Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

90. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

January 27, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Tripartite Talks

PARTICIPANTS

• M. Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
• M. Charles Lucet, French Minister
• Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
• Mr. Dean Brown, WE
• Mr. Thomas McKiernan, GER

Ambassador Alphand said that he had been requested to return to Paris immediately to discuss tripartite talks with French officials.¹ He expects to see General de Gaulle. He said that it is his impression that the Foreign Office understands the reasoning behind the Secretary’s proposal that the talks be primarily political.² Certain problems, he added, might be referred to the military but the discussions would be centered in the State Department.

The Ambassador then referred to the Mediterranean Command. He had advised Paris that the Secretary had said that this was a matter for military consideration. Paris had replied that it is also a political matter. France wants to change the status of its fleet in the Mediterranean to reflect the fact that its principal task is to defend lines of communication between France and North Africa. Such a change has, of course, important political implications. In the interest of making the French position clear, he believed that he must mention this again before his departure.

Personally, said the Ambassador, he believes that General de Gaulle was upset by the vote in Algeria (which had returned a group of deputies committed to integration and not truly representative of the Moslem masses).³ The Ambassador thought that this disappointment may be reflected in the General’s desire to change the status of the French fleet.

The Ambassador noted his belief that de Gaulle is heading in the right direction so far as Algeria is concerned. The new Assembly is largely for “integration” which de Gaulle opposes as he does independence. Despite de Gaulle’s clemency actions, terrorism continues. These facts result in a belief that considerable time will be required before a solution is attained.

(The French position on Mediterranean Command arrangements appears to be developing into a major political matter, affecting US/UK/French relations. The French seem to want to avoid discussing this matter with General Norstad until they have tripartite recognition of the validity of their claim that French Naval Forces should be under some sort of independent French command and that the mission of these forces be related to the French defense of North Africa, particularly Algeria.⁴ In addition to de Gaulle’s historic views on the necessity of French commanders for French forces there is intermixed French political necessities which seem to include the search for ways to convince the political integrationists and their allies among the military that France will not “abandon” Algeria. This revamping of the command arrangements appears to be regarded by de Gaulle as a step in that direction.)

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5/1–2759. Secret. Drafted by Brown and initialed by Murphy.
1. As a result of Alphand’s return to Paris January 28–February 2, the tripartite talks were postponed until February 3. For Alphand’s account of his conversations with de Gaulle, see L’Etonnement, pp. 300–301.
2. See Document 89.
3. Reference is to the election of deputies to the new 585-member French National Assembly held November 23 and 30. De Gaulle announced on October 10 that Algeria would be given 66 deputies in this new Assembly.
4. In Polto 2046 from Paris, January 22, Nolting wrote that Spaak had told him that his information indicated that French lack of cooperation in NATO was “designed to increase French bargaining power in Tripartite talks.” (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5/1–2259)