Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

233. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Vienna, October 15, 1960.

PARTICIPANTS

• Willy Brandt, Mayor of Berlin
• Egon Bahr, Director of the Information and Press Office of Land Berlin Ambassador Matthews
• Mr. Wainhouse
• Mr. Bennett
• Mr. Ewing

At an hour’s private meeting which Ambassador Matthews arranged with Mayor Brandt during the latter’s visit in Vienna in connection with Berlin Week, Brandt talked about conditions in Berlin and responded to questions regarding the possibilities in the situation there. He began by saying that morale of the West Berliners remains high. For all practical purpose there is full employment. As a long range problem there is the increasing age of the population, the problem of wartime losses having been aggravated by the emigration of many young Berliners in the years immediately after the war to West Germany and elsewhere. Some way must be found to attract young people back to Berlin.

He spoke of the trade problem with East Berlin. He said that the East Germans were already making overtures in connection with the recent announcement of intention to cancel the interzonal trade agreement as of January 1. He himself would be quite willing to see conversations undertaken and to hold them above the “Leopold” level at which trade questions have been normally handled in the past. He would be willing to go as high as the Ministerialdirektor level.

Mayor Brandt indicated that there is full identity of views between Chancellor Adenauer and him on the importance of standing firm on Berlin. In response to a question, he expressed the view that Ulbricht and the East Germans have a fairly free hand in devising measures of harassment and encroachment on West Berlin rights, and that the principal initiative comes from Ulbricht. He seemed to feel that Khrushchev, while in agreement, does not interest himself so much in the details of the situation but does exercise general control to ensure that the East Germans do not go too far and precipitate a real crisis.

It was clear that Brandt has no stomach for pussyfooting or retreat on the holding of a Bundestag meeting in Berlin. He pointed out that the Soviets had made dire threats before with respect to an even more important constitutional body, the Bundesversammlung which elects the President for the German Federal Republic. The meeting had been held in Berlin despite Soviet threats and nothing had happened.¹ If concessions are made to the Soviets on this kind of issue, they are merely emboldened to grab for more. He holds no truck with those who believe such steps are “provocative” and add to the dangers of the situation.

In reply to an inquiry he said that an important consideration in the decision to organize a civil militia in Berlin was the desire to create some sort of force which could counter minor or low level attempts at armed penetration into West Berlin or disorders organized by East German elements. Such a body could, for instance, control rowdies or could act in situations where it might not be thought advisable to engage police or other official elements of Berlin forces, or the Allied military.

Brandt expressed himself in favor of an increase of Western military forces in Berlin. This increase need not be large, perhaps only a total of a thousand troops or so, and certainly it should not be large enough to make any great difference in the event of serious trouble. However, it would be an evidence of “political will” on the part of the West to keep Berlin free. In response to a question as to whether such a buildup should be announced or merely carried out quietly, assuming of course that the Soviets would know about it, he said that he could see merit in each of these courses but that he was gradually coming around to the view that it would be better to make a public announcement. It could be assumed that communist authorities would learn of the buildup through agents or otherwise, and they might then take the initiative on the publicity or raise the matter in a way which could be embarrassing to the Western position. Mayor Brandt left little doubt that he foresees that the situation in Berlin is going to have to get worse before it gets better. He remarked that a Mayor could not be in the position of saying that he wanted a crisis to come because that would be irresponsible. However, he made clear his view that a dramatic worsening of Berlin’s position or the use of severe pressure tactics on the part of the communists would focus world attention on the plight of Berlin and perhaps aid in compelling necessary decisions. With respect to the future of Berlin, Mayor Brandt left no doubt that he would prefer a drastic cure to a steady and inexorable decline through nibbling tactics on the part of the communists. He indicated no particular concern over the effects in Berlin of possible East German measures to cut off traffic to and from Berlin, mentioning that there are good reserves of necessary stocks. Brown coal is the only vital item coming from the East and Berlin could switch to West German sources of supply, “assuming it were allowed to come through to Berlin.” In that connection, he pointed out that a truck of Berlin-produced goods leaves the city for the West every three minutes. Eastern success in reducing this traffic to one truck every nine minutes, for instance, could be very serious for the city.

There was some discussion of the Soviet memorandum handed to Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky by Gromyko during the Khrushchev visit to Austria in early July of this year, Brandt indicating he had heard nothing further about this gambit.² Perhaps significantly, Brandt inquired of the Ambassador whether Kreisky’s suggestion that use of UN forces to guarantee leased corridor to West Berlin under some arrangement with the Soviets on a free city status had resulted from some idea thrown out by the Soviets or whether it represented Kreisky’s own views. The Ambassador told him that Kreisky had indicated it was his own idea, while discussing possible solutions.

Brandt said that the Soviet memorandum handled through Kreisky was only one of several indirect approaches on this subject which had been made by the Soviet Union. There had also been the Smirnoff note in Bonn and there had been the Soviet notes to the three Western Powers which had relieved little public notice because they had been more or less lost in the general excitement over the abortive Summit meeting in Paris in May.³ It was his, Brandt’s, view that some notice should be taken of these approaches and some response made to the Soviets, in order to sound them out and ascertain insofar as possible what their intentions on Berlin are. He had urged Adenauer to take this up during his last visit to Washington, but Adenauer had not done so, apparently because of concern that any indication of a willingness to talk with the Soviets on the status of Berlin might be interpreted in Western quarters as evidence of West German weakness on the issue. Brandt commented that the Soviet Union is after all a great power with real interests in Central Europe, and should be treated as such and have its proposals considered in view of their great sensitivity on this prestige aspect. To ignore Soviet overtures altogether is merely to add an element of pique to the already unstable quality of Soviet reactions. The Ambassador told him Kreisky had received word through Ambassador Avilov⁴ that Gromyko would be glad to “clarify” any unclear points in his memorandum, a development which seemed to interest Brandt and of which he had not heard.

P.S. The Ambassador subsequently attended the reception for Brandt at the Rathaus where he made a very lucid, forthright address of an hour and a half which was loudly applauded. After giving a clear, factual history of the Berlin situation, emphasizing the Soviet propaganda falsely labeling any move from the holding of the Bundesversammlung to the preaching of Billy Graham as a “provocation,” he pointed out that just because the Berlin position is abnormal does not mean that any change would improve it. Any such change must not weaken this vital outpost of freedom.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10–1960. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bennett and transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 391 from Vienna, October 19. The conversation took place at the U.S. Ambassador’s Residence.
1. The Bundesversammlung met in Berlin in July 1959 for the election of the President of the Federal Republic.
2. See Document 203.
3. Regarding the Smirnov memorandum, see Document 69; presumably the Soviet note is that of June 30, printed in Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 707–708.
4. Viktor Ivanovich Avilov, Soviet Ambassador in Austria.