Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

213. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 18, 1960, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• German and Berlin Problems and Forthcoming United Nations Session

PARTICIPANTS

• German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano
• German Ministerial Director Hasse von Etzdorf
• German Observer to the United Nations, Ambassador Knappstein
• Mr. Franz Krapf, Minister, German Embassy
• Dr. Swidbert Schnippenkoetter, Counselor, German Embassy
• The Secretary
• Under Secretary Livingston T. Merchant
• Mr. Foy D. Kohler—EUR
• Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen—S/B
• Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

Foreign Minister Von Brentano began by stressing the nature of the present Communist actions against Berlin which were calculated through step-by-step harassment to prepare for the eventual loss of the city without ever precipitating a show-down with the Western Powers on a clear issue understandable to public opinion. Hence, the Western Powers must be resolved from the outset to react vigorously and unitedly. The Four-Power status of the city had been clearly violated by certain of the actions already taken by the GDR. It was necessary that all the Western Powers concert on the countermeasures they would take. Hence it was necessary to bring the Federal Republic into contingency planning, which could no longer be confined to the purely military area.

The Secretary said he was in complete agreement with Von Brentano’s analysis. Apart from the nibbling actions taken, an important feature was the legal claim of the GDR that it had a right to perform these actions. He agreed that the Western Powers should react now. Discussions were presently going on in Bonn with a view to designating feasible countermeasures which would hurt the East Germans more than the people of Berlin. Mr. Kohler noted that the last report we had received from Bonn was rather encouraging and that the Germans were studying the possibilities item by item.

Stating that he was speaking with the knowledge of the Chancellor on this subject, Von Brentano emphasized that the Federal Republic was prepared to take any action in the interzonal trade field which had the full support and cooperation of its Western Allies. Trade with the GDR was not of significant commercial importance to the Federal Republic, but the West must anticipate that in reaction to countermeasures in the trade field the GDR might intensify its actions against Berlin, possibly to the point of breaking off the flow of goods from the West to the City. While Berlin could easily absorb the loss of direct imports from the GDR (principally brown coal), the stoppage of traffic to and from the Federal Republic would bring about the economic collapse of the city.

The Secretary noted that Mr. Bohlen, who had been involved in Allied planning in the 1948–49 period, believed that an important factor in bringing about the 1949 agreement with the Soviets was the imposition of economic sanctions by the Federal Republic. Von Brentano commented that the situation was now different than in 1948 when the standard of living in Berlin had been very low and could be maintained through an airlift. In view of Berlin’s current highly developed economic activity, it was the most heavily industrialized city in all of Germany. An airlift was now no solution. The question, therefore, had to be asked whether the Allies would be willing under such circumstances to reopen access to Berlin by force, if necessary. The Secretary stated that this obviously was the primary question: that is, at what stage the East would have cut communications to Berlin and West Germany to an extent justifying the risk of going to war. Von Brentano reiterated that this was indeed a grave and difficult question. However, the Soviets had become more refined than in the past. It might be expected that they would work through organs of the GDR, starting with mere tricks and petty harassments of the kind recently experienced. Each instance would not be spectacular in itself and gradually a whole mosaic would be built up out of individual stones. Therefore, he had to repeat, it was essential that the West not wait until fifty per cent of these measures had been carried out but to react strongly and in common now. All of the NATO countries were involved because of the NATO guarantee. The Secretary observed that the Allied guarantee on Berlin to which the NATO guarantee was linked was directed towards an attack on the forces of the Occupying Powers or on the city itself, which would be regarded as equivalent to such an attack. He asked how much of the industrial life of West Berlin could be kept alive if the canals and railway lines were closed and only the roads were left open. Von Brentano said that he could not say precisely without having the matter studied, but he believed that if the roads were open, though it would cause inconvenience, the basic life of the city could be maintained. The Secretary said that he had asked this question since both the railway lines and canals were completely under GDR control. It was pointed out that the East Germans likewise control all German road traffic at the present time.

The Secretary said that one of the subjects discussed earlier today with the British¹ had been the possibility of a resolution in the UNGA on Germany and possibly Berlin starting with a reaffirmation of the 1951 UNGA resolution² establishing a commission to investigate whether conditions for free elections existed in all parts of Germany. Von Brentano commented that it was likely the Soviets would raise the German and Berlin questions in the UN. A resolution of the type mentioned by the Secretary would be good, but the West must avoid having the Berlin question through UNGA discussion become a matter within UN jurisdiction. With the limited understanding of many countries for complexities of the problem, the tendency would be to seek a compromise solution which would be tantamount to a Soviet victory. If this danger could be avoided, von Brentano was in favor of an initiative in the UN. In fact, he thought it desirable that in his speech the President should take the offensive on the German and Berlin questions. The Secretary noted that it would be difficult for the GA to turn such a resolution down since most countries would be reluctant to go back on their 1951 vote.

