230. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Douglas)0
Dear Jim: Thank you for your letter of October 3, 1960 to the Secretary forwarding a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the present situation in Berlin.1
We concur that it is important to make it clear to the Soviets, through appropriate measures and countermeasures on our part, that we shall not permit our position in Berlin to be eroded. At the same time, however, we consider that the effectiveness of the countermeasures available to us will depend in large measure on careful timing and dosage.
As the Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware, the three Western Heads of Government meeting in Paris on May 18, 1960 approved a paper on Berlin Contingency Planning which stated that it was considered advisable that more attention be given to the possibility of gradual harassment of German civil access.2 In accordance with the Directive of the Heads of Government, planning on this subject was initiated with the Germans in Bonn.
The most recent Communist harassment has been directed primarily against the access of West Germans to East Berlin (and to a lesser extent also against their access to West Berlin) rather than against the economic connection of West Berlin with Western Europe or the access and circulation of the Allied Forces and the population of Berlin. We and the British and the French have already protested to the Soviets against this harassment in both Berlin and Moscow. In addition, we have taken the concrete countermeasure of restricting severely the issuance by the Allied Travel Office of the Temporary Travel Documents which East Germans require for travel to most non-Communist countries.
In our view, the harassment we have seen in the past few weeks is of a type which calls for countermeasures primarily by the Federal Republic, which is not only directly interested but which also has the readiest weapon—economic countermeasures against the Soviet Zone, which have been under necessary extensive quadripartite study in Bonn for more than a month. The day after the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their memorandum to you, the Federal Republic took the important step [Page 604] of denouncing its Interzonal Trade Agreement with the Soviet Zone. We supported this move. The denunciation should have a good psychological effect on the East Germans, especially since the latter may infer that specific economic sanctions will follow. It should also facilitate the eventual stoppage of shipments to the Soviet Zone if such action is deemed necessary. Further discussion of countermeasures is now taking place at Bonn, where we have urged a selective embargo on shipments to the Soviet Zone.
The intelligence reports we have received to date indicate that there is considerable concern in the Soviet Zone about the effects which the present travel restrictions, the denunciation of the IZT agreement and future economic countermeasures may have on the Zone’s economy. While we are inclined to doubt that there will be a formal rescission of the recent East German decrees, we think it possible that they will no longer be strictly enforced.
None of the countermeasures which might be appropriate under the present circumstances, including travel restrictions and a selective embargo on shipments, seems to us likely to have more than temporary effectiveness. Moreover, to insure their maximum effectiveness, it is necessary that the cooperation of all the NATO countries be obtained to avoid evasion through transit shipments and substitution of sources. One of the requirements of the situation is that we develop, if possible, countermeasures which can be turned on and off just as harassment is turned on and off. In any case, our resources are limited, and the situation could become much worse than it is at this moment. We therefore believe it would be prudent to apply countermeasures with economy and caution in order to avoid firing off all of our ammunition at once or too soon.
We do, however, agree that it would be wise to accelerate planning for measures which might be taken if the situation worsens. The Embassies at Bonn have already been instructed to do so, in collaboration with the Foreign Office, as far as the problem of civilian access is concerned. As far as Allied access is concerned, we have recently given the British and French our suggestions as to measures which might be taken at a later stage, after our access has been interrupted. Representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now collaborating on a “sanitized” version of our “Checklist of Military and Non-Military Measures” to be passed to the British and French shortly.
With reference to the specific recommendation made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum, I believe that it would be very useful if the Joint Chiefs would suggest to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group which of the measures in the checklist we might [Page 605] emphasize in tripartite discussions as calling for priority study or as being more suitable for early implementation.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170, 381 Germany. Secret.↩
- For the JCS memorandum, see Document 222; regarding Douglas’ letter, see the source note, ibid.↩
- See Document 185.↩