Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

178. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/43

Paris, May 17, 1960, 3 p.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

PRESENT

• United States
  • The President
  • Secretary Herter
  • Secretary Gates
  • Mr. Bohlen
  • Colonel Walters
  • Mr. Akalovsky
• United Kingdom
  • Prime Minister Macmillan
  • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold
  • Mr. Zulueta
• France
  • President De Gaulle
  • Prime Minister Debré
  • M. Couve de Murville
  • M. Andronikof
  • Note Taker
• USSR
  • Absent

SUBJECT

• The Problems of Convening the Summit

President De Gaulle opened the meeting by saying that he was privileged to see the Western participants present and that he had to note the absence of Mr. Khrushchev. He said that Mr. Khrushchev had informed the press that the Soviet position was known and that so long as there were no apologies he could not attend any meeting. However, he had said that if President De Gaulle wanted to see him, he would meet with him.

M. Couve de Murville said that the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy had telephoned to find out what was the purpose of the meeting.¹ He said that if the question was to discuss what had been discussed yesterday, then the meeting would be acceptable, but not before five p.m. because Mr. Khrushchev had had no lunch. However, if other questions were to be discussed, then Mr. Khrushchev could not attend.

The President referred to and read a portion of his press statement issued this morning,² in which he said that he assumed that acceptance by Mr. Khrushchev of the invitation to this meeting would signify his abandoning the conditions he had advanced.

President De Gaulle remarked that thus the situation was quite clear.

The President said Mr. Khrushchev’s refusal to be at this meeting indicated that he did not want to attend the Summit meeting but rather a meeting at which a debate like the one yesterday would take place.

President De Gaulle agreed and said that this being so the Summit Conference could not convene and discuss the topics contemplated for it. Therefore there was no Summit meeting and in fact it had not even started.

The President then mentioned that the Foreign Ministers had prepared a statement to be put out.³

Prime Minister Macmillan wondered whether it would be proper to take this course. He said he understood that Mr. Khrushchev had stated that he would not attend the Summit meeting because of conditions, but that he would come to continue yesterday’s debate. He agreed that we could not engage in such a debate, and understood why President Eisenhower refused to do so. However, he felt that we should put Mr. Khrushchev to the test. Mr. Khrushchev had called off his press conference and had said that he would be prepared to see De Gaulle. That atmosphere should be utilized, and therefore perhaps President De Gaulle could see him, emphasize what responsibility he is taking upon himself, and explain to him that the statement by the President published yesterday⁴ should be adequate to meet his point. In such a case, there could be another meeting tomorrow and, after due deliberation of the situation, a final decision could be taken. The declaration drafted by the Foreign Ministers should not be put out hastily on the basis of telephone conversations. It was necessary to exercise great patience, particularly in view of public opinion reactions.

President De Gaulle observed that Mr. Khrushchev had read a part of his statement to him the day before yesterday when he called upon him.⁵ At that time Mr. Khrushchev was told that the statement contained conditions which were totally unacceptable. Yesterday Mr. Khrushchev had read his statement again plus an additional part which aggravated the situation seriously.⁶ Mr. Khrushchev was asked yesterday not to make his statement public and he did it nevertheless. Then it was suggested to him that a meeting should take place this morning at 11:00 o’clock, and he said that this was unacceptable to him. After that, a meeting at 3:00 p.m. was suggested, and he has not arrived to attend that meeting. Thus the present meeting, to which, in accordance with the agreement reached among the Western powers this morning,⁷ the other three participants had been invited to discuss topics for the Summit, is being attended now only by two invited parties while the third one has refused to come unless the Summit meeting was not a Summit meeting but rather a continuation of the unpleasant debate of yesterday. We could not be accused of lack of patience; after all, we have waited a long time. Should we now begin a new operation of seduction? So far such attempts have failed. Yet we must think of the future, not only about the present situation. In this situation of uncertainty we cannot think about the future, whereas Mr. Khrushchev is doing so, and therefore we are in a weaker position. Mr. Khrushchev had said that he would see President De Gaulle, and he, President De Gaulle, did not want to say that he would not see him; however, that would not be a Summit meeting but rather a visit by a Head of Government to the Head of State of the country he was visiting.

