Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

175. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/37

Paris, May 17, 1960, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Invitation to Khrushchev for First Summit Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The President
  • Secretary Herter
  • Colonel Walters
• U.K.
  • Prime Minister Macmillan
  • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
  • Mr. Zulueta
• France
  • President de Gaulle
  • M. Couve de Murville
  • M. Andronikov

The President began by speaking of the large amount of construction he had seen in the Paris area.

General de Gaulle said that the center of Paris was heavily built but that there was a great deal of construction underway in the suburbs. He said he had not seen the President since Washington and he had really been struck by the tremendous amount of construction in New York, and that this new construction was light and airy and did not suffocate the city. San Francisco was also a great city, and New Orleans was visibly forging ahead.

At this point General de Gaulle was handed a press release¹ concerning an impromptu press conference Khrushchev had held on the sidewalk in front of the Soviet Embassy in which he had said he was going home but would hold a press conference before he went.

The President said that when Khrushchev had begun his personal attack on him he had been inclined to let his Dutch temper get the better of him but he had decided to say nothing and not even look at Khrushchev. The President said that both he and Mr. Macmillan had been greatly impressed by the skill and dignity with which General de Gaulle had handled an extremely awkward situation. It could not have been handled better.

At this point Mr. Harold Macmillan, accompanied by Mr. Zulueta, arrived and joined the two Presidents.

General de Gaulle said that he might call the conference and if Khrushchev did not show up he could make a statement saying that it was obvious that the Summit conference could not be held.

Mr. Macmillan said he felt this was the most dignified way to bring the conference to an end, as they could not stay around Paris indefinitely as they all had work to do.

General de Gaulle asked what would happen if Khrushchev came and began going over his statement again.

Mr. Macmillan said that he could make perfectly clear that they were there to discuss only matters that had been agreed for discussion at the Summit.

The President said he agreed with this.

Mr. Macmillan repeated that he felt this was the most dignified way to conclude the matter. He wondered whether they could not call in the Foreign Ministers to help draft a statement which President Eisenhower had suggested be made.

The President and General de Gaulle agreed to send for the Foreign Ministers and this was done.

General de Gaulle again asked what they would do if Khrushchev came and said he wanted apologies.

Mr. Macmillan said he could be ruled out of order, that they had met to discuss matters of substance.

The President said he felt Khrushchev was in effect challenging his right to be there. We had never been guilty of aggression, and if there was anything aggressive it was Khrushchev’s enormous spy network in our country.

General de Gaulle said that the Soviet delegation had asked for the main hall at the Palais de Chaillot for a press conference by Khrushchev this afternoon.

The President said that General de Gaulle might say that he had taken note of Khrushchev’s statement at the preliminary meeting yesterday, and since the United States delegation refuses to state that the U–2 overflight was an act of aggression it followed that the Soviets could not attend.

Mr. Macmillan said he did not like this as it would put the onus on the President. If a Summit meeting was called to discuss matters on the agenda and Khrushchev refused to attend this would, from our point of view, be a positive way of handling the matter.

The President said he was somewhat disturbed at General de Gaulle’s suggestion that Khrushchev might come and make another scene.

General de Gaulle said that this would be unfortunate and again offered to call the meeting this afternoon to study the questions which were on the agenda and had been agreed by the four participants. If Khrushchev accepted they could meet at 5:00. If he said no, he could not come because he had not received excuses, he could note his refusal and declare the conference adjourned and at 6:00 the Western powers might issue a statement.

Mr. Macmillan thought this would be a good idea.

The President said that he was somewhat fearful that Khrushchev might say he would come because the statement of the President about halting the over-flights constituted in effect an apology. He might be clever enough to do this.

General de Gaulle expressed great doubt that Khrushchev would come.

The President said General de Gaulle could make it clear in the invitation that the meeting was not another preliminary meeting but an actual Summit meeting.

General de Gaulle said that he could do this and if Khrushchev still refused we could see what we would then do. He felt it would be better if the invitation were issued before lunch, and if Khrushchev did not come they could then issue a statement.

Mr. Macmillan expressed the hope that such a statement would indicate that the Paris meeting could not be held but not necessarily exclude the whole idea of future summits and that the meeting was simply adjourned.

The President said the statement could say that the present Paris conference could not take place, and that in this situation this conference was “terminée.”

Mr. Macmillan thought that they might meet again at 3:00.

General de Gaulle agreed with this.

The President said there were some possibilities for us to do some smart things ourselves. It might be smart not to reply until after he holds his press conference.

General de Gaulle said that in the statement it could be indicated that the three other powers were ready to go ahead with the Summit talks but that Khrushchev was not.

At this point Secretary of State Herter, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville and Foreign Secretary Lloyd joined the meeting.

