Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

222. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Gates⁰

JCSM–439–60

Washington, September 29, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Berlin Countermeasures

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are disturbed by the patterns of Communist action and Free World response as these have developed during recent weeks in the Berlin situation.

2. Communist action seems to thrust indirectly toward a most vulnerable point, the economic connection of West Berlin with Western Europe. It is doing so with some effectiveness and in a diffuse way, not offering any identifiably hostile act. Continuation of this line of action, which is already well under way, could gradually destroy the economic viability of West Berlin and thus dissolve the community of over two million whose continued existence in freedom the United States and NATO have so irrevocably guaranteed. It is a difficult line of action for the West to oppose, owing to the geographical situation of Berlin and to the fact that the emphasis in Berlin contingency planning has been on measures to counter Communist action against occupation troop access.

3. Free World response has been slow and limited, both in scope and effectiveness. Its purpose of causing the Soviets to decide to stop has not succeeded, nor do the actions so far adopted seem apt to do so.

4. The military significance of a free Berlin which denotes U.S. strength and determination is incomparably high. The U.S. guarantee of continued free existence for West Berlin is the keystone of our world-wide alliance structure. Everywhere our allies and the neutrals alike will be closely watching the United States perform in validating its pledge, watching both the nature of U.S. efforts, and the results. A U.S. failure would weaken our alliances, and a U.S. abandonment would tend to collapse them. But to continue the free existence of an economically healthy West Berlin even after the present creeping challenge would demonstrate both determination and strength.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States should now concentrate its efforts toward the objective of convincing the Communists that they cannot succeed, since the West will use necessary measures, including the use of force if required, to stop the current politico-economic erosion of Berlin. They believe that to achieve this objective, the United States should begin a program of political and military actions now, before the continued freedom of West Berlin comes into doubt. Progressively stronger actions have been planned against creeping restriction on Allied military access, and many of these listed actions would be equally effective against the creeping strangulation of the civilian economy.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that the U.S. Coordinating Group for Berlin Contingency Planning consider on an urgent basis what additional and more stringent countermeasures should now be taken to deter further Soviet activity against our interests in Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that they be permitted to comment on the countermeasures selected by the Coordinating Group prior to their submission to the President for final approval.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170, 381 Germany. Secret. Attached to a letter from Douglas to Herter, October 3, summarizing its contents and offering JCS assistance in planning military countermeasures.