Apart from their current piecemeal tactics regarding Berlin, Von Brentano said the Soviets might also simply go ahead and sign a peace treaty with the GDR and thereafter deny that they had any further competence or interest in the Berlin question. The Western Powers should therefore push ahead rapidly with their planning for this contingency (reference apparently was to the German paper on this subject which currently is being considered in Washington by the Four-Power Working Group on Germany, including Berlin).³

The Secretary noted that at Geneva the Soviets had never directly challenged the Western Powers in their assertion of Soviet responsibility for civilian access rights under the terms of the 1949 agreements.⁴Von Brentano conceded that this was correct but pointed out that they did repeatedly say that a separate peace treaty with the GDR would end their responsibility for Berlin and that the GDR could then do what it wanted. The Secretary noted that we, in turn, had made clear that we would not recognize any unilateral action of this kind. Mr. Kohler observed that this brought us back to the legal question. The recent reply of the Soviet Commandant General Zakharov⁵ had said this was no business of the Soviets. This was what the Soviets claimed a peace treaty would result in. Therefore, we agreed that vigorous action was required now.

After pointing out that contingency planning should cover both individual measures of this kind now being taken against the Western position in Berlin as well as the more ultimate actions connected with a formal peace treaty, von Brentano emphasized the desirability, both for practical and psychological reasons, of bringing the Federal Republic into both the military and civilian phases of Western contingency planning. He said he was aware that, for reasons unknown to him, the British and the French had opposed this full participation, and he had instructed the German Ambassadors in London and in Paris to make another strong approach on the subject.

In response to Von Brentano’s query as to what might be anticipated in the UN in the near future, the Secretary pointed out that we had only assumptions as to what Khrushchev was going to do in the UNGA, whether he would be aggressive or conciliatory. UN procedures created other difficulties such as the absence of free give-and-take debate and possibly long gaps between a speech and an opportunity for rebuttal. This might necessitate the use of press statements to achieve more rapid response. When we knew more regarding the order of the speakers as well as Soviet tactics, we could judge more clearly what our best tactics would be.

Von Brentano reiterated his belief that the President should not omit reference to the Berlin situation as a Soviet-created danger to peace rather than leaving the initiative to the Soviets in raising the question. The Secretary said we would think about it.

After a discussion of the German initiative in the North Atlantic Council,⁶ von Brentano agreed that it would be preferable to have one NATO member country speak for itself, with subsequent NATO country representatives confirming and expanding on such a statement rather than having the statement made on behalf of NATO as a whole. He recognized the disadvantage of NATO acting as a bloc within the UN framework.

The consensus also was that the recent three-point GDR “disarmament” proposals⁷ would probably turn up in one form or other under Soviet sponsorship.

It was agreed that the Federal Republic Observer to the UN, Ambassador Knappstein, who was present at the discussion, would keep in close touch with the American Delegation. The idea was welcomed which he said had been suggested by Ambassador Wadsworth that, should Khrushchev make the expected violent attack on the Federal Republic, he (Knappstein) should be prepared to give an immediate press conference in rebuttal.

Coming back to the Berlin situation, the Secretary asked whether von Brentano felt that East Germany’s desire to maintain trade relations with Berlin would play any role. Von Brentano said that, in his opinion, the GDR would be prepared to break off such relations to achieve the objective of creating a crisis over Berlin. With respect to any economic countermeasures which the West might take, he continued, it was essential to make them efficacious so that the GDR should be denied other sources or supply. The cooperation of NATO countries would have to be solicited; an embargo could only be efficacious if it were total.

During a discussion of the recent heightened refugee flow from East Germany through Berlin, von Brentano noted that it was interesting to see how, in the figures for recent weeks, the number of intelligentsia and young people had increased. In response to the Secretary’s query, he said there was no absorption problem in the Federal Republic and that all who wanted jobs could get them. He noted that the number of returnees to the GDR was in the neighborhood of one for every eight refugees to the West. However, no precise figures were available.

Reverting back to the UN, von Brentano asked what chance there would be during the UNGA discussion to emphasize the principle of self-determination for Germans in view of French sensitivities on this score because of the Algerian problem. The Secretary said we believed we should stress this principle. Since we and De Gaulle have talked about its applicability to Algeria, the French could not object too much. This was an important theme and he hoped that the President would say something on it. Von Brentano noted that it is a subject which irritates the Soviets. The former terminology used by the West in connection with the reunification issue was more agreeable to the Soviets than stress on self-determination. This had great appeal to the uncommitted world. He felt this, for example, during his visit last February to India. Ambassador Knappstein referred to a 1949 Soviet note to the Yugoslavs in which the enemies of self-determination were described as “absolutely imperialistic”.⁸ The Germans promised to provide this quotation for possible use at the UN.

On the subject of the recent De Gaulle press conference statement regarding NATO,⁹ Foreign Minister vonBrentano and the Secretary agreed that it was most unfortunate and that military integration in NATO at the command level was more essential than ever under modern conditions. The Secretary noted that we hoped to have some proposals to make soon on the next ten years in NATO so that there would be time for their consideration before the Ministerial meeting in December.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–1860. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on September 30. The conversation took place at the Secretary’s residence. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in telegram 524 to Bonn, September 19. (Ibid., 762.00/9–1960)
1. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 762.00/9–1860.
2. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, pp. 1824–1825.
3. A copy of this 6-page paper, submitted to the Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin on July 26, is attached to a memorandum of conversation, July 26; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–2660.
4. For texts of the May 4 and June 20, 1949, agreements on Berlin, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. III, pp. 751 and 1062–1065.
5. For text of this letter, dated September 13, see Dokumente, Band 5, 1960, p. 268.
6. See Document 212 and footnote 3 thereto.
7. For text of the East German memorandum on disarmament, transmitted to the United Nations on September 15, see Dokumente, Band 5, 1960, pp. 270–273.
8. Not further identified.
9. See footnote 2, Document 210.