General de Gaulle said that although he did not personally believe it, the Soviet delegation might decide to go ahead with the Summit without discussing the U–2 incident. He did not feel this was imaginable in any way, but he felt that the three other powers should be ready to state why the conference could not go ahead and prepare our position on what we would do. General de Gaulle said he was perfectly ready.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed with him that he should send a message to all the delegations, including the Soviets, saying that the meeting of the previous day would not be considered as having worked on the Summit but was a preparatory meeting, and that at 3:00 today a Summit meeting would be held to discuss those subjects which had been agreed by the participants in bilateral conversation for discussion at the Summit and only these matters would be discussed.

General de Gaulle understood that the President and the Prime Minister agreed with the thought that this be done at 3:00 this afternoon. The Russians would reply either that they could not unless they got apologies and then he would state that the meeting could not take place, or the Soviet delegation would reply that they would come and join the negotiations. If they started out to make a statement on the incident again, he would say that this subject was not on the agenda and if they refuse to go any further he would likewise take note that the meeting could not be held.

The President said there was a possibility that they were clever enough, since their position was well known, to state that his acceptance constituted a recognition by us that we had committed an act of aggression and an apology. The wording of General de Gaulle’s invitation should make it plain that this was not the case. After some thought the President said that perhaps he was being overcautious.

General de Gaulle said he could make it quite clear that this meeting was being held to discuss items on the agenda for the Summit, not other questions like the U–2 incident.

The President said that after thinking the matter over he was sure if the Soviets wanted to “validate the line” that his acceptance was an apology they would have to do this in their acceptance to General de Gaulle in writing. The President went on to say that Mr. Herter had brought up a matter that was worthy of consideration. Since it was well known that there had been bilateral talks between General de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan, and Mr. Macmillan and himself,² the issuance of a call for a meeting at 3:00 might indicate that here had been some change in the situation since yesterday. This was not the case. He felt that in drafting the summons for the 3:00 meeting care should be taken to indicate that there had been no change.

Mr. Macmillan said that General de Gaulle indicated on the previous day that we should give ourselves 24 hours to think things over.

Mr. Herter still expressed concern lest there arise a feeling that there had been some change behind the scene since yesterday.

General de Gaulle said that he could say that in view of the statements at the preliminary meeting he nevertheless felt it necessary to verify if a Summit meeting would be held to discuss questions on the agenda, and he therefore asked them to come to the Elysée at 3:00 to discuss those subjects which had been agreed for inclusion at the Summit.

The President said that we would agree with that but it might be simpler to say that in the light of the agreement at the preliminary meeting to hold a session on the following day, General de Gaulle could say he was calling the first Summit meeting.

Mr. Herter hoped that it could be made clear that there had been no change in the situation.

General de Gaulle said there had been no agreement on the previous day that a Summit would be held.

Mr. Macmillan said that this was true. He said that if Khrushchev did not appear we could consider this as adjourning the conference. He hoped that any statement would be carefully drafted to make it clear that this Paris meeting could not be held without excluding the idea of conferences in the future.

General de Gaulle said he would merely take note of the fact that a conference could not be held at this time under these conditions.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville then read out a draft invitation to Khrushchev, the wording of which would be the same to the other two Chiefs of Government:

“Having noted the statements made during the preliminary meeting of the 16th of May, I consider it necessary to ascertain whether the Summit conference can begin the examination of those questions we had agreed to discuss.

“l suggest that we meet today, the 17th of May, at 3:00 p.m. at the Elysée, with President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan to discuss these questions.”

General de Gaulle said that they could ask the Foreign Ministers to prepare quickly a statement that could be issued by the three of them if there were no meeting.

Secretary Herter said a joint statement, and the others agreed.

There was some discussion of the possibility of publishing this letter. General de Gaulle said that while they were not courteous we should be and not publish it before we received an answer.

The President said he could merely indicate that he had received an invitation from General de Gaulle to attend a first Summit meeting at 3:00 to discuss matters that had been agreed for inclusion in the agenda.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd asked where the Foreign Ministers could meet, and General de Gaulle replied at the Quai d’Orsay. It was agreed they could bring several advisers.

General de Gaulle then said that if Khrushchev was coming he would notify them. If not, they could still meet and note that he was not there and possibly meet again after his press conference.

Mr. Macmillan felt that the statement should be ready for issuance about the same time as Khrushchev held his press conference. Otherwise, we would have the difficulty of catching up with him.

The President suggested that we might meet at 3:00 and have the statement ready at that time.

General de Gaulle agreed, as did Mr. Macmillan, and the meeting then concluded.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–1760. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Walters and approved by Goodpaster on May 18 and in S on May 20. The conversation took place at the Elysée Palace. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in Secto 37 from Paris, May 17 at midnight. (Ibid., 396.1–PA/5–1760) For two other brief accounts of this conversation, see Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 208 and Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 556.
1. Not further identified. Regarding the press conference, which took place at 9:25 a.m., see Cmd. 1052, p. 10.
2. See Document 173.