Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

194. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

March 3, 1959.

SUBJECT

• French Fleet Withdrawal from NATO

PARTICIPANTS

• The Acting Secretary
• Ambassador Hervé Alphand, French Embassy
• M. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
• M. Pierre Landy, Counselor, French Embassy
• Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, EUR
• Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

The Acting Secretary said that the Secretary had told the French that we would consider a proposal from them if they had any specific suggestions regarding the status of the French Mediterranean fleet. We had heard nothing specific from them at all until we were now presented with a fait accompli by their decision to withdraw their Mediterranean fleet from NATO entirely, both in peacetime and in wartime. He stressed that we viewed this development seriously. In the first place, if there were a leak the psychological effects would be extremely bad. It would inevitably give the impression that the alliance was breaking up just at a time when unity was needed, especially because of the Berlin crisis. Furthermore, the effects on the other NATO members would be most unfortunate and might even cause the disintegration of the alliance.

Ambassador Alphand said that he had mentioned this matter to the Secretary he believed on January 22 and had said that the French wished to change the status of their Mediterranean fleet to give it a national status.¹ He said that practically this meant very little change. The Acting Secretary stated that we are particularly distressed because of the psychological effects of their action and noted that we were extremely upset about this matter.

Ambassador Alphand said that the principal reason for the French action was also psychological. He believed that the French action stemmed primarily from concern over the Algerian situation and the fact that France and the US had different policies in North Africa. As a result of this difference in policy it was necessary for France to have national control of her fleet. He added that in peacetime the fleet would continue to join in NATO maneuvers and would cooperate with her allies in wartime. He said the French believed they had already indicated these changes were to be made.

The Acting Secretary said that this matter had indeed been discussed but that it had been our clear understanding that if the French wished to change the status of the fleet they would make a proposal in this sense to the appropriate NATO commander. He said it was difficult to understand this action which had been taken with no consultation.

The French Ambassador said that there had been broad consultation on this subject both here and between the Secretary and General DeGaulle in Paris.² He thought we knew this development would occur even if we did not know the exact timing. He said France was certainly not thinking of leaving NATO. He added this latest move was a reflection of the fact that France preferred “cooperation” to “integration”. The Acting Secretary noted that there had not been much cooperation in this particular instance. Ambassador Alphand said he meant cooperation between the fleets.

The French Ambassador said he would report the Acting Secretary’s statements to Paris. He said he thought the problem was mainly one of form and presentation rather than substance.

The Acting Secretary said we had been shocked when we had heard of the French decision. He said this raised a question as to whether tripartite talks should be continued. He said these talks, although they had been spaced out over the past months, had, he thought, added to our over-all relationship with France. He though the most recent French action was the antithesis in spirit of tripartitism.

Mr. Merchant added that we had no idea that the French intended to withdraw their fleet from NATO in wartime. He said that when Prime Minister Debré called on General Norstad in January the latter had asked the Prime Minister to submit to the NATO authorities any suggestions which the French might have for changing the status of their fleet.³ We had thought that they wished to change it to something like the status of the US Sixth Fleet and not to remove it from NATO entirely. He thought there had been agreement that this was a complex question which should be discussed in NATO. The Acting Secretary stressed again that there had been no specific French proposal made to us or to NATO.

The French Ambassador said he thought that the basic cause of this had been the profound personal shock to General DeGaulle of the US abstention in the UN debate on Algeria.⁴

The French Ambassador said he had asked Paris to withhold delivery of the letter reporting the French decision at least until a report of his conversation with the Acting Secretary had reached Paris. He said he would cable the Acting Secretary’s views at once and concluded on this subject noting that this action did not mean French unwillingness to cooperate in NATO.⁵

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–359. Secret. Drafted by McBride and approved by Herter on March 12.
1. See Document 187.
2. See Part 2, Document 95.
3. See Document 198.
4. See footnote 2, Document 193.
5. Immediately following this meeting, McBride met with Alphand who, according to McBride, “was considerably upset.” Alphand said that his government had agreed to delay delivery of the French letter withdrawing the French fleet from NATO until after receipt of the report of his conversation with Herter. He thought that further delay of the letter would be possible if he could report that the status of the French fleet could be discussed on a tripartite basis in Washington. McBride replied that he believed the French proposal should first be made to NATO. After checking with Merchant, McBride later told Alphand that the matter should be referred to NATO. He reiterated what Dulles had told De Gaulle in Paris that the United States would give sympathetic consideration to any French proposal but first should discuss the matter with NATO. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–359)