Office of the Historian

218. Memorandum of Conversation0

SecDel/MC/72
New York, September 23, 1960, 9:55 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Discussion at Dinner Meeting of the Three Foreign Ministers—Berlin and Germany

PARTICIPANTS

  • US
    • The Secretary
    • Mr. Livingston T. Merchant
    • Mr. Foy D. Kohler
    • Mr. Theodore C. Achilles
    • Mr. Edward T. Long
  • France
    • M. Couve de Murville
    • M. Charles Lucet
    • Ambassador Alphand
    • M. Pierre de Leusse
  • UK
    • Lord Home
    • Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
    • Sir Harold Caccia
    • Mr. Peter Ramsbotham

Mr. Merchant said he would discuss briefly the current developments on the situation in Berlin and Germany. He observed that we now have tripartite agreement on a common action to be taken on temporary travel documents (TTD). This is being worked out in detail in Bonn. The Under Secretaries had discussed the issue of increased German participation [Page 584] in contingency planning1 and this was to be discussed in the tripartite ambassadorial forum in Washington. Quadripartite discussions were continuing in Bonn and in Washington tripartite discussions of economic counter-measures were in train.

The Under Secretaries had spent considerable time discussing the U.S. proposal to submit to the General Assembly a so-called “basket” item as a companion piece to the Soviet item accusing the US of aggressive acts. The U.S. “basket” item is designed to deal with the whole range of Soviet provocative actions of recent months. Under the “basket” item the U.S. is considering the submission of a special resolution on Germany and Berlin. At the Under Secretaries’ meetings the U.S. had distributed a draft resolution of this nature.

As a matter of fact, the U.S., in light of Mr. Khrushchev’s provocative speech of today,2 feels that this “basket” item is clearly desirable but the U.S. is still undecided as to the timing of its submission.

The Secretary said he felt the “basket” item should not be submitted until President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan have left New York. He thought the “basket” item was a good counter-move and we have a considerable number of items for inclusion in the “basket” proposal. Nevertheless, we should not push this too fast. The Russians have started the cold war again and we ought to wait a few days for this fact to sink in.

[Here follows discussion of general U.N. issues.]

Mr. Merchant reverted to the U.S. “basket” item, saying that our submission of this would not prejudge the submission of a resolution on Germany and Berlin.

The French Foreign Minister thought that as things now stood it was better not to submit the Berlin resolution.

The Secretary referred to Mr. Khrushchev’s “curious” remark on the fact that there would be no separate peace treaty with East Germany until a new Summit meeting.

The British Foreign Minister thought we should hold the Berlin resolution in reserve; that we shouldn’t use it unless the time came when it couldn’t be helped.

Mr. Kohler said he wanted to clarify the intent of the resolution on Berlin which was in effect just part of our tactics under the “basket” item. He referred to the 1951 UN resolution on Germany3 which was [Page 585] overwhelmingly passed, and which called for free elections in Germany. It was Soviet defiance of this resolution which caused the partition of Germany. It was in this broader context that we thought resolution on Berlin would be worthwhile.

The Secretary said this was something we would all have to think about.

Parenthetically, the Secretary referred to some joint military exercises in West Germany which were coming up. General Norstad had evidently recently sent a letter to the Chiefs of Staff of the U.S., France and the U.K. asking agreement on a planning exercise which would involve the commitment of a full division to test Soviet intentions with regard to Berlin access. The Secretary understood that the British wanted this done at the battalion level. He himself thought it was up to Norstad to determine the level of this exercise and he does appear to want to do it on a larger scale. This is all in the context of the Berlin problem and should be considered in that light.

[1 paragraph (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Hoyer Millar said that then all the U.S. suggested was a dress rehearsal.

The French Foreign Minister said this was a new idea to him, that he was not informed.

Mr. Hoyer Millar said he would ask his Berlin expert, Mr. Killick, to talk with Mr. Kohler about this.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1767. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Long and approved in M on September 29 and in S on October 10. The Foreign Ministers were in New York for the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly.↩
  2. See Document 212.↩
  3. For text of Khrushchev’s speech, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 35–38, 71–74, and 715–718.↩
  4. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, pp. 1824–1825.↩