The President recalled that this morning it had been agreed to seek an early but graceful end. He said that if President De Gaulle wanted to see “this man” he would not object, of course, but he felt that this might be an imposition on President De Gaulle’s patience. However, if the other parties so wished, he would be prepared to wait a few hours before we publicized the declaration. He was here for the purpose of the Summit Conference, and was at the disposal of the other participants. Yet one should remember that not only the personal dignity of the participants but even more the dignity of the Governments represented here were involved. There would be no point in protecting this situation. Yet, the President said, perhaps President De Gaulle could set a time and perhaps another meeting could be arranged for tonight. The President observed that Mr. Khrushchev had insulted him personally but that he had no personal feelings about this, because he did not care what Mr. Khrushchev called him; so no one could accuse him of impatience. But now the situation seemed to be imposing on President De Gaulle’s patience.

Prime Minister Macmillan said that there were three reasons why he would venture to urge the postponement of the publication of the declaration. First, Mr. Khrushchev should be asked to send a written reply to President De Gaulle’s invitation, because telephone calls were not sufficient. We should have something for the record. This was a serious matter which would be discussed for years, and we should be able to explain the events when we came home. If his written reply was negative, then perhaps President De Gaulle, if he wanted, could make one last plea. The second reason was that everyone—i.e., President Eisenhower, Mr. Khrushchev, and himself—were in Paris and this was an awkward situation. We have the right to ask for a written reply to the formal invitation sent by President De Gaulle this morning to complete the record so that the whole picture could be there. And thirdly, Mr. Khrushchev had canceled his press conference, and we should see what that meant.

President De Gaulle said that the question arose in his mind as to what would happen if Mr. Khrushchev stayed around for a week, taking sightseeing trips, walking down the streets, etc. Would we stay here that long, too?

Prime Minister Macmillan replied that he was thinking only of today and tomorrow.

The President noted that the question was whether after two days of work and waiting we should give this man one more opportunity to change his mind. Would we not look ridiculous in that case? The President said that he was not too settled on this point, as he was the aggrieved party. However, if we continued waiting, our own press would start criticizing us.

President De Gaulle said that Mr. Khrushchev had been given many occasions already and that he might never have enough occasions.

M. Couve de Murville reported that he had just received a new reply from the Soviet Minister at the Embassy, which rectified the first one. The new text contained the following question: “Is the 3 p.m. meeting to discuss questions the solution of which will permit the Summit meeting to take place?” He also stated that he had asked the Soviet representative for a written reply to De Gaulle’s invitation.

The President said that the Soviet question was precisely what we did not want to talk about, because this was the matter of the same incident that had been discussed before. Therefore he felt that if Mr. Khrushchev put this in writing, that would be the end of the Conference.

Prime Minister Macmillan said that this new message supported his own position, because there had been three press statements and each of them was different. Therefore it would be wiser to await further development.

President De Gaulle observed that the West, too, should make it clear where it stood and indicate what its thinking on the situation was.

The President emphasized that if there should be a meeting to discuss with Mr. Khrushchev only the possibility of holding the Conference, then it would have to take place without the President, because he was the object of Mr. Khrushchev’s hatred and insults.

Prime Minister Macmillan said that President De Gaulle could reason with Khrushchev. It was necessary to exert every possible effort in order to prevent the leftist elements from saying that we have failed to do everything in our power to get this Conference going.

M. Couve de Murville reported the text of a new message from Mr. Khrushchev, which inquired whether the meeting called by De Gaulle was for the purpose of ascertaining “whether the conditions for the holding of a Summit meeting have been fulfilled.”

Prime Minister Macmillan noted that this wording did not say “conditions of the Soviet Government.”

The President stated that Mr. Macmillan apparently wished Mr. Khrushchev to say clearly that he would not come so that he could quote that statement in the House of Commons.

President De Gaulle said that Khrushchev would never say such a thing. He stated that he had indicated how far he personally and the French Government could go and then read the text of a communiqué which the French Foreign Ministry had prepared and which was not to be put out as a joint communiqué, but rather a statement of his own. He then read the following text:

“General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, suggested to President Eisenhower, Chairman Khrushchev and Mr. Macmillan that they should meet with him on May 17 at 3:00 p.m. in order to consider with him whether the Summit Conference could begin studying the questions it had been agreed to discuss.

“The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain were present. The absence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union was noted. General de Gaulle took note of the fact that in these conditions the anticipated discussions could not take place.”

