220. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State0
464. Moscow’s 840 to Department.1 Soviet note is strongly worded and suggests Soviets have no intention of exercising moderating influence on East Germans. Final sentence concerning air corridors also has menacing tone. Zakharov’s comment to General Osborne (Berlin’s 222 to Department)2 that he could only act re vehicle problems on Autobahn when Soviet soldiers involved but could not if East Germans involved is disclaimer responsibility also having potentially serious complications. In fact, Soviets and East Germans are now acting as if long-threatened separate peace treaty were already in effect.
Feel firm Western reply to Soviets is essential to maintain our view on Soviet responsibility, to warn Soviets against action over use air corridors, and pin responsibility for tension re Berlin squarely on Soviets and East Germans. I am gratified learn from British Embassy that Foreign Office London has already proposed prompt response to Soviet note. British draft reply closely parallels one we drafted for tripartite [Page 590] consideration here.3 Believe British suggestion that prompt coordination take place in one of three allied capitals to get response to Soviets before weekend should be acted upon; Washington or New York seems logical place. In considering draft British reply, believe some mention should also be made of Four Power Agreement May 4, 1949,4 and Paris decision Council of Ministers June 20, 1949,5 ensuring normal functioning and use rail, water and road transport to Berlin. Believe further that note should contain final paragraph calling more clearly upon Soviet Government to live up to quadripartite agreements or accept responsibility for consequences. Finally, there is question in my mind whether British draft reply should not be more sharply worded; unless we can convince Soviets we are facing crisis, there will I think, be no hope of convincing them of essential firmness our position.
I recommend strongly that latest threatening Soviet note be used as basis for UNGA statement to action to expose what Soviets actually doing re Berlin and to demonstrate once again, at time when they are proposing new international agreements, their renewed violation solemn international obligations. I also urge that we exert every effort to institute selective trade embargo NATO-wide without delay.
To sum up, I think time has come when we must utilize every means at our disposal to deflect Soviets from present course, and to restore status quo ante. Otherwise, I am convinced we shall shortly be faced with situation in which only choice will be whether to retreat from Berlin or maintain ourselves there by military force.6
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–2860. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to London, Berlin, Paris, and Moscow.↩
- Dated September 26, telegram 840 from Moscow transmitted a translation of the Soviet note, September 26, denying any responsibility for the actions by the German Democratic Republic in closing the Berlin border which had been protested by the United States in a note of September 12. (Ibid., 762.00/9–2660) For texts of both notes, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 719–721.↩
- Dated September 27, telegram 222 from Berlin reported on a meeting of the Western Commandants with Zakharov on September 26 at which they protested against East German harassment of Allied officials including Ambassador Dowling. (Department of State, Central Files, 123–Dowling, Walter C.)↩
- Neither of these drafts has been further identified.↩
- For text, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. III, p. 751.↩
- For text, see ibid., pp. 1062–1065.↩
- Following a month of drafting among the three Western Powers, a reply was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on October 26. For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 722–723. Documentation on the drafting of the note is in Department of State, Central Files, 662A.62B41/9–3060 and 762.00.↩