Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

215. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

SecDel/MC/19

New York, September 21, 1960, 10:30 a.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September 19–24, 1960

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • Mr. Livingston T. Merchant
  • Mr. Foy D. Kohler
  • Mr. E.T. Long
• France
  • M. Charles Lucet
  • M. Bruno De Leusse
  • M. Claude Winckler
• UK
  • Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
  • The Hon. Peter Ramsbotham
  • Lord Hood

SUBJECT

• Tripartite Meeting—Berlin

TTD’s

Mr. Merchant advised Mr. Lucet that we had taken advantage of Lord Home’s presence in Washington on Sunday to work out with the British an agreed statement on the temporary travel document problem (TTD).¹ It had been our impression that the French had agreed with us on this problem originally.

Mr. Lucet said he had seen the statement and it looked all right to the French.² He asked whether it was correct that the TTD procedure would remain in effect until the GDR modified its restrictions on access to West Berlin.

Mr. Kohler said that was correct.

Other Countermeasures

Mr. Merchant stated his understanding that the Bonn working group was waiting for the promised Erhard memorandum on economic countermeasures before getting into this problem seriously.

Mr. Lucet said this was a difficult issue, not only in view of internal German trade, but because to be effective economic countermeasures could not be applied on a tripartite basis or even on a NATO basis, but would have to be done by all Free World countries.

Mr. Merchant said we recognized the difficulties in enforcing economic countermeasures, but we feel very strongly on this issue. Last month’s events, when the GDR took restrictive actions, something we had feared for a long time, had emphasized to us the necessity for taking an effective counteraction against the GDR, taking an action that would hurt them. In the absence of effective counteraction, we are going to be faced with continuing and increasing restrictions, a nibbling away of our position. We admit that the Federal Republic has the greatest economic leverage and that they have to take the original action. We must be prepared to support them, not only on a tripartite basis, but on a NATO and COCOM basis. We also admit that this is a delicately balanced choice, but we have to take risks in this instance.

Mr. Kohler stated that, while the first two moves taken by the GDR were not in themselves substantially important, they would become a legal basis for succeeding and more damaging moves. It was like the argument on the problem of stamping travel documents where we had agreed that the decisive moment was the very first step of placing the GDR stamp on the document. This was the act which would set in train our whole series of countermeasures.

Mr. Hoyer Millar said the British would be glad to study the issue, but that the real problem was that of timing, i.e., when you first take action. He pointed out that restricting steel exports would hurt the GDR.

Mr. Lucet observed that we must not make the crisis more acute just to prove we are resolute.

There ensued a give-and-take discussion of German participation in contingency planning, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in the up-to-now tripartite working group in Washington [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

The British appeared to have the idea that German participation in contingency planning would mean the reopening of the tripartitely agreed plans.

Mr. Kohler stated this was not the intention at all, that the Germans have agreed with the planning to date. It was not our intention to reopen the old plans at all.

Mr. Hoyer Millar said the British would take a new look at this problem and appeared favorable to German participation.

At the close of the meeting Mr. Kohler distributed to the French and British the draft of the possible Berlin resolution to be submitted to the United Nations.³

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1766. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Long and approved in M on September 23. This meeting took place at the Waldorf Towers.
1. A memorandum of the conversation with Home on September 18 is ibid., Central Files, 762.00/9–1860.
2. The statement has not been further identified.
3. The draft under reference has not been identified. At a similar meeting on September 22 at 10:30 a.m., Kohler distributed a revised resolution. A memorandum of the conversation at this meeting (SecDel/MC/26) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1766. A third draft resolution was transmitted to USUN in telegram 479, September 22 at 8:39 p.m. (Ibid., Central Files, 320/9–2260)