President De Gaulle then raised the question of a joint communiqué. He said that perhaps a sentence could be added to the French unilateral communiqué stating that the President of the United States, the President of the French Republic, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain would publish a joint communiqué tomorrow morning. If Mr. Khrushchev should yield in the meantime we could then see what to do. If not, a communiqué would then be published which would recognize that there was no Summit meeting; in any case the world knew that this meeting had been called by President De Gaulle and it should be informed that only two of the invited parties had come to attend it. The question Of the joint communiqué could perhaps be reserved until tomorrow as an extreme limit, but it should be resolved early in the morning because this situation could not go on indefinitely.

M. Couve de Murville reported that there had been another message from the Soviet Embassy, this time in reply to his request for an answer in writing. It stated that Mr. Khrushchev did not intend to reply in writing and in turn asked for an answer to his previous inquiry on the telephone. Couve said that the person who had talked to the Soviet representative had indicated that the invitation clearly stated that the meeting was for the purpose of discussing the questions on the agenda of the Summit meeting. The Soviet reply was that Mr. Khrushchev did not quite understand what this meant.

The President then said that perhaps it would be better to publish the French communiqué now and say that a joint communiqué would be published tomorrow morning.

Prime Minister Macmillan then raised the question of the wording of the French invitation and wondered whether Mr. Khrushchev could not argue that it implied the possibility of discussing his own point. He also said that perhaps it would be useful to say in the communiqué that the three Western participants would meet tomorrow morning. Otherwise the press would ask why the joint communiqué was going to be published tomorrow rather than tonight.

The President expressed the desire to have this statement to be put out by President De Gaulle contain an indication that this meeting had been convened for substantive discussion and not a debate of conditions for the Summit meeting.

President De Gaulle pointed out that his text contained such a statement.

The President observed that, of course, he personally was protected by his press statement this morning, in which this point had been made clear, to which President De Gaulle said that no one would be deceived because the texts were very clear.

The President said that of course we knew that Mr. Khrushchev was a liar, but perhaps Mr. Khrushchev could find some people who would believe him.

Couve de Murville at this point suggested that perhaps the best way to handle this situation was to read to the press the two replies Mr. Khrushchev had transmitted.

President De Gaulle noted that these messages had been conveyed by telephone and that therefore they could be easily denied.

Prime Minister Macmillan then reviewed the events of this afternoon, in particular the sequence of Soviet telephone messages, and again emphasized that we must have something for the record to explain what has happened.

President De Gaulle noted that Mr. Khrushchev had not even replied to him personally but rather had a third person call someone at his office.

The President stated that President De Gaulle had invited Mr. Khrushchev to this meeting and that the latter had not even been courteous enough to reply and had only called through a third person. We have been here since three p.m.; there have been these telephone messages going on, and it was obvious that on this basis the Conference could not start. Khrushchev in effect had refused to come.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd interjected that Khrushchev did not refuse but had rather asked us what the purpose of the meeting was.

The President wondered why Mr. Khrushchev had questioned this meeting rather than come to attend it.

Prime Minister Macmillan suggested that Mr. Khrushchev be given a written reply as to the nature of this meeting.

The President observed that Mr. Khrushchev had asked what kind of meeting this was, so it was obvious that he was not prepared to come to a Summit meeting.

Couve de Murville reported that there was a new message on behalf of Mr. Khrushchev asking by what time he could have a reply to his request for clarification as to the nature of this meeting.

Prime Minister Macmillan suggested that this reply could be made either in the form of a letter from President De Gaulle, or President De Gaulle could invite Mr. Khrushchev and explain to him the situation.

President De Gaulle stated that as to the first suggestion, he had no intention of writing to Mr. Khrushchev in view of the batter’s failure to reply to his letter. As to the second suggestion, this was a Byzantine method, and we all knew how the Byzantine Empire had ended. He then listed Mr. Khrushchev’s three conditions, and said that in spite of the fact that they had been publicized by Mr. Khrushchev, he had written him, by extreme good will, and invited him to come to this meeting. Mr. Khrushchev had failed to reply and had merely asked through a third person by telephone three times in succession whether the conditions for the Summit meeting had been fulfilled. It was true that he did not refer to his own conditions, but it was obvious that this was what he meant. So, President De Gaulle continued, this was enough, and he would publish his communiqué because he had the right to take note and state publicly that Mr. Khrushchev had not attended the meeting. He then said that as an extreme concession he would agree to have the joint communiqué published tomorrow morning. It would then be up to Mr. Khrushchev to bring about a change in the situation because only he could do that. President De Gaulle then said that he had just received the text of a press statement by Khrushchev, given to the press by Kharlamov, his press officer, which read as follows:

“I am ready to participate in a meeting with President De Gaulle, Prime Minister Macmillan, and President Eisenhower to exchange views on whether conditions have materialized to start the Summit Conference. If the United States has really come to the decision to condemn the treacherous incursion of American military aircraft into the airspace of the Soviet Union, publicly express regret over these incursions, punish those who are guilty, and give assurances that such incursions will not be repeated in the future, we would be ready on receipt of such assurances to participate in the Summit Conference.”

