214. Memorandum of Discussion at the 460th Meeting of the National Security Council0
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–4.]
5. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Berlin.]
Mr. Dulles said he would next report on the situation with respect to Berlin. In his desire to focus world attention on Berlin, Khrushchev was permitting the East Germans to undertake a new campaign designed to increase tensions over Berlin. The East Germans had imposed restrictions on the travel of West Germans to East Berlin. However, these restrictions had not affected commuters living in one part of Berlin and working in another. The East German restrictions appeared to be a step in the direction of incorporating East Berlin into East Germany by asserting that East German laws are applicable to East Berlin and by giving the East Berlin boundary the character of a frontier. One element in the situation is the desire of the Ulbricht regime to demonstrate the “sovereignty” of East Germany. By concentrating measures against the West Germans, the Communists probably consider themselves on safer grounds than they would occupy if they applied their restrictions to the allies. The East Germans may also attempt to impose restriction on the travel of West Germans to West Berlin. The Soviet commander has supported the East German position and has warned the Western Powers. Mr. Dulles said the USSR may be considering steps to bring the East Germans into flight clearance procedures applying to planes flying the corridors to Berlin, so that civil airlines would be compelled to operate without Soviet flight safety guarantees or else cease flights into Berlin. The USSR is taking the position that the corridors to Berlin have been established solely for the purpose of permitting the Western Allies to resupply their forces in Berlin. Civil planes flying in the corridors have recently been buzzed by Soviet jet fighters, one of which scored a near miss on a U.K. plane. Apparently, the Communists are trying to make the route too dangerous for civilian pilots to fly. Bonn is considering countermeasures but Adenauer is anxious to avoid any rash measures and is attempting to quiet Willy Brandt.
The President said he had many times discussed with Adenauer the question of what should be done in the event the East Germans, [Page 577] supported by the USSR, undertook to impose every kind of impediment on our movement to and from Berlin. He had been unable to secure a satisfactory answer from Adenauer. Adenauer and De Gaulle also had said we must maintain our “juridical position” in Berlin. Neither De Gaulle nor Adenauer will face up to the question of what we should do in the face of possible East German impediments. In fact, the President was not sure that the U.S. Government had completely faced up to the situation.
Mr. Dulles said that if shipments into Berlin were delayed, Berlin’s economy would be rendered completely untenable. The President said that the Soviets could seriously embarrass us by taking various measures which did not violate the Potsdam Agreement.
Mr. Gray said he understood inter-Allied talks in a low key on the subject of trade retaliation were in progress and that these talks had revealed a reluctance on the part of the West Germans to take any action. Mr. Dillon said that until recently the West Germans were unwilling to take action. They had taken the position that the Allies could act without them. We had taken the position that the key to the situation lay in action by West Germany, which had now agreed to go along in any action the NATO powers might take in the economic field. Secretary Dillon felt joint action by the NATO powers and West Germans made good sense. The West Germans believe that the greatest damage to East Germany can be done by concentrating on commodities which are in short supply in East Germany. A technical group in Bonn is now starting a study of these items. In the first meeting of the group, it was apparent that the West Germans had done considerable advance work on this subject and had developed concrete ideas. In any case the ground for action was now being prepared. It was not known how far the U.K. and France would be willing to go but Mr. Dillon felt these countries were prepared to collaborate.
The President said the weakness of our position with respect to Berlin was a geographical one. The East German hinterland supported the East German position in Berlin but our support was still 100 miles away down a narrow corridor. Secretary Dillon said the West German economic actions would be taken against the whole of East Germany. Mr. Dulles reported that West German shipments to East Germany are less than two per cent of West Germany’s total exports. These shipments, however, represent over ten per cent of the imports of East Germany and involve items which are of critical importance to East Germany.
[Here follow discussion of unrelated matters and the remaining agenda items.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs.↩