67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France0
1594. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Following is summary Secretary’s talk with French Ambassador October 31 on deGaulle letter based on uncleared memo of conversation:1
Alphand said French idea was not extend geographic responsibility of NATO. They rather wanted strategic military planning on [Page 114] tripartite basis covering such areas as Africa and Middle East as well as political planning. Other NATO parties would not be directly involved. Alphand added French entirely clear tripartite decisions could not engage others. Principal French thought was organize more effectively consultation among three powers who shared extra-European responsibilities and who were (or were about to be) atomic powers.
With regard to procedural aspects, French hoped deGaulle memorandum would remain unpublished but thought line developed in foregoing paragraph could serve for public presentation if necessary. Regarding possibility publicity re tripartite talks if such talks held, French thought there was no reason publicize talks but neither should we seek to hide them. There were ample precedents for tripartite talks in connection with disarmament, German reunification, summit matters, etc. We would simply say deGaulle had addressed message to US and UK, and three nations directly concerned were discussing it.
Secretary thought paper should be developed on public line re tripartite talks. This should refer to deGaulle initiative and fact matter had been discussed with Germans, Italians and Spaak. He thought we should indicate talks here were part of series of exchanges re problem of organizing free world more effectively. Alphand pointed out French would not discuss matter in same terms with Germans and Italians as with UK and US. He thought it would be difficult to speak of tripartite talks as “part of a series”.
Secretary noted deGaulle memorandum as now interpreted had nothing to do with NATO and that tripartite framework was justified by French on different grounds. Alphand said NATO might be involved but neither treaty area nor text would be altered. Main stress was on secret tripartite arrangements covering area outside NATO. Tripartite decisions could be reported to NAC if necessary. Secretary concluded French were now presenting quite different approach which, while eliminating certain problems, raises others, and he would wish consider more fully. He noted French idea for tripartite war plans in areas such as Africa and Middle East would raise serious problems.
Alphand inquired if he could report Secretary was not rejecting tripartite talks. Secretary replied he was not rejecting tripartite talks but was considering problem of how to explain them. He added another problem in this worldwide planning operation was that in areas such as Far East only US able and willing make real contribution. If new French approach implied they were willing create power in FE and accept responsibility there, we would be most interested. Alphand said one of French points was that in present situation US could take decisions alone in Far East for instance which might engage France. Secretary noted that under this criterion, many other nations also affected, and this seemed hardly appropriate yardstick. Alphand repeated basic [Page 115] French thesis was that tripartitism justified as including those countries with extra-Atlantic responsibilities and nuclear potentiality. Secretary indicated view US would remain only Free World power able carry financial burden having significant nuclear capability. Furthermore there was question conventional capability in which French contribution greatly reduced as result Algerian war.