89. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Tripartite Talks
PARTICIPANTS
- M. Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
- M. Charles Lucet, French Minister
- The Secretary
- Mr. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
- Mr. McBride, WE
- Mr. Brown, WE
Ambassador Alphand noted that the first substantive tripartite talk would take place before the end of January and would deal with the Far East.1 This discussion, he continued, should deal with the strategic aspect of the situation and thus become a first step towards what de Gaulle has in mind. Political consultation is but a part of de Gaulle’s proposals. The second part is the subject of just received instructions which are of such importance that their contents had to be personally passed to the Secretary.
There are three parts to these instructions, continued the Ambassador. The first is the need for cooperation in world strategy. The defense of the free world is based primarily on the nuclear deterrent. France has no defense without it; it is in American hands.
The Secretary then stated that American nuclear power, as he has often said, is in trust for the free world. The U.S. is always ready to discuss conditions as to how it is to be used and to receive suggestions. Possession of a nuclear deterrent capability is not possible for all nations; it imposes an exceedingly heavy economic burden on the U.S. It must be treated as a common asset. We are quite prepared to talk about it.
The Ambassador then continued from his instructions, saying that General de Gaulle believes defense is a global problem and that it is [Page 165] impossible to separate one area from another. They must be coordinated. The French, therefore propose a procedural suggestion. UK and French members of the Standing Group together with a US-designated officer should study (a) coordination among theaters of operations; (b) how the deterrent is to be used. It would be impossible for all free nations to study these matters together. The three, US, UK, and France, are or will be atomic powers; it is natural for them to work together. The United States is indeed the trustee but, as the final decision on use will be made in a matter of minutes, there must be preliminary general appreciation of nuclear defense. Details of this could be studied by the above-mentioned group. It would be a personal mission apart from their NATO responsibilities.
The third point, the Ambassador continued, is a specific NATO problem. It is of less moment than the other two. France does not want to imply that NATO is no good or that the Treaty should be changed. The structure of NATO is not, however, a part of the Treaty. It has evolved since as the result of agreement of the governments. The division of commands and the role of French forces within this structure are what concern France.
The Ambassador said that at the time of the EDC debate General de Gaulle had said that armies to be effective must have the belief that they are defending their own soil.2 They would lose effectiveness if they feel they serve under anonymous command. French remarks in this connection today are not directed at arrangements for Central Europe but rather at the Mediterranean. There the large French fleet does not have the same status as the U.S. Sixth Fleet. France wants it to have this. This does not mean, of course, that there would not be cooperation between the fleets.
To sum up, said the Ambassador, France attaches great importance to coordination, believes the nuclear problem must be tripartitely considered, and wishes changes in the Mediterranean command structure. General de Gaulle has said that progress of the Atlantic alliance is linked to discussion of these matters. If these discussions are fruitful, the alliance will become more effective.
The Secretary replied that he was not competent to talk on the third point (Mediterranean Command arrangements). He suggested that this is a subject for discussion by the appropriate military authorities.
As for the idea of political strategic talks, he said, the French should consider seriously the advisability of exploring the general subject with the State Department, which is the organization which recommends [Page 166] foreign policy decisions in which France is interested. He expressed willingness to talk freely and frankly with the French.
The Ambassador said that it is more than information for which the French search. It is the adoption of common views.
The Secretary said that if the French do not like US views then they can seek to have them changed. If changes are to be made, they will be done through discussions with those who shape foreign policy. He repeated his suggestion that France seek common understanding through political discussions. He noted his recent conversation with French journalist Lagrange in which he had said that the French tend to take a logical, schematic approach to problems while the Anglo-Saxons are more pragmatic.3 The two points of view, however, can be married.
The Ambassador wondered how the NATO theater could be coordinated with the Arctic. This would seem a problem for the military to discuss. He for one would not be competent to discuss military planning for Africa.
The Secretary replied that if there were general nuclear war there would be little need to worry about local theaters. The US and the USSR would be quite devastated. There is, of course, the possibility of a limited sort of aggression which would not lead to general nuclear war, but, as far as general war is concerned, it will be survival which will be the main problem.
The Ambassador pressed towards the point of possible eventual military talks after political decisions are made. He then said that General de Gaulle seeks the same relationship with the President and Prime Minister Macmillan that Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin had had. Only this time he wants Khrushchev rather than de Gaulle kept out.
Mr. Murphy inquired if the French were seeking operational planning.
The Ambassador said that, on the contrary, it was broad consideration of global problems that they want.
At the conclusion of the meeting Mr. Murphy informed Ambassador Alphand that we would be ready to start the Far East talks on the afternoon of January 29.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5/1–2259. Secret. Drafted by Brown and approved by Greene on January 30.↩
- At a working-level tripartite meeting on January 14, it was tentatively decided the tripartite consultation would be held the last week in January to discuss three items: 1) a report on the U.S. and British reactions to the French request for parallel military talks; 2) the Far East; and 3) other procedural matters including means of informing other countries of the discussions. When the French representative asked if military experts would take part in the talks on the Far East, the U.S. and British representatives expressed a desire to avoid this in the first session and to leave the question of future participation by the military for discussion in the meeting itself. This discussion is summarized in telegram 2501 to Paris, January 15. (Ibid., 700.5/1–1559) Summaries of other preparatory meetings are ibid., 700.5.↩
- Debate about the European Defense Community continued in the National Assembly from May 27, 1952, when the treaty was signed, to August 30, 1954, when the Assembly rejected the plan. de Gaulle’s statement has not been further identified.↩
- This conversation has not been further identified.↩
- In a January 22 memorandum of conversation, Brown noted that after this meeting with Dulles and Murphy, Alphand said privately that he understood fully the point that the Secretary had made about the advisability of centering discussions in the Department of State. The Ambassador said that unfortunately French officials had the illusion that real U.S. policies were made in the secret rooms of the Pentagon and they wanted to get into those rooms. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5/1–2259) For Dulles’ report to the President on his conversation with Alphand and Eisenhower’s reply, see Part 1, Documents 187 and 188.↩