Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria⁰

Washington, July 23, 1960, 7:10 p.m.

161. Your 158 and 180.¹ Department deeply appreciative your handling of delicate matter of Gromyko memorandum.

If you have not already done so, you may wish make following points to Kreisky.

Document contains nothing new merely reiterating old Soviet “free city” proposal for West Berlin, which is unacceptable because under existing conditions the rights of US, UK, and France to remain in Berlin with unhindered communications by surface and air are essential to continued protection of freedom of West Berliners, a responsibility solemnly accepted by the Three Powers and a responsibility they are resolutely determined to discharge. About this there should be no doubt whatsoever.

Basic solution of Berlin problem can only be found in context of German reunification. US Government remains ready to discuss German problem at any time with Soviet Government in any appropriate forum on the basis of any proposals genuinely designed to insure reunification of Germany in freedom. US Government continues to regard solution of all-German problem as essential to a lasting settlement in Europe. As Austrian Foreign Minister aware, Western Powers spent many weeks at Geneva in 1959 discussing with Soviets possible modus vivendi on Berlin. Agreement could not be reached, the Soviet position to date seems offer no basis for satisfactory arrangement. Lack of success of these efforts largely due Soviet refusal meet our offer of concessions with concessions on their part. If West makes concessions, Soviets must also. And we cannot regard as concessions offer perhaps to withdraw a few of a number of demands which were unacceptable and not legitimate from the start.

We can unfortunately put little faith in “new Four Power guarantee” of type envisaged at time when Soviets demonstrating so clearly their capacity to go to any lengths to repudiate their solemn engagements just as soon as it no longer suits their purposes to honor such obligations.

Our evaluation of Soviet purposes causes us to conclude that Soviets regard any new arrangement for Berlin as merely a way station on the road to a complete take-over. We have no reason to believe they are prepared to meet concession with concession but, on contrary, are merely attempting to weaken and undermine Western position to the point where a complete take-over is possible.

If Berlin has become a focus of international tension, it is because Soviet Government deliberately threatens to disturb existing arrangements at present in force there, arrangements to which Soviet Government is itself a party.

US Government has, of course, no intention whatsoever of provoking armed conflict. However, Soviets know full well that if they or East Germans resort to force to prevent exercise of legitimate Allied rights, thus endangering freedom and security of West Berlin, US will have no choice other than to respond in any way necessary to honor its commitments and obligations to Berlin.

FYI. While Dept would not wish encourage Kreisky to act as intermediary with Soviets on this question, nevertheless it would be useful if he conveyed to Soviet Ambassador his impression our determination and firmness on Berlin.² End FYI.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–2060. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cash in GPA on July 22; cleared with Davis, McBride, Stabler, Hillenbrand, Merchant, and S/S; and approved by Herter. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, London, Moscow, and Paris.
1. During Khrushchev’s visit to Austria June 30–July 8 (see Documents 326 ff.), Gromyko gave Kreisky a memorandum for Brandt which repeated the Soviet view on Berlin and reiterated the Soviet proposal for a free city guaranteed by the United Nations. Telegram 158 from Vienna, July 18, transmitted a translation of the memorandum. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–1860) Telegram 180 from Vienna, July 20, reported that Ambassador Matthews had discussed the memorandum with Kreisky on that day. Kreisky stated that he thought no opportunity should be lost to discuss the situation with the Soviet Union and indicated that he had passed the memorandum on to Brandt and Adenauer. (Ibid., 762.00/7–2060) Regarding the memorandum, see Document 207.
2. On July 25, Matthews reported that Kreisky had left Vienna for Paris and would then go to Sweden, not to return to Austria until the end of August. (Telegram 201 from Vienna; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–2560) There is no evidence to indicate that Matthews took the matter up at that time.