Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

219. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 26, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Germany and Berlin and the Current UNGA Session

PARTICIPANTS

• German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe
• Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler
• Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

Mr. Kohler began by saying that frankly Khrushchev had included somewhat less in his speech on how bad the Germans were than might have been anticipated.¹ Ambassador Grewe noted that the Germans had received information from a Mr. Shapiro (presumably UPI correspondent in Moscow) two days before Khrushchev’s speech predicting that the main attacks on Germany would be left to the Satellites beginning with Novotny² today to be followed by Gomulka. The possibility was, Grewe continued, that the UN would never officially be seized of the German Berlin problem. There would only be speech-making by satellite representatives. The question was should the West leave it there, responding only by speeches in rebuttal.

Mr. Kohler pointed out that all were agreed there must be some replies by Western representatives during the general debate. We had accepted the line agreed in the North Atlantic Council. This involved an initial statement by one representative, not speaking on behalf of NATO but making reference to the organization, which might be somewhat along the lines of the original German suggestions circulated to the Council.³ We had had talks with the British and French in New York and had concluded that the three delegations should take the lead in ensuring consultation in New York with all NATO delegations and the German Observer in order to work out a division of labor as to who would say what. Some countries had already talked in the general debate and were not eligible to speak again. It was generally agreed, Mr. Kohler continued, that, during the first phase, the West should avoid taking any action which would distract attention from the theme of Khrushchev’s attack on the UN. We had decided in principle to submit an omnibus or basket item, but had not yet decided when the best time for this would be. The Soviet Union has an item attacking the alleged aggressive acts of the United States, and we have thought that they would drag in the subject of Germany under this. We would file a counter-item relating to the actions of the Soviets increasing tensions. This would include, inter alia, their harassment of Berlin. Under this item the West could focus on the German Berlin problem, possibly putting forward a resolution on the subject. This would have to be decided in the light of developments. We already had a draft resolution, Mr. Kohler noted. As the situation develops, we will, of course, consult fully with the Federal Republic. Much will depend on the way and the extent to which the subject arises in the Assembly.

Ambassador Grewe said he could understand how it might be desirable at the present time to leave the main issue of Khrushchev’s attack on the UN undiluted. He wondered, however, whether it would not be wise for the West to take the initiative on the German and Berlin problem to avoid giving an impression of timidity or bad conscience on the subject. Mr. Kohler observed that our statements on Germany and Berlin in the general debate should be firm and clear, as should also be the actions which we take outside of the UN. He was encouraged by the progress being made in Bonn, for example, in the study of possible countermeasures. The degree of GDR vulnerability to these counter-measures was apparently also somewhat greater than originally thought. He was also encouraged, Mr. Kohler continued, by such things as Norway’s coming into NATO on the subject of East German travel and saying it was prepared to take action agreed by the other NATO members. He hoped the Western Powers could move quickly to evidence their firmness.

Grewe said he had been disturbed by the attitude on the part of both the Occupying Powers and the Federal Republic, which seemed to amount to saying what are you going to do about it. Mr. Kohler commented that he would be frank in indicating that we were not satisfied that the Federal Republic was doing all it could. Grewe observed that any action taken must be common action if it is to be really effective. For the Federal Republic to act alone would not suffice; its actions must be backed up by all NATO countries. Mr. Kohler, agreed that Four Power and NATO cooperation would be essential. The British might perhaps stress the difficulties involved, but in the last analysis they could probably be brought around. As to neutrals like the Swedes and the Swiss, we would try to use our influence with them in the trade field to avoid the evasion of any countermeasures that might be invoked. But we were prepared to go ahead with such countermeasures, even if they were only two-thirds effective.

Grewe said he had talked to Dr. Erhard in Washington.⁴ His view was that any economic measures taken must be backed by as many Western countries as possible. Every economic measure taken by the Federal Republic within the framework of the interzonal trade agreement would create the danger of provoking the economic strangulation of West Berlin. Such measures might bring on a crisis in a short time. Therefore the West must coordinate its views as to what to do when such a crisis arrived. Dr. Erhard had been discouraged at the lack of unity shown by the three ambassadors in Bonn as to what the West would do under such circumstances. Mr. Kohler said it was preferable to face a crisis now rather than to lose Berlin bit by bit. We hoped we could persuade the British and the French on this point, and had had some useful talks with Lord Home, Hoyer-Millar and Couve which we hoped would have some good effects. In answer to Grewe’s query as to where these matters should be further discussed, Mr. Kohler said initially in Bonn, with the Four Powers in Washington reviewing the matter on a quadripartite basis. We had told the British and French, Mr. Kohler continued, that we consider the situation analogous to the stamp issue with respect to personal travel. While the substance of what is happening may not be so important, the legal basis which the GDR is trying to establish is important. They are making an unacceptable assertion of authority.

Mr. Kohler went on to say that the United States had taken a strong line on the issue of TTDs, which had now been substantially accepted by the British and French. Grewe observed that this would be made more effective if we could get the support of as many free countries as possible to avoid such subterfuges as the use of Czech or Polish passports by GDR travelers. Mr. Kohler commented that this was why we were encouraged by the Norwegian initiative. The NATO countries should obviously be brought into all these measures. If NATO agreement could be obtained this would make them effective enough to hurt.

Grewe noted that it would be good if, for example, the Swedes would not permit GDR representatives to remain in Sweden on the basis of Polish or Czech passports.

Grewe said that Chancellor Adenauer, upon his recent return from Italy, had been determined to take firm action. Mr. Kohler observed that common action was desirable, but our trade with the GDR is negligible. What little there is we could stop, but the main possibilities were those of the Federal Republic. Grewe said he had noted a feeling in the United States that German industry was not willing to cut off deliveries under the interzonal trade agreement. This was not really the problem. The main deterrent for the Federal Republic was the vulnerability of West Berlin.

Mr. Kohler observed that, despite the current electoral campaign, the United States was united on this question. Both parties and candidates were committed to a firm position.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–2660. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and initialed by Kohler.
1. See footnote 2, Document 218.
2. Antonin Novotny, President of Czechoslovakia.
3. See Document 212 and footnote 3 thereto.
4. Erhard and Grewe also met with Dillon on September 26 and presented the West German view of trade restrictions along lines similar to this. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–2660.