
Fujiyama said he had met March 12 with LDP Foreign Affairs Research Committee. Most of its members seem to understand that overall revision of Administrative Agreement, opening up virtually all its substantive provisions to re-examination and renegotiation, is neither desirable nor politically necessary at this time. On other hand, Fujiyama said, he was forced to report in all frankness that majority opinion among responsible elements of his party does not feel that revision of Administrative Agreement could be limited only to Article XXIV and XXV (2) (b). At present, the various interested ministries and agencies were studying the agreement, in line with customary right to make known their views when an international agreement is under consideration. However, Fujiyama added, the results of those studies will be submitted to FonOff for screening and he hopes to be able to dismiss large number of suggestions for changes as unnecessary or unrealistic.
It was his intention, Fujiyama said, to keep suggestions for substantive changes to minimum. At same time, however, GOJ must be in position to answer criticisms that Japan is receiving significantly less favorable treatment than other US Allies. In some cases, Fujiyama said, such charges could probably be met by mere face-lifting or window-dressing. In other cases he would probably be satisfied with any information or arguments that we might furnish to enable GOJ to answer such criticisms. Where treatment of Japan is glaringly discriminatory as compared with other US Allies, however, and where such impression cannot be met by appropriate explanations or by changes in form, it may be necessary to contemplate also substantive changes.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/3–1459. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC and COMUS/Japan.↩
- Documents relating to bilateral negotiations on the subject are ibid., 894.245.↩
- Document 44.↩