Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany⁰

Washington, October 10, 1960, 7:43 p.m.

665. Deliver Wolf 8:00 a.m. October 11. Polios 480, 487, 488, 496, 498, 499, 500; Bonn’s 504, 507, 517, 529, 531.¹

Department has noted information reported reference telegrams and concluded other NATO countries will not accept invocation economic sanctions at this time without a wider agreement on underlying rationale for such action.

We believe Soviets probably implementing calculated policy of gradually turning over their responsibilities re Berlin to East German regime with view to creating situation of fact which will weaken Western negotiating position. Continuation on this course can lead to an intolerable situation.

Apart from extreme legal claims of complete sovereignty and implied abrogation Western rights, disturbing factor in situation is new energetic role of “GDR” which acting almost as if separate treaty concluded. This assertion of authority is more serious than actual action taken. Present threat to Berlin cannot be measured solely by limited restrictions on travel thus far imposed. Also disquieting is Soviet position set forth publicly in September 26 note² (which British agree “hard and disturbing”) disclaiming its responsibilities and supporting “GDR” jurisdictional claims. This calculated undermine quadripartite status Berlin, destroy legal position of Allies in City, force us out, establish phony “Free City” and incorporate all of Berlin into Soviet bloc.

We do not think Allies should lull themselves with hopes that Soviets do not want crisis over Berlin. Probability is that in seeking another Summit soon, Khrushchev will be prepared precipitate crisis or threaten do so. US does not seek crisis but unwilling pay blackmail in order postpone one. We do not want Soviets to misjudge US firmness during election campaign. If there must be crisis over Berlin we would prefer have it when we are relatively stronger rather than after Berlin softened up and Allied position eroded by creeping encroachment.

Neither should Allies take it for granted that Berlin problem can be settled at conference table in few months. Next US administration not committed to new Summit. This will have to be considered very carefully. US does not want another fiasco like Paris. As recently as October 7 both Presidential candidates said publicly they would not be willing meet Khrushchev before careful preparatory negotiations gave some reasonable prospect of progress, and we see no indication Soviets prepared be reasonable re Berlin, or under presently enunciated formula, engage in such preparations.

In any event Allies cannot afford have Berlin position deteriorate seriously in whatever interval ensues.

US believes firm united action now might well head off serious crisis later.

Although specific revocation “GDR” decrees would ideally be most desirable, more realistic goal would be that firm stand would produce nonimplementation and discourage “GDR” from proceeding with further harassments.

Agree discussion implementation NATO restrictions on East German travel should be reserved for NAC meeting October 12 unless Three Powers in position propose agreed solution in trade category.

Quick agreement re TTD’S and visas obviously essential and we have, therefore, with following proposals come as close to British position as possible. Believe they should move rest of way to meet us.

Would agree “National Interest” trade cases not tied any specific termination date for present although would wish reconsider when Germans decide what happens IZT January 1. Should be agreed “National Interest” invoked in general only to continue trade at present levels not increase.

Would agree TTD’s and visas granted for genuine trade mission replacements with as much administrative delay as possible in order not facilitate replacements, but no TTD’s or visas for additional trade mission personnel.

Cannot agree “administrative convenience” should dictate validity period of six months for TTD’s and visas. Would propose one month subject monthly renewal but not guaranteed. Would as final concession settle for three month validity.

Believe this should prove acceptable to British as should not affect trade at all, much less constitute economic countermeasure.

We have incidentally seen report indicating London and Paris businessmen will have nothing to do with trade mission personnel preferring to handle transactions directly with East German trade partners.

Agree clarification by German NATO representative of position re IZT indispensable next step. Necessary in order deal with Spaak’s contention they may have gone too far too fast in direction economic blockade and British contention they have not taken lead in moving toward economic countermeasures. Obviously Germans must inform NAC whether can or cannot continue interzonal trade in 1961 in absence new agreement. In this connection see Bonn’s 529 and 531 conclusion that trade can continue and German confirmation. Also see Berlin’s 255.³

Department agrees NATO should be furnished report contained Bonn’s 531 re Bonn quadripartite study economic countermeasures.

We know of no US commitment not to urge implementation of economic countermeasures. Also in agreeing include trade category in TTD ban UK did not make clear they intended include broad commercial interests in “National Interest” category nor that they intended exempt from ban East Germans already abroad.

Quadripartite study economic countermeasures should be expedited so that if we cannot convince Allies to go along with measures in trade field at this time we will at least be prepared react immediately and concertedly with selective restrictions of increasing severity (but not necessarily exactly in kind) when next harassment comes.

USRO should consider proposing study in NATO of how burdens of any such countermeasures might be equalized.

Germans should consider what they can do to help NATO members needing skilled maintenance and repairmen with parts to service heavy machinery purchased from East Germany.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/10–760. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Cash; cleared by Hillenbrand, Davis, SOV, BNA, and RA; and approved by Kohler. Also sent priority to Paris, repeated priority to Berlin and London, and pouched to Moscow and the other NATO capitals.
1. These cables, dated October 3–8, discussed various aspects of the question of sanctions against the German Democratic Republic. (Ibid., 375/10–660 and 375/10–760; 462A.62B41/10–760; 662A.62B41/10–860; 762.00/10–360, 762.00/10–560, 762.00/10–660, and 762.00/10–860; and 862.181/10–460, 862.181/10–560, and 862.181/10–760, respectively)
2. For text of this note, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 720–721.
3. Dated October 8, telegram 255 from Berlin outlined the shipments and deliveries that would be carried out between East and West Germany now that the interzonal trade agreement had been denounced. (Department of State, Central Files, 662A.62B41/10–860)