202. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany0
G–30. Following are our preliminary views re Bundestag meeting Berlin in light of Khrushchev Austrian press conference threat.1 While we believe they will remain applicable in situation likely obtain in next few months, we will of course wish review situation as it develops, particularly as Soviet threat to take counteraction may intensify or weaken or even change form.
Decisions to hold meetings of Bundestag, Bundesrat, and Bundesversammlung in Berlin or have Federal President visit Berlin have been [Page 540] taken solely on initiative of Federal authorities. We have not encouraged these manifestations although we have naturally sympathized with objective of stressing symbolic roles of Berlin as German capital and show-window of democracy, which is entirely in accord with our own general policies and objectives in Germany. Allied intervention such matters has been and should be limited to decision whether these meetings or visits compatible with status or endanger security of Berlin.
Three Powers have long since decided such meetings and visits do not in fact conflict with special status of Berlin as area under Allied occupation. This is confirmed by series precedents since first Berlin Bundestag meeting 1954.
Neither have these meetings in past in any way endangered security of Berlin. They have been conducted in orderly and dignified way. They have, to be sure, been objects of Communist propaganda attacks but this has meant little in situation where mere existence free Berlin has been object of incessant vituperation. Such threats as have been contained in this propaganda attack in past have proven empty. Deputies have previously encountered no difficulties in transmitting Soviet Zone by road and rail (where, contrary Khrushchev’s apparent impression, they have always been subject GDR controls).
Whether Khrushchev would actually translate his threatening remarks into action by concluding separate peace treaty if Bundestag meets in Berlin is question to which we can have no certain answer at this time. However, if Soviets conclude separate peace treaty, it will be for more fundamental reasons. Bundestag meeting would be occasion rather than cause. Soviets already have numerous pretexts for treaty if they care use them.
Moreover, discontinuance, on basis of Soviet threat of treaty, of activities which are now accepted as usual could have serious adverse effect on security of city and our position there. In effect only alternative Khrushchev threat offers is choice of ways in which Soviet objectives are to be accomplished. Part of motivation of Soviet separate peace treaty agitation may be Soviet belief treaty can facilitate attrition of Federal Republic–Berlin relations, which are second only to Allied presence as guarantee of free Berlin’s survival. It is questionable whether Soviets could make much immediate progress in this direction if Allies and Germans prepared maintain firm resistance against attempts enforce any provisions of treaty concerning Berlin. If on other hand Allies and Germans can be frightened or bluffed by threat of treaty into altering various aspects of Berlin situation to suit Soviet purposes, Berlin’s security can be quickly and effectively undermined.
On basis above we do not believe we can or should object to Bundestag meeting on security grounds.
[Page 541]Prestige and psychological factors involved Radio Law issue (our 83)2 are also involved here. We cannot allow Soviets to overrule our decision as to what Federal activities are and are not compatible with special status of Berlin, all the more so when we are patently unable oblige Soviets to restrain activities in Soviet Sector which unquestionably conflict with city’s status. We could expect any precedent of such overruling to be followed by increased Soviet demands which, if acceded to, would rapidly reduce us to impotence in Berlin.
Furthermore, we cannot afford appear weak in face of specific Soviet threats, for we would then undermine Berlin’s spirit of resistance, jeopardize faith in us on which not only maintenance of Berlin but also firmness of our alliances depends, and encourage increasingly serious threats.
Should Federal authorities decide cancel Bundestag meeting because of recent Khrushchev threat, we would probably not urge them reconsider. However, we believe that it would be difficult for Soviets and for general public avoid inference Federal Republic’s moral support for Berlin was lessening or Federal Republic’s actions were being unduly influenced by Soviet threats.
Embassy is requested communicate above views to British and French.
Decision on timing of communication above views to Germans will be made following report of French and British reactions.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/7–1560. Confidential. Drafted by McKiernan; cleared with Kohler, Merchant, Hillenbrand, Kearney, Vigderman, Armitage, and S/S; and approved by Herter. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 200.↩
- Document 200.↩