Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

98. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

Paris, March 6, 1959, 9 p.m.

3238. Re Embtel 3194.¹ Couve de Murville asked me to call at 7 this evening. Joxe was also present. Foreign Minister said that telegram had been sent to Alphand instructing him to inform Department that letter to NATO concerning withdrawal of French Mediterranean Fleet from NATO control was being delivered this afternoon.² Couve de Murville said in view of my conversation with Joxe March 4³ he also wanted to tell me personally as he had not been able to see me on that date.

Foreign Minister said:

1. He hoped move would not be taken too dramatically.

2. It would be handled as Cosmic and as far as France concerned there would be no publicity.

3. France was motivated in this move entirely by French reasons, the Algerian situation.

4. He emphasized that only French Mediterranean fleet was concerned and not rest of French fleet, which would continue to be under NATO control.

5. He referred specifically to the Belleau Wood and said that as this ship had been lent by United States it had special status and obviously would be one of first to cooperate with NATO fleet operations in time of war.⁴

6. After Ely–Norstad consultation (see Embtel 3222)⁵ French realized that even if French Mediterranean fleet were given same status as United States Sixth Fleet it would still be subject to NATO call and this did not give France sufficient freedom of action.

7. France’s interests naturally north-south Mediterranean routes rather than east-west.

8. He definitely thought there should be coordination of how French fleet and other NATO naval forces would cooperate in time of war.

I reviewed most of arguments which Acting Secretary presented Alphand March 3⁶ and in replying my suggestion that this move would undoubtedly leak, since there were 15 nations in NATO and it would have very bad psychological effect at this time of Berlin–German problem, he admitted it probably would leak though he hoped it would not. He also here again emphasized importance to France of Algerian problem.

When I said that it would be setting bad example which other nations might be tempted to follow, Foreign Minister replied that he didn’t think any nations in NATO today had problem similar to Algeria, certainly not Norwegians, Danes, et cetera.

When I asked if one might expect decision to be reversed if Algerian war terminated, he referred to France’s larger problems in Africa as whole and possibility of Soviet move in that region which was not covered by NATO. I said that in my opinion we all had one concern today and only one, USSR, and hence our concern this area was the same.

In summary, Foreign Minister emphasized that action was inspired entirely because of French problem and in actuality it did not make very great difference and he hoped that it would not become exaggerated or misinterpreted.

Foreign Minister was his usual calm, relaxed, deliberate self, but I didn’t feel that either he or Joxe was too happy in giving me this report.

Lyon

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–659. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London.
1. In telegram 3194 from Paris, March 4, Lyon reported that he had tried to persuade Joxe to prevent the French from withdrawing their Mediterranean fleet from NATO by reiterating the arguments used by Herter to Alphand on March 3. (Ibid.)
2. See footnote 1, Document 97.
3. See footnote 1 above.
4. The Belleau Wood was a small aircraft carrier lent by the United States to France on September 5, 1953, under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program for the specific purpose of antisubmarine warfare and was earmarked for NATO.
5. Telegram 3222 from Paris, March 6, reported that Ely told Norstad the evening of March 5 that the French decision to remove the fleet from NATO was irrevocable and that Norstad’s suggestion that the French fleet be put on the same basis as the U.S. Sixth Fleet was not enough to satisfy the French Government. Norstad replied it was a political matter of gravest importance and that if the decision were final, French and NATO political authorities should consult on the method of handling it. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–659)
6. See Part 1, Document 194.