Prime Minister Macmillan commented that now he was satisfied because this statement gave us sufficient background and the fish was back on the hook.

The President suggested that the procedure proposed by President De Gaulle should be followed.

President De Gaulle said that he would publish his communiqué and that he believed that the joint communiqué should also be published at this time because Khrushchev had now put the dots over the “i’s”.

Prime Minister Macmillan suggested that it would be more seemly to wait until tomorrow, as had been proposed by President De Gaulle originally.

President De Gaulle replied that if the final communiqué was to be published tomorrow, then the morning press would have only Khrushchev’s statements and none of ours. People would wonder what decision had been taken by us here.

The President expressed the opinion that this was not so important as far as public opinion in our country was concerned but that he still preferred that the communiqué be made public tonight.

Prime Minister Debre interjected that Mr. Khrushchev was making his statements to the press, so they could not be left unanswered by us.

Prime Minister Macmillan suggested that each Delegation make statements to the press tonight but that would be done through spokesmen rather than in the form of communiqués. He then said that this development was the collapse or nearly collapse of a policy that had been pursued persistently by his Government for two years. The situation would have grave consequences and could bring us even close to war. He expressed the hope that the three statesmen present here would prefer to reply to Mr. Khrushchev’s spokesman through their own spokesmen tonight and sleep on this until tomorrow morning. Every word said here would be part of history and therefore it would be much better to reflect on this until tomorrow morning. Mr. Macmillan said that this was the most tragic day of his life and that if Mr. Khrushchev did not change his mind, public opinion in his country should be prepared for this grave situation.

The President pointed out that if the publication of the joint communiqué was postponed until tomorrow morning, he would put out through his office a statement that would be much harsher.

Prime Minister Macmillan said this was the right thing to do and that his Delegation would do the same, but on the basis of spokesman-to-spokesman. He then again suggested that there be another meeting tomorrow.

President De Gaulle said that as far as meeting tomorrow morning was concerned, as was suggested by Prime Minister Macmillan, that would be all right with him, but that meeting would not be a Summit meeting but rather to discuss other business of interest to the three parties. He then again raised the question of when the joint communiqué should be published.

Prime Minister Macmillan suggested ten o’clock tomorrow morning.

The President pointed out that this would be five o’clock in the morning in the United States and that this would be a very inconvenient time for our press.

Prime Minister Macmillan observed that statements by the respective spokesmen to be made tonight would fill the papers tomorrow.

President De Gaulle then asked what could happen between midnight and ten o’clock tomorrow morning.

The President stated that even though perhaps he should not take up this subject himself, he was wondering whether, if individual press statements were to be made, the problem would not change and become in effect a personal row between Mr. Khrushchev and himself. He said that this would be all right with him personally because he could take care of himself, but that this would not be a sign of unity of the three Western powers and of their resentment of Mr. Khrushchev’s attitude. He thought that allied unity was one of the most important things to come out of this meeting. Thus, he said, he was sorry to disagree with Mr. Macmillan’s argumentation.

Prime Minister Macmillan stated that in his view the text of the final declaration was a noble document, moderate, and reflecting the sentiments of those present here. However, he would want the world to know that this statement had been thought over by us and it was not the result of a hasty decision, so perhaps the press could be given tonight another, preliminary communiqué which would describe the events of today, mention President De Gaulle’s invitation, Mr. Khrushchev’s replies and conditions, etc., and then say that this was a very serious development which was being studied by us and that we would make public our considered opinion tomorrow morning. This would give the world an idea of what has happened and also indicate that we were deliberating on what has happened. It would also indicate that we would meet tomorrow to make our decision.

