Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

231. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State⁰

London, October 8, 1960, 7 p.m.

1721. Paris USRO for Burgess. Prime Minister asked me to call on him yesterday afternoon. Conversation was not specific and generally covered his impressions of his New York visit, with which believe Dept broadly familiar. He struck me as being in good form and he reflected optimism as to outcome current problems generally along same lines as he has expressed publicly.

I took occasion to raise with him matter of British attitude toward Berlin, noting that while without instructions I was becoming concerned that US and UK appeared to diverge in their assessment of seriousness of present Soviet drive against West Berlin and consequently on the feed for effective and immediate countermeasures, principally economic. Macmillan rationalized British attitude on grounds that serious Soviet attack on Western position Berlin not in his view underlying policy at moment, and recent harassments are still in realm of isolated separate actions. He felt this British view confirmed in conversation he had in New York with Khrushchev, wherein latter reiterated Soviet intention not to bring Berlin situation to head before next spring. PM apparently accepts Khrushchev’s statement, as he does Khrushchev’s further reiteration of desire to hold summit meeting in 1961 after change in US administration, with regard to economic countermeasures per se. PM added, as British have previously said, that the UK would require additional legislation to institute serious economic countermeasures, and he assumed other countries including US would be under similar necessity.

On basis this conversation I cannot but conclude that current prospects of British going along with US on countermeasures in economic field are dim. I will continue to pursue this matter with PM and his colleagues as opportunity offers and specific instructions for use in that connection would be helpful. However, with this attitude at the top I cannot be hopeful that in the absence of developments which will serve to counteract his present assessment of Soviet Berlin tactics we will be able to persuade the British of the importance of Western firmness in deterring Soviet or East German piecemeal encroachments.

Whitney

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.4111/10–860. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn and Paris.