Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

195. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower⁰

March 4, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Status of French Mediterranean Fleet

In a memorandum of February 28 we told you of the French intent to inform NATO that as of April the French Mediterranean fleet would no longer be earmarked for assignment to SACEUR in time of war.¹ Since that date we have been advised by the French Permanent Representative to NATO that this action would take place imminently, perhaps March 4. As of this moment, however, the French have not taken this step.

In anticipation of the French action I called in Ambassador Alphand yesterday to tell him that the United States viewed the proposed French action in NATO with great concern.² I said that I thought that the French were presenting us with a fait accompli rather than a proposal which we could study sympathetically. I stressed that the psychological and political repercussions, rather than the military implications, were most important, saying that an unfortunate impression would be created that the Western alliance was breaking up at a moment when unity is so vital because of the Berlin crisis. I also said long-term effects on NATO could be unfortunate. The proposed French action, I continued, raised the question of whether we should continue the tripartite talks we have been holding together with the British in Washington. Later I had Ambassador Alphand informed that I thought that implementation of this French decision would seem to remove the legislative justification for cooperation in the nuclear field, particularly with reference to a nuclear propulsion reactor for a submarine, which the French have requested.³ We have instructed our chargé Chargé in Paris to take the same line with Prime Minister Debre.⁴

The fact that the French have not submitted their paper to NATO may indicate that they are seriously considering the warnings we have given them. We know, however, that General De Gaulle’s decision to go ahead with this project was taken by him alone against the counsel of his political and military advisers. We dare not, therefore, be too optimistic.

We are consulting with the British on this matter. We have also passed on considerable information on this subject to our German allies inasmuch as Chancellor Adenauer is presently in Paris to see General De Gaulle and Prime Minister Debre.⁵

Christian A. Herter

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. The source text bears the President’s initials.
1. A note attached to the source text from John A. Calhoun, Director of the Executive Secretariat, to Goodpaster, March 4, states that the memorandum of February 28 is the one he sent Goodpaster containing information on the status of the French Mediterranean fleet. The February 28 memorandum contains a short report on the status of the French Mediterranean fleet and recent relevant telegrams from and to Paris on the subject. (ibid., Staff Secretary Records, NATO)
2. See Document 194.
3. Telegram 3195 to Paris, March 3, which summarized Herter’s talk with Alphand, March 3, also reported that later that day Herter had Merchant call Alphand to say that the execution of the French decision on the fleet matter would appear to remove legislative justification for a nuclear submarine and make congressional approval unlikely. “We felt French should be forewarned.” (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–359)
4. In telegram 3185 to Paris, March 3. (ibid.)
5. See footnote 1, Document 193.