Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

44. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, March 7, 1959, 4 p.m.

1806. CINCPAC for POLAD and Adm Felt. COMUS Japan for Gen Burns. Reference Embassy telegram 1758.¹ Fujiyama asked to see me privately last night with respect to security treaty negotiations. He said after his continuing talks with party leaders he thought there were no longer any substantial divergences in treaty itself; he hoped to adjust remaining differences within relatively short time; and he would then want to move quickly to complete negotiations. However, he did not on this occasion wish to discuss provisions of Mutual Security Treaty itself, but the Administrative Agreement.

In view of my strong statements to him and to Kishi (Embtels 1274² and 1584³) that it will be impossible to move ahead with treaty negotiations unless we first have a clear understanding with respect to Administrative Agreement and my insistence that it was also necessary to keep changes in Administrative Agreement largely to those of form and not open up all kinds of substantive matters, he and Kishi had been holding the line on Administrative Agreement. However, while substantial unity exists among conservatives with respect to handling of security treaty itself, there are widely differing views within party about Administrative Agreement and he wished to discuss them with me in all frankness. Opinions on Administrative Agreement within LDP fall essentially into three groups:

• First, there are those who desire massive revision of Administrative Agreement now. Such persons usually talk without knowledge of actual provisions of the agreement and want to make changes just for the sake of their political impact. This point of view was definitely opposed by Kishi government. Fujiyama felt that such persons could be dealt with.
• Second, there were some who feel that certain changes of substance, though not necessarily numerous changes, should be made in Administrative Agreement, but that negotiations should be concluded fairly soon. They do not desire to open up entire agreement for renegotiation. However, they have in mind several changes in addition to elimination of Articles XXIV and XXV (2) (b) dealing with consultation and yen contribution. They feel certain changes are necessary to make Administrative Agreement less vulnerable to criticism that it is not in line with “new era of equal partnership.”
• Third, there is large group who feel that Japan should not at this time press for more than elimination of Articles XXIV and XXV (2) (b), provided there is a public understanding between us that Administrative Agreement will be reopened for renegotiation after signature of new Mutual Security Treaty.

In any event, Fujiyama said, legal experts of Foreign Ministry, Prime Minister’s small [staff?] and Conservative Party all agree that technically the present Administrative Agreement will expire upon entry into effect of new Mutual Security Treaty so that, even if no changes were made (beyond changing references from old Security Treaty to new Mutual Security Treaty), it will in any event be essential to have technically “new” Administrative Agreement. This is strictly legal view, and has been fortified by finding of parliamentary experts that Administrative Agreement will have to be submitted to Diet for ratification.

Fujiyama said strong majority of LDP was developing in favor of third alternative above. Fujiyama realized third alternative created certain difficulties on our side and in light of this development had asked to see me urgently after dinner in order to put the problem frankly before US and to hear my reaction.

I said I appreciated frankness with which Fujiyama had spoken and would reply with all frankness although I might have to say some things that he would not like. I said treaty revision basically involves US giving up certain broad rights which we have under present treaty and undertaking a commitment to assist in defense of Japan. In return we would have assured use of bases and facilities on mutually agreed terms and also one intangible element that we regard as of great value: This is strengthening of relationship of friendship, mutuality and durable cooperation in security field on basis of free and voluntary association between our countries. A new security treaty can be presented in Japan as valuable achievement for Kishi government in eliminating certain one-sided aspects of present treaty, thus improving atmosphere between our two countries. However, if we were to sign such a treaty, only to be confronted immediately by the prospect of prolonged and perhaps acrimonious debate about Administrative Agreement, the entire idea of new treaty loses its attractiveness for US.

I said it would in my opinion be most serious error to proceed along lines of third alternative. Neither our Executive branch nor our Senate would be interested in new security treaty if at same time we are served notice that Administrative Agreement, which spells out what we obtain under treaty, is to come in for extensive and unpredictable renegotiation. Furthermore, our ability to carry out our responsibilities under a new security treaty would depend on a satisfactory Administrative Agreement. Therefore I thought it imperative that we reach agreement on Administrative Agreement before we could conclude a new security treaty.

Fujiyama then said that under second alternative there would not be major or massive revision, but improvement of appearances and possibly a small number of changes. Fujiyama said he had been taking position that only substantive changes would be elimination of Articles XXIV and XXV (2) (b) on yen support costs but there was considerable opposition within LDP to restricting changes to these two articles only.

At this point I decided (Deptel 1028)⁴ it was best to give Fujiyama clear indication of what we were willing to do and how we envisioned improving appearance of agreement. I said Washington still strongly preferred simply to conform old Administrative Agreement to new treaty by an exchange of letters or documents. Our legal experts did not see why a new agreement was essential. However, in view of position of GOJ that some form of new Administrative Agreement was required under Japanese laws we were willing to have a new Administrative Agreement which would be technically new since the language would be conformed to the new treaty. There would also be some other modifications of appearance in an effort to be helpful to Kishi and make agreement better received by Japanese public opinion, and we would also agree to drop Article XXIV as proposed by Japanese. I then gave him paper containing changes we are prepared to make (Deptel 1029).⁵ I said I hoped he would agree that we had made a serious effort to be helpful and meet his and Kishi’s problem.

I also gave Fujiyama draft of exchange of letters by which GOJ would confirm our continued use of facilities and areas and that continued validity of decisions, procedures, interpretations, agreed views, arrangements and all other agreements of joint committee (Embtel 1263⁶ and Deptel 1029). I said it would of course be necessary to exchange letters on these subjects but if Japanese prefer they need not be made public.

Fujiyama said he would study papers I gave him most carefully. He wished to remind me that he and Kishi were both committed to seek elimination of Article XXV (2) (b). He would report his talk with me in detail to Kishi and after they had time to consider problem further he would be in touch with me. He wished to assure me that he and Kishi both realized that we had our problems as well as the fact that they had their problems. He also wished to emphasize that he and Kishi would try and keep substantive changes to absolute minimum.

Comment: While Kishi and Fujiyama obviously have a problem with respect to the Administrative Agreement, I am most strongly opposed to easy way out (third alternative favored by majority of Conservative Party). This would in effect merely postpone negotiations on Administrative Agreement. I continue to feel strongly that we should not conclude new Mutual Security Treaty until we have reached satisfactory agreement with Japanese on substance of Administrative Agreement.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/3–759. Secret; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to CINCPAC and COMUS/Japan.
1. Telegram 1758, March 2, reported that some LDP faction leaders had publicly come out in favor of major changes in the Administrative Agreement. Kishi, attempting to stem the tide, made statements in the Diet implying that changes in the Administrative Agreement could be made after the signing of the new security treaty. (Ibid., 794.5/3–259)
2. Reference is apparently incorrect as telegram 1274 did not deal with the subject.
3. See footnote 7, Document 43.
4. Document 43.
5. See footnote 8, Document 43.
6. See footnote 2, Document 43.