President De Gaulle stated that he was glad that Mr. Macmillan approved this text, because he himself liked it. The text contained no polemics. We in the West did not engage in polemics with the Soviets. However, if we issued another, preliminary communiqué, that would lead to polemics, there would be a battle of communiqués, and the impact of our solemn statement would be lost. Our statement that the hopes for the Summit were dashed would lose its effect. He wondered whether this procedure was a good one to follow. So far Mr. Khrushchev was the one who had been unpleasant and insulting while we have refrained from saying harsh things to Mr. Khrushchev publicly. We had invited him to reserve the secrecy of the Summit and he had refused to do so by releasing his statement. We had been restrained, so why should we now lose the advantage that we have gained from our attitude so far by engaging in this series of communiqués? President De Gaulle also noted that the communiqué did not state that the Conference was over.

At that point a new message was brought into the room indicating that Mr. Khrushchev was not having a press conference today and that he was not leaving Paris today.

Prime Minister Macmillan apologized for insisting on his point but emphasized that this was something that was tremendously important to them. He stated that he would hate to see a communiqué decided upon six or seven hours before the actual event. If the communiqué should be published tonight, then we should meet again and put out a communiqué that would reflect exactly the situation prevailing at that time. Mr. Khrushchev had not broken off the Conference; he had asked whether conditions for the Conference existed, which was a different thing.

President De Gaulle said that if something new were to happen between now and eight p.m. tonight, then we could meet, but otherwise we would meet in a vacuum, without Mr. Khrushchev, and would look rather awkward to the world. So a time should be set for the publication of the communiqué, which would be observed unless something new should have happened in the meantime.

The President asked Mr. Macmillan whether he still preferred to wait until tomorrow morning, to which the latter replied in the affirmative.

Secretary Herter asked whether or not this meant that Mr. Macmillan wanted another meeting.

Prime Minister Macmillan replied that there would have to be another meeting anyway to discuss other questions.

President De Gaulle noted that this would be a different meeting not related to the Summit and dealing with “our affairs.”

Prime Minister Macmillan observed that Mr. Khrushchev had changed his plans now and that he now might accuse us of breaking up the Conference. This was a very grave matter, because a long cold war with all its inherent difficulties and dangers could result from it.

President De Gaulle pointed out that the situation would be the same tomorrow as today, and that the prospects of cold war would not change between today and tomorrow.

Prime Minister Macmillan again apologized for insisting on a point that was not shared by his colleagues. He said that in his country the failure of this Conference would be the greatest blow since World War II. In all churches prayers had been read for the success of this meeting and now the hopes of the people had been dashed. This could not be accepted easily. Perhaps by grace of God Mr. Khrushchev might change his mind. Although it was true that he had placed unacceptable conditions, Mr. Khrushchev had not yet broken up the Conference. In any case, the joint communiqué could be published tonight at ten p.m. unless there was no new development. The Foreign Ministers could meet at 9:30 p.m. to review the situation.

President De Gaulle reiterated that the communiqué did not state that the Summit Conference had ended; it simply said that the Conference had never started, so the door for future meetings was not closed.

The President interjected that Mr. Khrushchev had indicated that he would not go to a Summit Conference before next January 21.

President De Gaulle replied that by that time Mr. Khrushchev himself may not be around.

The President once again reviewed the developments of today and noted that this man had been asked to meet here at eleven o’clock. He had said that this was not acceptable; so we had waited for four hours, until three o’clock. Even then he failed to show up. Thus our patience was running out. However, if dignity required such an action, the President said, he would be willing to meet with President De Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan here at ten p.m. to issue the joint communiqué and thus make the occasion more formal.

President De Gaulle said that obviously if there was a new development by that time a meeting of that sort could take place.

Prime Minister Macmillan stated that he liked the President’s idea and that such a meeting would take only five minutes but would give the declaration much more weight and dignity.

After a brief exchange, it was decided that it would be best for both the principals and the Foreign Ministers to meet tonight at 9:30 and, if nothing had occurred in the meantime to change the situation, to issue the joint communiqué.

(Whereupon at 5:05 p.m. the meeting was adjourned.)

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–1760. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S and by the White House on May 31. The conversation took place at Elysée Palace. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Cahto 10 from Paris, May 18 at 8 p.m. (Ibid., 396.1–PA/5–1860) For four other accounts of this conversation, see Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp. 209–210; De Gaulle, Mémoires, p. 265; Walters, Silent Missions, p. 347; and Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 467.
1. Regarding this telephone conversation and subsequent ones with the Soviet Embassy during the meeting, see Cmd. 1052, pp. 12-14.
2. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 430-431.
3. For text, see ibid., p. 431.
4. For text, see ibid., pp. 429–430.
5. See Document 160.
6. See Document 168.
7. see Document 175.