Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

172. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/18

Paris, May 16, 1960, 6 p.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • Mr. Kohler
  • Mr. Hillenbrand
• Germany
  • Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe

SUBJECT

• Summit Situation

In response to Ambassador Grewe’s initial inquiry, Mr. Kohler said that the Summit Meeting appeared to be fairly definitely dead. One question which the three Foreign Ministers might put up to the Heads of Government was whether it would be a good idea for President de Gaulle simply to summon a meeting of the Summit Conference tomorrow morning. If the Soviets, as seemed likely, refused to come to such a meeting, it would help the West to dramatize their withdrawal. Mr. Kohler noted that the President had made clear he would not see Khrushchev alone or attend another so-called pre-Summit meeting with him. Mr. Kohler pointed out that the Soviet and American press releases of this afternoon¹ corresponded very largely to the statements made by Khrushchev and the President at the meeting this morning.

Mr. Kohler confirmed that no definite departure time had yet been set for the President. There was a general feeling on the Western side that there should be a NATO meeting with all three Foreign Ministers present. Probably the best time for this would be Wednesday morning. [3-2/2 lines of source text not declassified] While there was some speculation in the American Delegation as to what the Soviets might do next, such as moving on Germany, there was no conclusive evidence pointing one way or the other. Ambassador Grewe noted that the Soviet Press Officer, in answer to an inquiry this afternoon, had said that it was not certain that the status quo on Germany and Berlin would be preserved during the period of 6 to 8 months which the Soviets had said should elapse before another Summit meeting.

In response to Ambassador Grewe’s question as to American thinking about Soviet motivation, Mr. Kohler said there was no question but that Khrushchev’s basic statement had been written in Moscow. It was still not possible to arrive at any definite conclusions, but there was a general feeling that the Soviets had begun to realize that they were not going to get anything on Germany and Berlin. The recent speeches by the Secretary and Under Secretary Dillon,² as well as reports about Western firmness and unity as manifested in the Four-Power Working Group and elsewhere, had presumably confirmed this impression. There was also no doubt that the Soviets were very annoyed by the penetration of their territory made by our plane. This had apparently strengthened elements in the Soviet Union which opposed what they regarded as Khrushchev’s soft policy. The Soviets might also have thought that the incident provided a good opportunity for dividing the Allied front. The West now had to drop its Summit preparations and work harder on contingency planning, Mr. Kohler noted. Ambassador Grewe said that his theory was that the Soviets were trying to change the sequence of events. Now the peace treaty would come first, then the crisis, and finally the Summit meeting during the climax of the American electoral campaign. He felt that the two urgent problems for the West now were how to react to Soviet signature of a peace treaty with the GDR and how to strengthen contingency planning.

In reply to Ambassador Grebe’s question, Mr. Kohler indicated that he thought the American public would support the President’s position unanimously. The break-down of the Summit might mean an intensified defense effort on our part, with more funds being made available for military expenditures.

Ambassador Grewe asked whether there was any inclination to attempt to salvage the Summit meeting. Mr. Kohler said the British were reluctant to think that it had come to an end. However, since the publication of Khrushchev’s statement, they probably felt it was hopeless. They were naturally anxious that everything be done to make it clear that the Soviets were responsible for the collapse.

In response to Ambassador Grewe’s question as to whether a tripartite Western statement were planned, Mr. Kohler indicated that this had not been specifically discussed. The others had been informed yesterday of the President’s intention to make a public statement if the situation required. This question might be discussed by the Heads of Government this afternoon.³ Ambassador Grewe said he thought it was necessary to have such a tripartite statement. Mr. Kohler agreed it would be useful and asked whether the Ambassador felt that a NATO statement should also be made. Ambassador Grewe said something was needed for tomorrow. If a statement were issued, it would be useful in providing guidance for a possible later NATO statement.

Ambassador Grewe asked when the President might be expected to leave Paris. Mr. Kohler said it had not really been discussed, but his own advice would be that the President should stay longer than Khrushchev. If the latter left on Tuesday afternoon, that would mean the President might remain until Wednesday morning. Ambassador Grewe indicated that Foreign Minister von Brentano would be back in Paris tomorrow and would be at the disposition of the other three if wanted. Mr. Kohler said he probably would wish to stay on for the Wednesday NATO meeting. While not suggesting that a formal Ministerial Council be convened, it might be useful to suggest that such Foreign Ministers as could make it come to Paris for the Wednesday session. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Zorlu, is already in town.

Mr. Kohler noted that some people actually seemed to be experiencing a certain amount of relief. Laloy of the French Foreign Office estimated that the West had gained 6 to 8 months on Berlin, since he assumed the Soviets would not move during this period. Mr. Kohler said he did not believe we could assume this automatically to be the case. He was inclined, however, to think that the Soviets had overplayed their hand. The West might not come out too badly as far as public opinion was concerned. Ambassador Grewe injected this would be the case at least in the United States. Mr. Kohler said he thought also in other countries.

Mr. Kohler concluded by mentioning that both De Gaulle and Macmillan had given gratifying strong support to the President on the overflights question. The meeting this morning had been held in a tense atmosphere. There had been no handshakes, only curt nods of greeting.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on May 17. The conversation took place at the U.S. Embassy. For another German view of the reasons for the summit collapse, see Grewe, Ruckblenden, pp. 437–439.
1. For text of the President’s statement released after the meeting, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 429–430; for text of Khrushchev’s statement at the meeting which was released to the press by the Soviet delegation during the afternoon on May 16, see Document 168.
2. For text of Herter’s address to the National Association of Broadcasters on April 4, see Department of State Bulletin, April 25, 1960, pp. 635–640; regarding Dillon’s speech on April 20, see Document 130.
3. No meeting of the Heads of Government took place during the afternoon of Monday, May 16. Since Hillenbrand drafted the memorandum of conversation on May 17, presumably he was referring to the meeting at 3 p.m. on that day. See Document 178.